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Abstract 
 
 
Nearly 25 years since its passage, the Ontario Class Proceedings Act has become one of 
the most frequently debated procedural mechanisms of its kind. The CPA came about 
following the release of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee (AGAC) Report in 
1990. None of the current narratives explain how this Report pulled together so many 
divergent interests where previous attempts had failed. My thesis answers this question 
with reference to the historical sources and the legal, political and social changes that 
took place throughout this period. 
 
This thesis also highlights the unique nature of the AGAC consultation process, which 
saw the negotiation of a consensus between the parties and the subsequent drafting of 
legislation. Although this process was effective, however, it led to compromises and a 
lack of democratic oversight that continue to affect the CPA and its goals of access to 
justice to this day. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
A. Overview 
 
On June 24, 1982, Attorney General Roy McMurtry announced to the Ontario legislature1 
that the Ontario Law Reform Commission had completed its Report on Class Actions.2 
The result of six years of deliberation and running to nearly 900 pages, the OLRC Report 
was widely hailed as one of the most comprehensive treatments of the subject, covering 
almost every aspect of class actions in exhaustive detail. It was accompanied by draft 
legislation and had been especially commissioned by the Attorney General, with 
McMurtry stating the following year that he regarded class action reform as “a high 
priority. I would expect to be discussing these issues … with my cabinet colleagues in the 
early autumn, with a view to possibly bringing first reading legislation before the House 
by the end of the year.”3 
The draft Act was never passed. The OLRC Report gathered dust on the shelves 
of the Ministry of the Attorney General for more than five years, while the Conservative 
government was voted out of power and a minority Liberal government took its place, 
continuing the reformist agenda initiated by the 1985 Liberal-NDP accord once it won a 
majority in 1987. While certain interest groups made submissions to the Ministry on the 
OLRC Report and class actions, virtually no steps were taken towards reform. Then, in 
1988 and with the strong backing of a Liberal government, Attorney General Ian Scott 
turned his activist eye towards class actions. Focused on the subject of access to justice, 
Scott saw class actions as a way of securing justice for consumers, environmental groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 32nd Parl, 2nd Sess (June 24, 1982) 
(Roy McMurtry), online: <http://www.olip.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/32-2/l087.htm> [Hansard, June 24, 
1982]. 
2 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 
1982) [OLRC Report]. 
3 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 32nd Parl, 3rd Sess (June 17, 1983) 
(Standing Committee on Administration of Justice, Estimates, Ministry of the Attorney General), J-173, 
Ontario Law Reform Commission files, Nov 1976 - Dec 1982, Project name: class actions, RG 4-66, 
BA77, Box No B380537, Archives of Ontario [Hansard June 17].	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and others on a mass scale, while levelling the playing field between plaintiffs and 
powerful defendants.  
Ready to help him was Michael Cochrane, an ambitious young lawyer who had 
joined the Policy Development Division of the Ministry of the Attorney General just 
weeks before Scott was appointed. The OLRC Report was just one of a number of 
projects that had been idling at the PDD, and Cochrane volunteered to dust it off and 
move it forward.4 Together, the two men were to create a unique consultation process that 
saw key stakeholders from business, the legal profession, consumer groups and 
environmental organizations gathered together in a mediation-style process. This process 
involved a political commitment to undertake reform; a commitment by the group to 
reach a consensus, or there would be no legislation at all; a public and up-front 
commitment by the participants to several written terms of reference, which were non-
negotiable and around which the legislation would be designed; and a willingness to 
discuss interests and goals, rather than lock into particular positions.5 Trained as a 
mediator, Michael Cochrane chaired the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on 
Class Action Reform and successfully negotiated a compromise between the vastly 
differing viewpoints at the table.6 The resulting consensus on such a controversial topic 
was a surprise to everyone, including Premier David Peterson.7 
However, it was not without compromise. The OLRC Report had called for 
various mechanisms to level the playing field for plaintiffs and remove procedural and 
substantive barriers to class actions. In particular, it recommended that traditional costs 
rules (“two-way” costs, where the losing party paid the successful party’s legal costs) 
should not apply to class actions. Instead, each party should pay its own costs, no matter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Interview with Michael Cochrane, June 28, 2016 [Cochrane Interview 2].	  
5 MG Cochrane, “The Process of Principled Negotiation of Public Policy: An Overview” (unpublished, on 
file with the author) at 5-8 [Cochrane Principled Negotiation]. This approach borrows from the Principled 
Negotiation approach developed by Roger Fisher et al in Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without 
Giving In, 2nd ed (New York: Penguin Books USA, 1991). There is some overlap between Cochrane’s 
paper and the principles outlined in Getting to Yes, including focusing on interests, not positions; and 
insisting on objective criteria for negotiation. These principles were based on the work of the Harvard 
Negotiation Project, and taught as part of the Project’s Program of Instruction for Lawyers (see notes in 
Getting to Yes). Cochrane was almost certainly exposed to these principles when he took part in negotiation 
training at Harvard in 1989. 
6 Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG), Policy Development Division, Report of the Attorney General’s 
Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1990) [AGAC 
Report or Advisory Committee Report]. 
7 Interview with Michael Cochrane, April 21, 2016 [Cochrane Interview 1]. 
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which party was successful (the “no-way costs” rule).8 Cochrane and Scott had originally 
proposed the same costs mechanism, and it was one of the Cabinet-approved terms of 
reference for the work of the Advisory Committee. However, it quietly fell to the 
wayside, as the business groups asserted their position that class actions should depart as 
little as possible from the traditional rules of litigation: for them, it was either traditional 
costs rules or no class actions at all. The no-way costs rule was one of the casualties of 
the compromise struck by the Advisory Committee, and the decision not to include it has 
been questioned by class actions lawyers to this day.9 
In addition, the consultation process led to compromises not only in the shape of 
reform itself, but also in the process by which the legislation was created. Some on the 
Advisory Committee – and also those who had not been invited to participate – 
questioned a process that only invited certain parties to the table, leaving other major 
stakeholders such as women’s groups out in the cold. The members of the Advisory 
Committee worked long and hard to agree to a compromise, and were justifiably proud of 
the consensus that resulted. Unfortunately, that pride took a proprietary turn in that they 
were unwilling to allow legislative counsel a free hand in drafting the statute. Due 
process would dictate that legislative counsel draft the legislation (using the Advisory 
Committee’s report as guidance only), which would then be debated by the legislature 
and any necessary amendments made. This was not the process followed for the Class 
Proceedings Act.10 In that case, legislative counsel drafted the statute clause by clause, in 
regular consultation with the members of the Advisory Committee, who signed off on the 
finished draft to ensure that it reflected their consensus. Before the Bill was tabled in the 
legislature, Scott made a commitment to the Advisory Committee that he would get the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Another costs mechanism put forward by various commentators, such as Neil Williams who prepared 
draft legislation for the Consumers’ Association of Canada in 1974, was that of “one-way costs”. Under 
this scheme, successful plaintiffs would be awarded costs by the court, but successful defendants would 
have to pay their own costs. NJ Williams, “Consumer Class Actions in Canada – Some Proposals for 
Reform” (1975) 13 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 at 51-52 [Williams 1975]; NJ Williams, Consumer Class 
Actions in Canada: A Study Prepared for the Consumers’ Association of Canada (Ottawa: Consumers’ 
Association of Canada, 1974) [Williams 1974]. 
9 Law Commission of Ontario, Review of Class Actions in Ontario: Issues to be Considered (Toronto: 
LCO, 2013), online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/class-actions-project-scope> at 9-11 [LCO 2013].	  
101992, SO 1992, c 6 [CPA]. The companion statute to the CPA is the Law Society Amendment Act (Class 
Proceedings Funding), 1992, SO 1992, c 7 [LSAA]. 
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Bill through the readings and committee stages with no substantive changes.11 That is 
what happened, and the CPA received Royal Assent on June 25, 1992 – with virtually no 
input from the democratically elected representatives of the Ontario Legislature. 
The process by which class action reform came about in Ontario, therefore, 
reflects an uncomfortable tension between an innovative mediation-style process that 
brought many of the major stakeholders to the table to negotiate a compromise, and the 
democratic process with its usual avenues of consultation and statute-creation. The 
departure from due process meant that certain compromises were never reviewed or 
approved by a wider audience – including crucial decisions on the issue of costs. While 
several Advisory Committee members argue that reform might never have come about 
otherwise,12 those compromises continue to affect class proceedings to the present day, 
often to the detriment of the philosophy of access to justice that underlies the CPA. 
 
B. Why a historical study of the CPA? 
 
Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since class action reform came about in Ontario. 
Since then, the CPA has become one of the most frequently debated procedural 
mechanisms of its kind. Plaintiff lawyers proclaim the CPA as the bastion of access to 
justice, while defence lawyers emphasize its safeguards against frivolous use and the 
requirements that must be met before class actions can proceed.  
At the same time, the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO)13 has begun a wide-
ranging review of the Act, acknowledging that, “[i]t is unclear whether the CPA is 
working as intended and many unforeseen challenges associated with it have become 
fodder for discussion in conferences, academic papers, professional associations, social 
media and other commentary.”14 
 In light of the LCO’s review, a study of the genesis of the CPA is timely. By 
examining the origins of the Act, the controversies to which it gave rise and the views 
that were current at the time of its passage, clarity can be brought to issues that are 
currently under the LCO’s spotlight, as well as the manner in which the CPA is used and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7. 
12 Ibid; interview with Advisory Committee member, April 13, 2016 [AC Member Interview]. 
13 The LCO is the successor to the Ontario Law Reform Commission.	  
14 LCO 2013, supra note 9, at 2. 
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interpreted by stakeholders today. For example, one subject of the LCO’s review is the 
issue of costs. Numerous commentators have questioned why the Attorney General’s 
Advisory Committee did not follow the OLRC’s recommendations on no-way costs. In 
the case of Bayens v Kinross Gold Corporation,15 Justice Perell stated that the loser-pays 
regime creates a strong economic disincentive for plaintiffs to bring claims. He 
concluded that, “[i]t may be wise for the Legislature to revisit whether any of this is what 
it intended when it rejected the Law Reform Commission’s recommendation that class 
actions not be governed by the loser pays principle.”16 Justice Strathy came to a similar 
conclusion in the 2011 case of Dugal v Manulife Financial Corporation:17 
 
One of the important goals of class proceedings is to provide access to 
justice to large groups of people who have claims that cannot be 
economically pursued individually. In Ontario, the costs rules applicable to 
ordinary actions apply to class proceedings – the loser pays. The costs of 
losing can be astronomical – well beyond the reach of all but the powerful 
and very wealthy – not exactly the group the legislature had in mind when 
the C.P.A. was enacted.18 
 
This discussion on the subject of costs can be informed by a review of the history of the 
CPA, and especially the deliberations of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee and 
the subsequent passage of the legislation. These deliberations provide vital insight as to 
why the Advisory Committee rejected the OLRC’s recommendations on costs. A review 
of these reasons will inform any review of the CPA today. 
 A review of the history of the statute will also reveal the political influences that 
shaped it. Economic theory has shed light on the politicization of law reform by positing 
two grounds for legal change: public interest grounds (both economic – for example, 
correcting a market failure – and non-economic, such as fair distribution of resources or 
protection of vulnerable groups) and private interest grounds (for example, pressures 
from various interest groups).19 The literature on the history of class proceedings has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 2013 ONSC 4974 [Bayens]. 
16 Ibid at para 35.  
17 2011 ONSC 1785. Both Dugal and Bayens, supra note 15, are cited in LCO 2013, supra note 9. 
18 Ibid at para 27.	  
19 See, for example: A Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994) [Ogus]; RA Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation (New York: National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 1974), online: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w0041.pdf> [Posner]. 
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focused almost exclusively on public interest grounds. For example, both Shaun Finn and 
Bill Bogart state that class proceedings legislation came about as a response to market 
failure (in that small claims were not being litigated because they were not individually 
economically viable) and, to a certain extent, fair distribution of resources and 
paternalism (for example, to modify the behaviour of corporate and other actors who hold 
power and privilege, and to protect consumers and other relatively vulnerable groups).20 
However, a review of the historical record reveals that private interests were also at play 
in the creation of class proceedings legislation.21 While public interest grounds acted as 
the pull towards reform, private interests such as business groups acted as the pull away 
from it. Business groups opposed reform for as long as they could and, when reform 
seemed inevitable, sought to influence the creation of the legislation (most notably 
through the groups’ influence on the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee) to ensure 
that it was as conservative as possible. Business groups were able to do this because of 
the unique nature of the consultation process instituted by Ian Scott, as detailed above. 
My study will also present a more nuanced picture of the class proceedings debate 
than has been presented to date. For example, the widely accepted narrative is that, after 
more than two decades of controversy, an activist attorney general (Ian Scott) 
commissioned the 1990 Attorney General’s Advisory Committee Report and thereby 
“broke the logjam” that had prevented the advent of class actions.22 This narrative, 
however, does not explain how the report suddenly pulled together so many divergent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 S Finn, “In a Class All Its Own: The Advent of the Modern Class Action and its Changing Legal and 
Social Mission” (2005) 2:2 The Canadian Class Action Review 333 [Finn 2005]; S Finn, Étude d’un 
recours évolutif: redéfinir la procédure sui generis du recours collectif Québécois (2011, unpublished 
LLM thesis, on file at the Faculté de Droit, Université Laval) [Finn 2011]; WA Bogart, J Kalajdzic, I 
Matthews, “Class Actions in Canada: A National Procedure in a Multi-Jurisdictional Society?” (Report for 
The Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University, December 2007) [Bogart 2007]. 
21 While there is extensive work on the role of private interests in the conduct of class proceedings, 
virtually no scholarship exists on the role of these interests in the creation of the legislation itself. Examples 
of the former include: D Hensler et al, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain 
(Santa Monica: RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 1999); A Cassone and G Ramello, “Private, club and 
public goods: the economic boundaries of class action litigation” in JG Backhaus et al eds, The Law and 
Economics of Class Actions in Europe: Lessons from America (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2012) at 101 [Backhaus]; J Beisner et al, “Class Action ‘Cops’: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?” 
(2005) 57 Stanford Law Review 1441. 
22 Bogart 2007, supra note 20, at 3; MG Cochrane, “Conditions for Instituting Class Actions” in A Prujiner 
and J Roy eds, Class actions in Ontario and Quebec: Proceedings of the first Yves Pratte Conference 
(Montreal: Éditions Wilson & Lafleur Ltée, 1992) at 3 [Yves Pratte Conference]. Even Cochrane, Chair of 
the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, writes (without explanation) that the Committee’s delivery of 
a unanimous report occurred “much to everyone’s surprise”. 
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interests, and why those interests had not been reconciled before. My study will compare 
and contrast the OLRC and Advisory Committee Reports, as well as the surrounding 
debate and the changes in the wider legal culture, to answer precisely those questions. 
In light of the Law Commission of Ontario’s current review of the Act, the results 
of this research will be of assistance not only to the LCO but also to lawyers, other 
stakeholders, legal academics and policymakers. This detailed historical study, looking at 
class actions from an interdisciplinary perspective, will build upon and contribute to the 
existing literature on the history of class proceedings and access to justice.  
 
C. Literature Review 
 
For the most part, historical analyses of class action reform in Ontario have been limited 
to brief overviews involving the seminal Supreme Court of Canada decision in Naken,23 
in which the court severely narrowed the scope of class actions at common law; the 
OLRC Report; and the Advisory Committee Report.24 Slightly more detailed analyses 
have included the increased activity of the Ministry of the Attorney General leading up to 
the formation of the Advisory Committee, including Ian Scott’s Conference on Access to 
Civil Justice in Toronto in June 1988,25 and the recommendations on class actions of the 
Uniform Law Conference of Canada in August of that year.26 Such narratives can be 
found in the work of Michael Cochrane, chair of the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee, in the years following the enactment of the CPA.27 Cochrane’s narrative has, 
for the most part, been picked up uncritically by other commentators.28 
Very little academic scholarship has looked further than that. The relatively short 
articles that have touched on the history in Ontario generally cover the entire history of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 GM (Canada) v Naken, [1983] 1 SCR 72 [Naken]. 
24 See, for example, P Perell, “Class Action Devils and Angels” (2013) 30:3 Thomas M. Cooley Law 
Review 285 [Perell], although Justice Perell also discusses the roots of the class action in equity.  
25 Ministry of the Attorney General, Conference on access to civil justice: June 20-22, 1988 (Toronto: 
Ministry Of The Attorney General, 1988) [Access to Justice Conference]. 
26 Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC), Proceedings of the Seventieth Annual Meeting, held at 
Toronto, Ontario, August 1988, online: 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/images/stories/Past_Proceedings_PDF/1988ULCC0070.pdf> [ULCC 1988]. 
27 MG Cochrane, Class Actions: A Guide to the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 (Aurora: Canada Law Book 
Inc, 1993), at 1-4 [Cochrane 1993]; “Conditions for instituting class actions”, in Yves Pratte Conference, 
supra note 22, at 3. 
28 See, for example, MA Eizenga and E Davis, “A History of Class Actions: Modern Lessons from Deep 
Roots” (2011) 7 Canadian Class Action Review 3. 
	   8 
class actions, from their beginnings in the Court of Chancery to the present day. They 
treat each period in a fairly cursory manner – including the crucial period during which 
the device was actually being debated in Ontario.29 The more in-depth treatments stick 
largely to the case law on class actions. For example, John Kazanjian looks at the roots of 
class actions in equity, and then conducts a useful review of the case law in England, in 
Ontario and in other provinces.30 However, this is where his historical analysis ends, and 
the structure of the article clearly indicates that he is conducting such an analysis simply 
to answer present-day questions. This is largely true for other articles that look at the 
equitable beginnings of class actions and review the case law.31 While these provide a 
useful overview of how the Ontario courts handled class actions prior to the enactment of 
the CPA, they reflect a narrow view that legal history consists purely of prior court 
decisions. Such articles do not look at the wider context of the CPA, and the political and 
social influences that shaped it. 
There have been fairly detailed historical treatments of the class action device in 
other jurisdictions. With regard to Québec, the most in-depth work is that of Shaun 
Finn.32 Finn discusses the genesis of Québec class proceedings legislation, with reference 
to the debates in the legislature and the reports from the Standing Committee on Justice. 
He provides a useful analysis of the cultural and political context of the movement for 
reform, but he does so without reference to wider “non-legal” sources such as newspaper 
articles and correspondence of key players. Catherine Piché has also looked at the history 
of the class action in Québec,33 relating her review to an overarching analysis of the 
cultural impact of class actions, and the way in which class actions are also informed by 
culture. Again, however, Piché does not look at other historical sources. Both scholars 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid; Perell, supra note 24. 
30 JA Kazanjian, “Class Actions in Canada” (1973) 11 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 397 [Kazanjian].  
31 Williams 1975, supra note 8; C Gillespie, “The Scope of the Class Action in Canada” (1981) 11 
Manitoba Law Journal 215; L Nissen, “Class Actions in Canada: An Environmental Perspective” (1984) 48 
Saskatchewan Law Review 29 [Nissen]; JK Bankier, “Class Actions for Monetary Relief in Canada: 
Formalism or Function?” (1984) 4 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 229.  
32 Finn 2005 and Finn 2011, supra note 20.	  
33 C Piché, “The Cultural Analysis of Class Action Law” (2009) 2 Journal of Civil Law Studies 101, at 120 
and 123 [Piché]. 
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rely almost exclusively on case law, academic commentary and (in their discussion of 
other provinces) the reports of the provincial Law Commissions on class actions.34 
The most notable historian of class actions is Stephen Yeazell, who looks in depth 
at the roots of class actions in equity and English history.35 Yeazell focuses on group 
litigation in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, and finds that such litigation was the result of 
the two relationships that governed the lives of many English people: the manor-
copyholder (or landlord-tenant) relationship, and the parishioner-priest relationship. Both 
involved various rights and duties, including the payment of rent (to the manor) and tithes 
(to the parish priest). As these groups struggled to work out the customary laws that 
governed their relationships, they turned to the Court of Chancery to declare what those 
customary laws were. In that sense, early modern litigation was not really litigation by 
classes, but requests by pre-existing groups to declare what the law was. Yeazell argues 
that such “group litigation” was fundamentally different to the modern class action, 
because (a) the groups existed as social entities independent of the lawsuit (whereas 
aggregation in modern class actions increases the power of individuals by grouping them 
together), and (b) the issues at stake involved status and declaratory remedies (whereas 
modern class actions involve individual claims of right which are generally remedied by 
monetary damages).36  
In doing so, Yeazell undermines the assumptions of many other scholars of class 
actions, who state that class actions have an unbroken history that stretches back to the 
Court of Chancery. Indeed, even the proponents of reform in Ontario pointed back to this 
history in order to legitimize what appeared to be a procedural novelty. Attorney General 
Ian Scott did this when he addressed the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association in 
September 1989:  
 
[Class actions] have been a part of our legal system for a great many years 
and in fact can be traced to the early part of the eighteenth century. Until the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 For an overview of class actions in each Canadian province, see M Good, “Access to Justice, Judicial 
Economy and Behaviour Modification: Exploring the Goals of Canadian Class Actions” (2010) 47 Alberta 
Law Review 185. 
35 S Yeazell, “Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action” (1977) 77:6 
Columbia Law Review 866 [Yeazell 1977]; S Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern 
Class Action (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) [Yeazell]. 
36 Yeazell 1977, ibid, at 876-877. 
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fusion of law and equity in 1873 in England, and in 1881 Ontario, this 
procedural device was employed only in Courts of Chancery.37 
 
Yeazell argues persuasively that such arguments are incorrect. This would explain why 
courts such as the Supreme Court of Canada in Naken were so reticent to adopt class 
actions in the absence of legislative authority, because there was little historical precedent 
for doing so. It also explains why there was a dearth of group claims for monetary 
damages in the 20th century after the fusion of the courts, a phenomenon commented on 
by Kazanjian,38 because class actions were overwhelmingly an equitable and declaratory 
device. The modern class action is therefore fundamentally different from its forbears.39 
This fact was conveniently overlooked by many of the proponents of class action reform 
in Ontario and elsewhere, but it explains why the device provoked such bitter opposition 
from business interests and other more conservative groups. H. Patrick Glenn, in his 
scholarly commentary on and opposition to class actions, noted that group litigation 
throughout history was highly exceptional in character, a “serious judicial usurpation of 
the functions of the legislature”, and “an instrument of royal political and social policy 
rather than as a strictly ‘adjudicative’” procedure.40  
Yeazell was not the first to write of the equitable origins of class actions,41 but his 
work is so authoritative that it has guided most of the subsequent scholarship on the 
subject.42 However, his work on US class actions in the 20th century has since been built 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Notes for Remarks by the Honourable Ian Scott, Attorney General, to the Luncheon Meeting of the 
Canadian Manufacturers’ Association, September 19, 1989 (at 2), speeches and notes for remarks by Ian 
Scott, F 4339-1, Box No B222612, Archives of Ontario [CMA Speech]. 
38 Kazanjian, supra note 30, at 433-436. 
39 Curiously, the modern defendant class action (involving a class of defendants) bears much more 
similarity to group litigation in equity: S Chiodo, “Defendant Class Actions: Awkward Twin or Distant 
Cousin?” (2015) 10:3 Class Action Journal 649.	  
40 HP Glenn, “Class Actions in Ontario and Québec” (1984) 62:3 Canadian Bar Review 247 at 271-272 
[Glenn]. Glenn took the position that judicial activism in the context of class actions was inappropriate 
even if it was authorized by legislation, because it would involve a distortion of the traditional judicial 
function. He did not specifically discuss how the Charter factored into this analysis. The effect of the 
Charter on the class actions debate in Ontario will be addressed in Chapter 3. 
41 It should be noted, however, that Yeazell was not the first to write of the equitable roots of class actions. 
See Z Chafee, “Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties” (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1297; J Story, 
Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, 8th ed (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1870), available online: 
Hathi Trust Digital Library <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101068559671;view=1up;seq=7> 
[Story]; F Calvert, A Treatise Upon the Law Respecting Parties to Suits in Equity (New York: Gale 
Academic, 2010). 
42 See, for example, GC Hazard Jr et al, “Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits” (1998) 
146:6 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1849; F Valdes, “Procedure, Policy and Power: Class 
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upon, most notably by David Marcus who has conducted significant original historical 
research on the genesis of Rule 2343 and its political, social, cultural and economic 
context.44 Through the lens of the philosophical tension within class actions (do they 
confer substantive rights, or are they merely procedural?), Marcus looks beyond the case 
law and academic commentary relied on by most other scholars of class actions history. 
He refers to primary “non-legal” sources such as newspaper articles, records of 
institutional proceedings, reports and submissions from interest groups, and writings and 
speeches of key players. He not only looks at the official reports of the committee that 
drafted the various revisions to Rule 23, but also their working papers, notes, and 
correspondence. In addition, Marcus refers to events occurring in the wider society that 
affected the development of Rule 23. His contrast between the “regulatory conception” of 
class actions (whereby proponents of Rule 23 saw it as a mechanism for regulation of big 
business, environmental polluters and others) and the “adjectival conception” (whereby 
more conservative interests held that Rule 23 should not depart from the traditional rules 
of court and was merely procedural in nature)45 is compelling and is reflected in the 
history of class actions in Ontario. 
Marcus’ work on US class actions therefore provides a model for a detailed look, 
in the broader legal historical sense, of the genesis of class proceedings legislation. By 
contrast, and as noted above, many legal academics define “history” very narrowly to 
mean “precedent”. This is the internal view of legal history that is largely limited to a 
review of the case law and tracking developments in doctrine without an in-depth look at 
influences outside of the law. Often it is also instrumental, in that its purpose is to use 
history to explain or justify modern day phenomena. There are some exceptions in the 
current literature. For example, Bill Bogart has written numerous articles on the influence 
of the Charter and its role in changing the legal and cultural landscape that preceded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Actions and Social Justice in Historical and Comparative Perspective” (2008) 24 Georgia State University 
Law Review 627. 
43 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class actions in the United States federal court: 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Title IV: Parties, Rule 23: Class Actions, 383 US 1029 (1966), available 
online: Legal Information Institute <https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/ frcp/rule_23> [Rule 23 or 1966 
rule]. 
44 D Marcus, “The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953-1980” (2013) 90 
Washington University Law Review 1 [Marcus]. 
45 Ibid at 4-11.	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class action reform.46 Bogart argues persuasively that the Charter changed perceptions of 
the judicial function, as well as of individual and collective rights, and thereby helped 
prepare the ground for the CPA.47 He also links the evolution of class actions with wider 
societal developments such as the rise of mass consumerism and government 
bureaucracy, and the increased use of the class action mechanism in the US.48 Catherine 
Piché also discusses the influence of the Charter49 and links class actions with the wider 
culture. However, Piché’s work focuses largely on Québec, and neither author discusses 
the genesis of the Ontario CPA with regard to the historical record. 
My research will follow Marcus’ example by using a wide array of historical 
sources to study the development of class actions law in Ontario in relation to its social, 
economic, political and legal background. This is the “law and society”50 or “external” 
approach to legal history as espoused by Brian Simpson and numerous Canadian 
scholars,51 as opposed to the internal legal perspective on class actions that is restricted to 
canvassing and analyzing case law and other legal documents.52 Scholars of external 
legal history examine history on its own terms. This history looks at legal institutions and 
players and their work in society, as well as the dynamics of lawmaking. It seeks to 
explain legal developments with reference to the wider social and political context, and 
relies on both legal and “non-legal” sources such as archival documents, newspaper 
articles, interviews and other material.53  
In studying legal history in this way, scholars such as Simpson have found that 
the sources reveal an underlying story that often explains why cases were decided a 
certain way or legislation passed in a certain form.54 Presently, there is no such external 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 WA Bogart, “Naken, the Supreme Court and What Are Our Courts For?” (1984) 9 Canadian Business 
Law Journal 280 [Bogart 1984]; “Questioning Litigation’s Role – Courts and Class Actions in Canada” 
(1987) 62:3 Indiana Law Journal 665 [Bogart 1987]. 
47 WA Bogart, “Ambiguity” in Yves Pratte Conference, supra note 22, at 3.  
48 Bogart 1984, supra note 46. 
49 Piché, supra note 33, at 120 and 123. 
50 P Knepper, Writing the History of Crime (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), Chapter 1, “Legal 
History”, at 13-16 [Knepper]. 
51 See, for example, AWB Simpson, “The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the 
Forms of Legal Literature” (1981) 48:3 University of Chicago Law Review 632; WW Pue and B Wright, 
Canadian perspectives on law & society: Issues in legal history (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988). 
52 Knepper, supra note 50, at 10-11. 
53 Ibid. 
54 A fascinating example is the underlying story of R v Dudley and Stephens, elucidated in AWB Simpson, 
Cannibalism and the Common Law (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984).	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legal historical analysis of class actions reform in Ontario. That will form the subject of 
my thesis, in which the underlying story of the CPA will be revealed. 
 
D. Methodology 
 
My research involves a thorough review of the historical record, in order to determine the 
views, intentions and deliberations of four key groups: the general public; major 
stakeholders such as consumers’ groups and corporate actors; the legal profession and the 
legal academy; and the debaters and drafters of the legislation within the provincial 
government. This approach is widely accepted and commonly used amongst those who 
espouse the “external” approach to legal history.55 While the sources I have consulted 
often overlap among the four groups, as a general rule, the sources for each group are as 
follows: 
 
(i) The general public. I have gauged public opinion of the debate over class 
actions by consulting major daily and community newspapers. 
 
(ii) Major stakeholders. I have reviewed the submissions and reports of major 
stakeholders, including their oral submissions during committee and legislative 
proceedings. 
 
(iii) The legal profession and the legal academy. I have reviewed 
contemporaneous articles and monographs published by lawyers; articles and 
monographs published by legal academics; lawyers’ submissions to the 
government; lawyers’ submissions in cases such as GM (Canada) v Naken; and 
contemporaneous conference materials. 
 
(iv) The provincial government. I have reviewed the legislative debates in Hansard, 
as well as the reports and papers of the Ontario Law Reform Commission; 
Cabinet minutes, standing committee reports and submissions; records of the 
Ministry of the Attorney General; legislative drafts; and key players’ biographies 
and autobiographies.56 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 A Musson and C Stebbings, “Introduction”, and J Baker, “Reflections on ‘Doing’ Legal History”, in A 
Musson and C Stebbings, eds, Making Legal History: Approaches and Methodologies (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
56 See, for example, the writings of Attorneys-General R McMurtry (Memoirs and Reflections (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2013)) [McMurtry]; and I Scott (with N McCormick, To Make a Difference: A 
Memoir (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 2001)) [Scott]. 
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In addition to a comprehensive review of the documentary record, I have also used oral 
history, in the form of the Oral History Collection of the Osgoode Society for Canadian 
Legal History,57 as well as semi-structured interviews with central figures. Interviewees 
were selected through purposive sampling (based on participants’ knowledge and 
experience) and snowballing (to facilitate identification of and access to key players).58 
Prior to contacting any interviewees, ethics approval was obtained from the Research 
Ethics Board of York University.59 
There were limits to my sampling approach, in that several people whom I wanted 
to interview (especially members of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee) did not 
respond to my requests despite repeated follow-ups. Nevertheless, I was able to interview 
Michael Cochrane, the chair of the Advisory Committee, as well as at least one member 
of the Committee from each side of the debate (ie the business and 
consumer/environmental sides). In addition, I was able to interview some authors of the 
OLRC Report as well as officials who were at the Ministry of the Attorney General at the 
relevant time. These interviews, together with the interviews in the Osgoode Society 
archive, gave me a good picture of the reform debate throughout this period. 
 
E. Terminology 
 
Before moving on to a review of the beginnings of class actions in English law, a section 
on class actions terminology is necessary. It will be assumed that the reader has a basic 
knowledge of civil procedure in Ontario; however, the field of class actions has several 
terms of art that need to be defined in order to clarify the discussion. 
 An action or application is a “class” proceeding when it is brought on behalf of a 
group of people, and the suit claims that this group has been affected by the actions of 
one or more defendants. Before the CPA was passed in Ontario, certain groups could 
bring class actions pursuant to a number of statutes – for example, tenants under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Available online: <http://www.osgoodesociety.ca/oral-history>. 
58 This method is used widely in the social sciences: see, for example, A Aliverti, “Exploring the Function 
of Criminal Law in the Policing of Foreigners: The Decision to Prosecute Immigration-Related Offences” 
(2012) 21:4 Social and Legal Studies 511 at 513 (and accompanying references). 
59 Ethics Approval from Chair of Human Participants Review Committee, Office of Research Ethics, York 
University, granted February 19, 2016. 
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Residential Tenancies Act,60 or shareholders under the Ontario Securities Act.61 These 
statutory actions will be referred to as “representative actions”, as will actions brought 
purely for injunctive, declaratory or other equitable relief (also available before the CPA). 
Modern day group actions for damages, brought under Rule 75 or the CPA (or their 
equivalent in other jurisdictions), that were theoretically available to a wide variety of 
groups and for various causes of action, will be referred to as “class actions” or “class 
proceedings”. 
The group on whose behalf a class action is brought is generally defined in the 
statement of claim (for example, “all Canadians who ingested drug X between 2010 and 
2014”) and the individuals in this group are known as class members. Depending on the 
jurisdiction, the class can either be “opt-in” (individuals must take steps to be included in 
the class, such as submitting a form) or “opt-out” (individuals captured by the class 
definition are automatically included in the class, unless they take steps to be excluded). 
Class members are not parties to the action. They are represented by one or more 
representative plaintiffs, who are parties. The lawsuit is brought in the name of the 
representative plaintiff, who is named in the style of cause, is subject to discovery and 
can be liable for costs, just like a plaintiff in an ordinary action.  
There are several stages to a class action. Many (but not all) jurisdictions have a 
certification requirement for class actions, where a motion must be brought for court 
approval of the action as a class proceeding. Certification can be a controversial issue, as 
it imposes on class actions a requirement that is not imposed on ordinary proceedings. 
The certification stage generally requires that a number of criteria be met. In some 
jurisdictions, this includes an assessment of the merits of the action, while certification in 
other jurisdictions is solely a procedural hurdle. If an action is certified, it will then move 
to a common issues trial. This is akin to an ordinary trial, except the issues to be 
determined are “common” across the class (for example, “did the drug ingested by the 
class members materially increase the risk of heart disease?”). If one or more common 
issues are determined in favour of the class, then the action will move to the individual 
issues stage. This step determines issues that arise from the common questions, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Residential Tenancies Act, RSO 1980, c 452, cited in the OLRC Report, supra note 2, at 264-265. 
61 Securities Act, RSO 1980, c 466, Part XXII, cited in the OLRC Report, ibid, at 233.	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cannot be determined in common – for example, individual damages. Often this step is 
completed through a claims process, whereby individual class members will make a 
claim for their damages and submit supporting documentation. 
Damages can sometimes also be determined without reference to the individual 
class members’ discrete claims. This can occur when the defendant’s liability has been 
established and some or all class members are entitled to monetary relief, and it is 
possible to calculate the totality of the harm caused by the defendant. In this situation, an 
“aggregate damages” award can be made to the class as a whole, which is subsequently 
apportioned among the class members. In certain jurisdictions, if any part of this award 
remains unclaimed by class members after a certain amount of time, it is automatically 
returned to the defendant. In some situations, it may not be possible or practicable to 
distribute a monetary award (aggregate or otherwise) to individual class members. In that 
case, a cy-près62 award can be made, whereby the award is given to a charity or non-
profit organization, or distributed in another way that can reasonably be expected to 
benefit class members.  
 Because a class action encompasses a group of individuals who are not parties, 
those class members must be notified of their rights at the various stages of the 
proceeding. This entails giving notice to the class members (this can usually be given in a 
number of ways, whether by direct mail, newspaper notice or social media). In some 
jurisdictions, such as the United States (which has constitutional “due process” 
requirements), notice is mandatory for certain types of class action; in others, it is within 
the discretion of the court. Notice is usually given after certification, once the proceeding 
has been certified as a class action, because then any subsequent judgment will bind class 
members. In an “opt-out” jurisdiction, if class members do not want to be bound by any 
subsequent judgment, they must exclude themselves within a certain period of time. 
Obviously, they cannot exclude themselves if they do not know about the action, which is 
why notice and the way in which it is given is important. Notice is also usually given 
after a determination of the common issues, so class members are able to make claims at 
the individual issues stage.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Cy-près is a legal French term that can be translated as “as near as possible”. It originated in the law of 
charitable trusts. 
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 While there are other terms that are used in class actions, I have defined the terms 
that tend to be the object of controversy in the policy-making context. Many of them 
certainly proved controversial when class actions reform was being debated in Ontario. 
 
F. Scope and Structure 
 
The focus of my thesis will be on Ontario, the first common law jurisdiction in Canada to 
enact class proceedings legislation. Apart from a handful of cases,63 there appears to have 
been very little interest in class actions in the province until the reform to Rule 23 of the 
US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966 and the subsequent debate in Québec. The 
debate in Ontario in fact did not begin until the early 1970s, and my investigation 
therefore begins at that point. It will end upon the coming into force of the CPA on 
January 1, 1993.64 While I intend to do a thorough study of primary historical sources 
within the scope of my research, I will be relying almost exclusively on secondary 
sources when referring to other jurisdictions and time periods.  
 The debate on class action reform in Ontario was preceded by the origins of class 
actions and group proceedings in the Court of Chancery, the limited jurisprudence in the 
UK and subsequently Ontario, and the rise of class actions in the US and elsewhere. That 
will therefore form the second chapter of this thesis. The third chapter will cover the 
period from the early 1970s, when class actions began to be discussed in Ontario in the 
context of federal competition legislation and provincial consumer protection laws, to 
1985, encompassing the release of the OLRC Report and the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Naken. The fourth chapter will look at the reform debate under the tenure of 
Ian Scott as Attorney General, the lead-up to and release of the Advisory Committee 
Report, and the subsequent passage of the CPA. Finally, my conclusion will provide an 
analysis of the history of the debate and its impact on the work of class actions lawyers in 
Ontario today. 
 Of the period leading up to the enactment of the CPA, Shaun Finn writes 
eloquently that:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Examples are cited in the OLRC Report, supra note 2, at 18-32. 
64 The legislative history of the CPA essentially ends with its coming into force on January 1, 1993. The 
CPA has remained in its original form since then, except for a minor amendment in 2006 to reflect the fact 
that the Ontario Court (General Division) was renamed the Superior Court of Justice. 
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Common law Canada was becoming increasingly sensitized to the class 
action. Beneath the surface, the seed planted by the provincial [OLRC] 
report was slowly taking root, stretching out, and sending tentative, unseen 
shoots towards the sunlight.65  
 
This thesis will, for the first time, investigate the history of class actions reform in 
Ontario in depth, revealing those shoots as well as the factors that aided or hindered their 
growth. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Finn 2005, supra note 20, at 364. 
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Chapter 2 
Class Actions in England, North America, Australia 
 
 
A. Representative Proceedings in Equity and English Law 
 
Class actions have their forbears in equity. They first emerged in medieval England from 
about the year 1200,66 and usually involved pre-existing groups suing for a declaration of 
rights: for example, villagers suing for a declaration against the manorial lord that they 
had a right to graze common land. Representative actions reached their ascendancy in 
England in the 17th century, and since that time, as Stephen Yeazell has written, they 
have been put to three chronologically separate and distinct uses.67 In the first phase, such 
proceedings were used to modernize and adjust the customary law governing manorial 
(landlord-tenant) and parochial (priest-parishioner) relationships on the eve of the 
agricultural revolution. In the second phase, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the proceedings were instead used in disputes between new sets of groups, such 
as business persons and trade unions. For Yeazell, the third phase involves the emergence 
of the modern class action in the United States. The first two phases will be examined 
below, while the third phase will be reviewed later in this chapter. 
Prior to 1873, judicial authority was vested in two systems: the common law 
courts, which dealt with strictly “legal” matters, and the Court of Chancery, which dealt 
with “equitable” rights. Common law courts saw disputes as purely a two-party affair; 
they took a narrow view of the joinder rule and only allowed permissive joinder if the 
judgment would affect the direct and immediate interests of the people to be added. The 
court of equity, however, existed to adjudicate not only the immediate dispute but also 
the rights that would be affected by it. This court called for compulsory joinder of all 
persons whose interests would be affected by the suit, so that the eventual judgment 
would bind everyone and no further related suits would be brought.68 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Yeazell, supra note 35 at 38. See also RB Marcin, “Searching for the Origin of the Class Action” (1974) 
23 Catholic University Law Review 515, which outlines the history of the class action in the British Isles 
from the 14th century onwards.	  
67 Yeazell 1977, supra note 35 at 867. 
68 Kazanjian, supra note 30 at 399-400; Williams 1975, supra note 8 at 8-9. 
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There were occasions, however, where all interested parties could not be located 
or it would be impractical to join them, so the court of equity began to make use of the 
representative action. Under this device, one person could bring a suit on behalf of all 
interested persons, and any judgment would bind all those people. In this way, the 
compulsory joinder rule would not prevent the parties from “com[ing] at justice”,69 and 
the court could still avoid an inefficient multiplicity of suits.70 This relaxation of the rule 
was essential for groups such as tenants who had disputes with their manorial lord,71 or 
parishioners who wished to assert their rights against their parish priest.72 As society 
industrialized and commerce became more complex, business people also combined and 
collectivized, but these collectives lacked separate legal personality (this was prior to the 
birth of the modern corporation). They therefore exercised their group claims through the 
court of equity.73 
It was considered acceptable to bind people even if they did not know about the 
judgment, because equitable suits did not involve claims for damages and therefore did 
not directly affect people’s financial interests. Relief was generally declaratory or 
injunctive, and the declaration or injunction usually involved the rights of a pre-existing 
group.74 Stephen Yeazell is one of the few scholars to have noted this distinction between 
representative actions at equity, and modern day common law class actions (generally 
involving damages and class members with no pre-existing bond): 
 
Once one realizes that the relief sought was a declaration of custom, the 
problem [of absent class members] seems far less urgent. Having one’s day 
in court loses some of its significance if what the court does at the end of 
that day is simply to declare what shall be the law tomorrow, without 
retrospectively applying that law to a specific dispute.75 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Duke of Bedford v Ellis, [1901] AC 1 (HL) at 8 [Ellis], cited in WE McNally and BE Cotton, “Guiding 
Principles Regarding the Constitution of a Representative Defendant and a Defendant Class in a Class 
Action Proceeding” (2003) 27 Advocates’ Quarterly 110 at 115-116. 
70 Kazanjian, supra note 30 at 401. 
71 How v The Tenants of Bromsgrove (1681) 23 ER 277; Brown v Howard (1701), 21 ER. 
72 Brown v Vermuden (1676), 1 Chan Ca 271; Brown v Booth (1690), 121 ER 960.	  
73 Kazanjian, supra note 30 at 401. See also City of London v Richmond (1701), 2 Vern 421 ER 870; 
Chancey v May (1722), 24 ER 265. 
74 See, for example, Lloyd v Loaring (1802), 31 ER 1302 (lodge of Freemasons seeking injunction against 
dissident member); Adair v The New River Company (1805), 32 ER 1153 (shareholders seeking an account 
of moneys owing against the corporation).  
75 Yeazell 1977, supra note 35 at 891.	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The declaration of the rights of one member of the group was a declaration of the rights 
of all. The subject matter of the dispute simply had to be a general proprietary right in 
which all parties had a common interest, and the parties had to be so numerous that actual 
joinder would be impracticable.76 
From about the mid-1800s, the popularity of group litigation at equity began to 
decline. The birth of the corporation meant that businesses had standing to sue and be 
sued in their own right.77 In addition, Parliament enacted several statutes that dealt with 
the issues regularly faced by corporations, which reduced business peoples’ tendency and 
desire to resort to group litigation to clarify those issues.78 Equity litigation in general 
began to fall out of favour, with the publication of Dickens’ Bleak House in 1852-1853 
illustrating the torturous delays and overly complex nature of that system. A campaign 
for court reform led to the fusion of the courts of law and equity with the passage of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873.79 From this point onwards, representative actions 
could be brought in the courts of common law under Rule 10, which was very similar to 
the later Rule 75 and read as follows: 
 
Where there are numerous parties having the same interest in one action, 
one or more of such parties may sue or be sued or may be authorized by the 
Court to defend in such action on behalf of or for the benefit of all parties so 
interested.80 
 
However, because of their equitable roots, representative actions were not well received 
by the English courts when those actions involved monetary damages. This is because, as 
noted above, binding absent class members was much more troublesome when financial 
interests were involved. Damages were also generally different for each class member, as 
opposed to declaratory relief that was the same for everyone. Equitable representative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Two other criteria (privity between the group and the adversary, and privity between members of the 
group) were abandoned by the Lord Chancellor in The Mayor of York v Pilkington (1737) 26 ER 180. The 
Lord Chancellor reasoned that equity courts entertained Bills of Peace even though they did not necessarily 
involve such privity, and that representative actions should be no different. The requirement that the right 
in question be proprietary also disappeared in 1901, in the Ellis (supra note 69) and Taff Vale (infra note 
84) decisions.  
77 Yeazell, supra note 35 at 124-125. 
78 Ibid at 210-212. 
79 36 & 37 Vict, c 66 (UK). The fusion took effect in Ontario in 1881 by way of The Ontario Judicature 
Act, 1881, 44 Vict, c 5 [Ontario Judicature Act].  
80 Rules of Court, Order XII, Rule 10, enacted as a schedule to the Ontario Judicature Act, ibid. 
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actions were simply a different beast than common law class actions for damages, and the 
courts treated them differently.  
Many commentators, including the authors of the OLRC Report, have noted that 
class actions began promisingly after the fusion of the courts, but express confusion at the 
courts’ restrictive interpretation of them from the beginning of the 20th century.81 When 
one looks at the difference between equitable and common law group actions, however, 
the reason for this restrictive interpretation is clear: the major representative actions 
brought in England after 1873 were received favourably by the courts because they 
involved equitable relief only. The restrictive interpretation began in 1910, with the 
bringing of a class action that involved claims for damages. To understand this 
explanation, however, is to acknowledge that there is a profound difference between 
representative actions in equity and class actions at common law, and this is to 
acknowledge that the modern day class action is a substantial departure from precedent. 
Such an acknowledgement did not fit in with the 20th century reformers’ efforts to play 
down the innovative nature of class proceedings and thereby reassure business and other 
groups supporting the status quo.82 
The two major representative actions for equitable relief after 1873 were Duke of 
Bedford v Ellis 83  and Taff Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants.84 Duke of Bedford v Ellis involved a group of fruit and vegetable growers who 
claimed to be entitled to certain statutory rights regarding the use of Covent Garden 
Market. They sought equitable relief in the form of a declaration and an injunction. A 
majority of the House of Lords found that a class action could be brought, because three 
criteria had been satisfied: there was a common interest, a common grievance, and the 
relief sought was beneficial to all whom the plaintiff proposed to represent.85 The second 
case, Taff Vale, involved a registered trade union and whether it could be sued for an 
injunction in its registered name. The law lords found in obiter that a defendant class 
action was a viable procedural alternative. Given that both these cases involved claims 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 10-13. 
82 Yeazell 1977, supra note 35 at 866-867. 
83 Supra note 69. 
84 [1901] AC 426 (HL) [Taff Vale]. 
85 Ibid at 8. 
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for equitable relief, they did not pose the procedural difficulties that were posed by 
claims for damages. 
These difficulties arose in a 1910 case, Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co 
Ltd,86 which was a representative action for damages. The plaintiffs’ goods had been 
damaged when a Russian warship destroyed the defendant’s vessel, on the suspicion that 
it was carrying contraband. The plaintiffs sued on behalf of 44 other shippers and sought 
“damages for breach of contract and duty in and about the carriage of goods by sea.”87 
The English Court of Appeal found that the plaintiffs could not bring a representative 
action, because there was no common interest. First, the shippers all had separate 
contracts with the defendants (no common interest); second, their damages were all 
different; and third, the defendants might be able to raise different defences against 
different shippers.88 The relief sought (monetary damages) was necessarily personal to 
each shipper, and this relief could not therefore be beneficial to all whom the plaintiffs 
proposed to represent. The case therefore failed the test articulated in Duke of Bedford v 
Ellis, and could not proceed as a representative action.89 
The subsequent jurisprudence followed the ruling in Markt. Very few 
representative actions could satisfy the three-part test articulated in Duke of Bedford v 
Ellis: common interest, common grievance, relief beneficial to all. The exceptions were 
largely cases that sought equitable relief or damages from a common fund (such as a trust 
– trusts also being part of the law of equity), or involved groups that pre-existed the 
litigation, such as unions, who were not simply bound together by individual contracts 
against the same defendant.90 There were also some cases in which the courts allowed 
representative actions for a declaration of liability; in those cases, class members would 
then have to follow up with their own individual suit for damages.91 However, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 [1910] 2 KB 1021 (CA) [Markt]. 
87 Ibid at 1022. See also M Stiggelbout, “The Recognition in England and Wales of United States 
Judgments in Class Actions” (2011) 52:2 Harvard International Law Journal 433 at 446 [Stiggelbout]. 
88 Markt, ibid, at 1029-30, 1035, 1040; Stiggelbout, ibid, at 447. 
89 Markt, ibid, at 1035, 1040-1041. 
90 EMI Records Ltd v Riley, [1981] 2 All ER 838 (Ch) (suit brought on behalf of all members of a music 
industry trade association). 
91 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd, [1979] 3 All ER 507 (Ch). 
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seeking of monetary relief, or the presence of individual contracts, were major 
impediments to representative actions in England.92 
The situation was similar in Ontario, where the case law generally followed the 
precedent set by Markt. Representative actions in which the claims of class members 
were based on separate contracts were found not to satisfy the “common interest” 
requirement,93 as were actions that sought monetary relief.94 Courts in Ontario continued 
to be largely unreceptive to class actions until the 1970s, when group litigation began to 
increase in popularity following class action reform south of the border. 
 
B. Class Actions in the United States 
 
Class actions in the United States have undergone a long and complex history. This 
history is further complicated by the fact that class actions are available at two levels of 
courts in the US – the state level and the federal (national) level. The discussions on 
reform in Ontario, as well as the various reports on class actions in that province, were 
influenced far more by the federal Rules than those at the state level. The focus of this 
section will therefore be on federal class actions in the US.95 
The concept of representative litigation entered the United States in the early 19th 
century, when Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story discussed the mechanism in his 
treatise on equity.96 Story also looked at the representative action in the case of West v 
Randall,97 a decision he wrote as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit. The case arose from a dispute over the estate of West involving numerous 
individuals, and the issue before Story was which of those individuals should be made 
parties to the lawsuit. The action originated in equity (as it involved a trust), and Story 
held that the same rule that applied in equity in England should apply in the United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v Times Newspapers Ltd, [1980] 1 All 
ER 1097 (QB); Smith v Cardiff Corporation, [1954] 1 QB 210. 
93 Preston v Hilton (1920), 48 OLR 172 (HC Div); Shields v Mayor, [1953] OWN 5 (CA); Agnew v Saulte 
Ste Marie Board of Education (1976), 2 CPC 273 (Ont HCJ). 
94 Turtle v City of Toronto (1924), 56 OLR 252 (App Div). See also Williams 1975, supra note 8 at 30. 
95 A good overview of US class actions at the state level can be found in the OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 
64-70. Until the 1980s at the earliest, class action litigation in the US federal courts was far more 
significant than litigation at the state level: Marcus, supra note 44 at 5. 
96 Story, supra note 41. The history of US class actions generally is discussed in Yeazell, supra note 35.  
97 29 F Cas 718 (RI 1820), available online: 
<https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F.Cas/0029.f.cas/0029.f.cas.0718.pdf>. 
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States: namely, that all persons materially interested in the subject matter of the suit 
should be joined as parties.98 The rule applied for the same reason as it did in England – 
to ensure a complete adjudication of all the issues between the parties, to prevent a 
multiplicity of suits, and to protect the rights of everyone involved.99 Where it was not 
possible to bring all the parties before the court, “a few may sue for the benefit of the 
whole”.100 In other words, representative litigation could be resorted to in the context of 
equity, if it was required for justice to be done. However, this was not a blanket rule: “[a] 
bill cannot be sustained in equity, which is multifarious and embraces distinct matters, 
affecting distinct parties, who have no common interest in the distinct matters.”101 
 In 1833, Story’s ruling was codified in Equity Rule 48. Although this rule allowed 
for representative litigation where it was impractical to join all interested parties, such 
litigation could not bind absent parties. For practical purposes, the rule was therefore 
ineffective.102 The Supreme Court got around this problem by interpreting the rule so that 
absent parties could be bound.103 However, uncertainty as to the binding nature of such 
judgments persisted, even after a revision of the Equity Rules in 1912.104 In the early part 
of the 20th century, Equity Rule 48 became Rule 38 as part of a major restructuring of the 
Rules. When the courts of law and equity were fused in the US at the federal level in 
1938, Equity Rule 38 became Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, 105  and 
representative actions became available for both legal and equitable relief.  
 The original Rule 23 attempted to provide some guidance to the courts as to the 
types of actions that would be amenable to class treatment. The rule described three 
different types of class actions: true, hybrid and spurious.106 True actions involved rights 
that were enjoyed jointly; hybrid actions involved rights to property, where the rights 
were several; and spurious actions involved several rights, with only common questions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Ibid at 1.  
99 Ibid at 8. 
100 Ibid at 10. 
101 Ibid at 1. 
102 Yeazell, supra note 35 at 221. 
103 Ibid at 221-222. 
104 OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 8. 
105 308 US 653 (1938) [original Rule 23 or old Rule 23].	  
106 These terms are not used in the original Rule 23, ibid, but over time they came to be used to describe the 
categories laid out in that rule: OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 8. 
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of law or fact affecting them.107 The true actions were closest to their equitable forbears, 
because they involved a pre-existing group (property owners) with a common interest 
(property).108 Hybrid actions still involved a pre-existing group, even though their 
property rights were not held in common. It was the spurious actions, however, that gave 
the courts the most trouble. Most courts allowed binding judgments as to absent class 
members only in the first two categories, so the spurious category soon became 
completely worthless.109 In other words, it was essentially only the actions that were 
closest to their equitable forbears (those with a pre-existing group and/or a common 
interest) that survived as class actions under the new regime. The US federal experience, 
in this sense, was similar to the English and early Ontarian experience.  
 The categorizations under the old Rule 23 proved overly conceptual and 
extremely difficult for courts to follow. In addition, there were significant problems with 
notice, and this affected the due process rights of absent class members.110 These 
problems, and the virtually useless nature of the “spurious” category, led to calls to 
reform the rule. These were answered in 1966.111 Under the 1966 rule, all class actions 
bound absent class members 112  and contained specific safeguards for their rights, 
including requirements for notice. In addition, actions had to be certified by the court 
before they could proceed as a class action, and the certification requirements included 
the following:113 
 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 W Landers and B Vance, “Comments: Federal and State Class Actions: Developments and 
Opportunities” (1975) 46 Mississippi Law Journal 39 at 75 [Landers and Vance]. 
108 This conclusion was supported by Landers and Vance, ibid, who stated that the purpose of this 
categorization was “to give meaning to the terminology of ‘common or general interest’ as used in the Field 
Code version of the class action rule” (at 74-75). 
109 Ibid at 75. 
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111 Rule 23, supra note 43. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid, Rule 23(a).	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Most importantly, the 1966 rule did away with the old categories, constructing in their 
place a new tripartite structure:114 
 
• Rule 23(b)(1) class actions were designed to avoid the risk of individual 
judgments that would impose incompatible standards of conduct on defendants, or 
be dispositive of or impair the interests of other members of a group; 
 
• Rule 23(b)(2) class actions involved class injunctive and declaratory relief; 
 
• Rule 23(b)(3) class actions could be maintained where questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominated over individual issues, and where a class 
action was superior to other methods for adjudicating the controversy.  
 
It was Rule 23(b)(3) that was the most revolutionary part of the new rule. The other two 
kinds of class actions were fairly close to their equitable predecessors: Rule 23(b)(1) 
actions largely encompassed pre-existing rights or members of a pre-existing group, and 
thus were closer to the “true” actions under the old rule;115 and Rule 23(b)(2) actions 
were only for equitable relief. Rule 23(b)(3) actions, however, encompassed class 
members who might only be tied together by the conduct of the defendant.116 The first 
two parts of the new tripartite structure had arguably always been available, albeit 
without the new protections and requirements applicable to all class actions. The third 
part, however, was a drastic departure from precedent and constituted the birth of the 
modern class action as we know it today.  
 One of the reasons Rule 23(b)(3) was so revolutionary is that it allowed the 
aggregation of claims that were not economically viable on an individual level, without 
any pre-existing ties between class members. The departure from equitable claims also 
meant that class actions for damages were suddenly available,117 opening up the horizons 
for class litigation in a massive way. Combined with contingent fees and no-way costs, 
the incentives for entrepreneurial class counsel were plentiful.118 However, the due 
process protections specific to Rule 23(b)(3), including individual notice of each class 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 L Silberman, “The Vicissitudes of the American Class Action – With a Comparative Eye” (1999) 7 
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 201 at 204 [Silberman]. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 54-55. 
118 Silberman, supra note 114 at 205.	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member’s right to opt out, could also cripple a class action, leading to procedural delays 
and rendering the action economically unviable.119 Notice also had to be provided where 
any certified class action was dismissed or settled, and such dismissal or settlement could 
not occur without court approval.120 Because the U.S. was the first jurisdiction in the 
world to explicitly allow class actions for damages, other jurisdictions have looked to 
Rule 23 as both an example and a warning in structuring their own class actions regimes. 
This includes Ontario.  
 The provisions of Rule 23 were used prolifically from 1966 to the early 1970s in a 
range of proceedings, from civil rights lawsuits to consumer actions, in order to 
“dispens[e] justice to socially or economically disadvantaged groups as well as to small 
claimants generally.” 121  Class actions were also used to supplement government 
securities and anti-trust regulations,122 with many plaintiff class action lawyers styling 
themselves as “private attorneys general”.123 As enthusiasm for the new class actions 
device ran high, courts were initially liberal in their willingness to certify.124 
However, this tendency slowed from the early 1970s. 125 Several landmark 
decisions at that time stymied class actions for damages at the federal level.126 In Snyder 
v Harris127 and Zahn v International Paper Co.,128 the US Supreme Court held that the 
$10,000 minimum requirement for the federal courts to take jurisdiction applied per class 
member. In other words, it was not sufficient for the claims of the class to total more than 
$10,000; each class member’s claim had to total more than that amount. This removed 
almost every consumer class action, and many others as well, from the federal courts’ 	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jurisdiction.129 In Eisen, as noted above, the Supreme Court held that, as far as possible, 
individual class members must receive notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) suit, and the costs of that 
notice must be paid by the representative plaintiff. This had the effect of removing many 
damages actions from the federal courts, as they would be cost-prohibitive. Eisen also 
removed district courts’ ability to conduct preliminary hearings on the merits of a case, 
which had generally been favourable to plaintiffs. Finally, courts were far more reluctant 
to award lawyers’ fees. Although the US had no-way costs, courts could make an 
exception for the “private attorney general”, lawyers whose successful prosecution of the 
case had furthered the public interest. However, the Supreme Court effectively wiped out 
this exception in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co v Wilderness Society, 130  stating that 
lawyers’ fees were not recoverable absent express statutory authorization.  
 From the mid to late 1970s, the class actions pendulum swung back towards the 
middle, in “a period characterized by increasing sophistication, restraint, and stabilization 
in class action practice.”131 Plaintiffs’ lawyers defined the scope of their claims and 
classes much more carefully and realistically, and defence lawyers, in turn, became less 
resistant to the prospect of class actions.132 Judges also began to exercise their managerial 
functions in a much more nuanced way, redefining classes, granting partial certification, 
and bifurcating cases where necessary.133 The US Supreme Court had softened its stance 
so that, by 1982, the OLRC Report could conclude that, “the attitude of that Court to 
class actions ... in recent years, may be characterized as one of cautious acceptance.”134 
This was something of a boon to the reformers in Ontario, as they could refer to the US 
experience to show how the class action was, for the most part, a balanced remedy that 
treated the rights of plaintiffs and defendants with equal concern. 
 
C. Ontario in the 1970s: the Precursor to Reform 
 
As noted earlier in this chapter, Ontario was largely unreceptive to class proceedings until 
the 1970s, when the effects of the United States’ new Rule 23 began to make themselves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Silberman, supra note 114 at 205-206. 
130 421 US 240 (1975). 
131 Miller, supra note 121 at 680. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid at 680-681. 
134 OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 62.	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felt. Representative proceedings in Ontario were governed by Rule 75, which was similar 
to the previous Rule 10 and stated that, “[w]here there are numerous persons having the 
same interest, one or more may sue or be sued or may be authorized by the court to 
defend on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all.”135 An increasing number of actions in 
Ontario, including those involving separate contracts and those for monetary relief, were 
found to satisfy the “same interest” requirement. As John Kazanjian has noted, the phrase 
defies clear and specific meaning, which was ideal for the flexible approach of the court 
of equity, but invited arbitrary treatment once it was codified as a rule of civil 
procedure.136 Where earlier in the 20th century the “same interest” requirement had been 
interpreted inflexibly, then, the Ontario courts began interpreting it more generously from 
1970 onwards.137 
 In doing so, they took the lead from several decisions in British Columbia. The 
two most notable were Shaw v Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver138 and Chastain 
v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority.139 In Shaw, a group of real estate 
salespersons brought a representative action for an accounting, in order to recover 
portions of commissions that they claimed had been wrongfully withheld by the 
defendant. The court held that it was immaterial that the group members had been 
wronged in their individual capacity, “provided, of course, that their claims were not for 
personal damages.”140 Because the group had brought their action for equitable relief – 
that is, for an accounting and not for damages at common law – it did not matter to the 
court that calculating the entitlement of each class member would involve “long, detailed 
and difficult accountings.”141 What was important was that the class had the “same 
interest” in that they had a common interest in the success of the action: 
 
A class action is appropriate where if the plaintiff wins the other persons he 
purports to represent win too, and if he, because of that success, becomes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Rule 75 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ontario. 
136 Kazanjian states that the phrase “same interest” and “common interest” were used interchangeably in 
equity: Kazanjian, supra note 30 at 416-418. 
137 As the OLRC Report has noted, courts did not have difficulty with the “numerous persons” requirement, 
unless there were so few class members that they could just as easily have been joined in an ordinary 
action: OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 18-19, citing Goodfellow v Knight (1977), 2 CPC 209 (SCTD). 
138 (1973), 36 DLR (3d) 250 (BCCA) [Shaw]. 
139 (1973), 32 DLR (3d) 443 [Chastain]. 
140 Shaw, supra note 138 at 253-254.	  
141 Ibid at 255. 
	   31 
entitled to relief whether or not in a fund or property, the others also become 
likewise entitled to that relief...142 
 
This “common success” criterion was also followed in Chastain.143 In that case, the 
plaintiff brought a representative action on behalf of hydro customers who had been 
required to pay a security deposit (the practice was discriminatory because only 
customers with poor credit histories were required to pay the deposit). The action sought 
equitable relief, in the form of a declaration that the defendant had no authority to require 
deposits, as well as an injunction preventing the defendant from keeping current deposits. 
The injunction was effectively a claim for monetary relief (which would involve 
returning different amounts to each customer), but the court nevertheless allowed it to 
proceed. McIntyre J. concluded that the plaintiffs and those whom they represented “form 
a group having the same interest in the cause.”144 In other words, all class members had 
the same interest in the success of the action. 
 The case law in Ontario in the 1970s reflects the dual strands of Shaw and 
Chastain: first, the adoption of the “common success” test, and second, the creative use 
of equitable remedies to bypass the restrictions of Markt and claim monetary relief on 
behalf of the class. Farnham v Fingold145 was a representative action brought on behalf 
of non-controlling shareholders, who claimed they had been unjustly deprived of a 
premium that had been paid to the controlling shareholders upon the sale of the company. 
They sought several forms of relief, including a declaration, an accounting, and damages. 
Despite the plaintiffs’ creative efforts to seek relief by equitable means, the Court of 
Appeal in fact chose to treat the action as one for damages. Jessup JA treated the holding 
in Markt as obiter, and instead preferred the holding in Taff Vale, which would permit a 
more flexible approach to representative actions.146 While the plaintiffs in Farnham 
sought a pro-rata share of damages, Jessup JA expressed circumspection about class 
actions for damages where individual assessments would be required. Not only would 
such an action deprive the defendant of the ability to conduct discoveries to establish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Ibid at 254. 
143 This case is discussed in Williams 1975, supra note 8 at 12-13. 
144 Chastain, supra note 139 at 443. 
145 [1972] 3 OR 688 (HC); [1973] 2 OR 132 (CA). 
146 Ibid at 135. 
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individual entitlement, but, in the event of success, the defendant would only have 
recourse for costs against the plaintiff, even though his or her costs had been increased by 
multiple separate claims. 147  Jessup JA’s statement implied that class actions for 
separately assessed damages could be problematic.148 
 The case of Cobbold v Time Canada Ltd.149 built on the success of Farnham and 
adopted the “common success” test from the BC jurisprudence. The plaintiff in Cobbold 
brought an action for breach of contract, on behalf of himself and other subscribers with 
unexpired subscription contracts, when the defendant suspended publication of its 
magazine in Canada. The defendant had since been supplying the US version of Time 
and, because that version was more expensive, it had curtailed the length of the class 
members’ contracts. The plaintiff sought relief in the form of specific performance 
(delivery of Time for the full length of the original contracts) or a declaration that the 
class members were entitled to damages. This case is another example of the creative use 
of equitable relief in order to bypass the restrictions of Markt. Nevertheless, the 
defendant objected that the action was essentially one for damages, and also pointed out 
that each class member had a separate contract with the defendant. The court allowed the 
action to proceed anyway pursuant to the “common success” test in Shaw. Citing that 
case, Stark J. stated that, “a class action is appropriate if it can be shown that success for 
the plaintiff means success for the other members of the class, especially where the same 
measure of success applies equally to all.”150 It helped that the class members were not 
claiming damages that had to be individually assessed, but were instead seeking damages 
that could be assessed in the aggregate.151 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Ibid at 136. 
148 Kazanjian, supra note 30 at 435-436; Williams 1975, supra note 8 at 32-33. The issue of individually 
assessed damages was one of the issues that later prevented the Naken case (supra note 23) from 
proceeding as a class action. 
149 (1976), 13 OR (2d) 567 (HCJ). 
150 Ibid at 569. 
151 The action was, however, dismissed at trial on the grounds that the class members who had been sent the 
US version of Time instead had not suffered any damages. The class members who instead received a 
refund from Time were found to have settled with the defendant, and were therefore excluded from the 
class. Costs were awarded against the plaintiff in an unspecified amount: Cobbold v Time Canada Ltd, 
1980 CanLII 1879 (ON SC). 
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 This approach was successful at the Ontario Court of Appeal in GM (Canada) v 
Naken.152 The representative plaintiff was suing on behalf of persons who purchased new 
models of the Firenza, manufactured by General Motors, in 1971 and 1972. The Firenza 
was a notoriously unreliable vehicle, finding its place in automotive history next to the 
flaming Pinto.153 As a Canadian newspaper reported more than a decade later:  
 
The Firenza made mechanics rich. Owners picketed car lots all over Ottawa, 
Montreal, Oshawa and Toronto, protesting its low resale value. They sued 
dealerships. They formed an association and drove a motorcade to 
Parliament Hill to protest – along the route one Firenza broke down, barfing 
smoke at the sky.154 
 
The plaintiffs in Naken OCA, not surprisingly, alleged that the vehicles were in breach of 
the manufacturer’s collateral warranty. They sought pro-rata damages in the same 
creative way as in Farnham, alleging that each class member had suffered $1,000 in 
damages based on the reduced resale value of each car caused by the breach of warranty. 
 At the first instance, the defendant’s motion to strike was dismissed.155 However, 
the Divisional Court saw through the plaintiffs’ creative presentation of their damages 
claim and allowed the defendant’s appeal.156 It held that individual assessments for 
damages would be required, and that the class members’ damages could not be disguised 
as aggregate damages simply by capping the claims at $1,000 each.157 In addition, the 
court held that the claims involved individual contracts.158 The class members did not 
have the “same interest”, and could not claim that their case involved a “common fund” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 1979 CanLII 1983 (OCA) [Naken OCA]. 
153 The Pinto was a vehicle manufactured by Ford that became infamous in the 1970s for bursting into 
flames if its gas tank was ruptured in a collision. It is now the subject of one of the main exhibits at the 
American Museum of Tort Law. 
154 B Evenson, “The Lemon Car Legacy”, Ottawa Citizen (July 26, 1992), p A4 [Lemon Car Legacy], in 
Policy Development Division (PDD) Counsel correspondence files, Class Proceedings – Media, RG 4-40, 
Box No B703283, Archives of Ontario [PDD Media]. 
155 Naken et al v General Motors of Canada Ltd et al, 1975 CanLII 498 (ON SC). 
156 Naken et al v General Motors of Canada Ltd et al, 1977 CanLII 1317 (ON SC). 
157 Ibid. 
158 The plaintiffs acknowledged that the main contracts were formed between class members and various 
automobile dealers, not the manufacturer; however, they claimed that GM had established a preliminary or 
collateral contract with class members by inducing them to purchase their vehicles through advertising and 
other means. The court held that this question of reliance was inescapably individual, and that a common 
cause of action was therefore missing (ibid). 
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out of which all class members would be paid if the case succeeded. The suit could not 
therefore proceed as a class action under Rule 75.159 
At the Court of Appeal, Arnup JA allowed the plaintiffs’ appeal and permitted the 
pleading to stand. 160  While the contracts between the class members and various 
automobile dealers were not common, there was a collateral contract between GM and 
the class members, whereby GM’s advertisements and other representations had induced 
those class members to buy the vehicles. The only members of that class, however, were 
those that had relied upon the advertisements. The pleading therefore had to be amended 
to narrow the class to those people, so that there would be a “common interest” among 
the class.161 In that way, the plaintiffs’ damages would be sought on behalf of the class as 
a class, instead of just part of the class. Damages could therefore be assessed in the 
aggregate. While individual proceedings would be necessary in order for each class 
member to demonstrate that they had relied upon the manufacturer’s warranty, Arnup JA 
held that such proceedings could be held after the common questions were answered, and 
that this should not be a bar to a class action.162 
 This was a promising development towards the increased use of class actions in 
Ontario.163 It was not an unqualified win, however. Two subsequent decisions from the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario clarified the jurisprudence on damages class actions, making 
it clear that a class action could not proceed where individual assessments for damages 
were required. In Seafarers International Union of Canada v Lawrence,164 the plaintiffs 
sought damages for defamation. The court concluded that the damages for each class 
member would be different, and that it would not be possible to establish the exact 
amount of damages and pro-rate that amount among the class.165 In Stephenson v Air 
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160 Naken OCA, supra note 152. See also: unknown author, “Judge rules Firenza action is proper, if change 
made”, Globe and Mail (October 13, 1978), p 5, in Ontario Law Reform Commission files, Nov 1976 - Dec 
1982, Project name: class actions, RG 4-66, BA77, Box No B380543, Archives of Ontario [B380543]. 
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Canada, the Court of Appeal for Ontario166 affirmed the earlier judgment of Southey J.167 
This judgment held that a group of people who had bought Air Canada flights in August 
1978, only to find the flights were subsequently cancelled due to a strike, could not 
proceed with a class action for damages. Again, there was no common fund available in 
this case, and no way in which damages could be assessed in the aggregate. Individual 
enquiries as to damages would have to be conducted, and this meant that a class action 
would not be fair to the defendants.168 
 Nevertheless, it was clear that Ontario courts were becoming accustomed to the 
idea of class actions in general, even if they would still not permit Rule 75 proceedings 
involving individual damages or individual contracts. This development was reflected in 
other jurisdictions in Canada and internationally, where class actions were being 
researched, debated and even legislated. 
 
D. Developments in Other Jurisdictions 
 
i) New Brunswick 	  
The vanguard of the movement for class actions was led by consumer protection and 
environmental rights advocates. Postwar Canada, like many other countries in the West, 
saw a dramatic rise in mass production and the availability of consumer products. 
However, this development took place without many of the institutions that were required 
to protect consumers and ensure that transactions were fair. This led to a nationwide 
movement advocating for consumer rights and the means for enforcing them.169  
 In New Brunswick, this movement led to the creation of the Consumer Protection 
Project in the Law Reform Division of the New Brunswick Department of Justice. This 
project looked into various consumer protection mechanisms over a number of years, one 
of which was class actions. The project’s third report, released in 1976, recommended 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 The Court of Appeal for Ontario gave its decision on February 10, 1981 without reasons. Its decision is 
cited in the OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 24. 
167 (1979), 26 OR (2d) 369 (HCJ). 
168 Ibid at 369-370. See also: unknown author, “Class action suit against Air Canada ruled out”, Toronto 
Star (February 12, 1981), no page number stated, B380543, supra note 160. 
169 One of the organizations that sprang out of this movement was the Consumers’ Association of Canada, 
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Canada to the Public Policy Process” (2014) 48:2 The Journal of Consumer Affairs 380 [Sadovnikova]. 
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that legislation permitting class actions be enacted. 170  However, like many initial 
proposals for statutory change, the New Brunswick report adopted the new Rule 23 of the 
US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with very little change. Such proposals were 
troublesome in that they imported the weaknesses of Rule 23, such as the requirement for 
individual notice in damages class actions that, as noted above, could cripple class 
actions and even prevent them altogether. 
 Nevertheless, the report of the Consumer Protection Project was an important first 
salvo in the fight for reform. While New Brunswick would not end up introducing class 
actions legislation until 2006,171 its officials informed other jurisdictions’ research into 
class actions, as well as that of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada.172 
 
ii) British Columbia 
 
British Columbia also undertook early research into the possibility of class action reform. 
In August 1977, J Douglas Lambert, the BC delegate to the Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada and member of the BC Law Reform Commission, presented the annual meeting 
with a memorandum on class actions.173 The memorandum was only a preliminary 
outline of the issues to be discussed by the ULCC, with more in-depth research to follow 
once the ULCC had given guidance. Nevertheless, it was useful in outlining current 
developments,174 the state of the current law, and possibilities for reform, as well as 
crucial issues such as costs, certification and the distribution of damage awards.175  
 In response, the ULCC established a committee to monitor developments in the 
field and possibly prepare model uniform provisions for consideration the following 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 KJ Dore and RW Kerr, Third Report of the Consumer Protection Project, Vol 1 (Fredericton: New 
Brunswick Department of Justice, Law Reform Division, 1976). 
171 Class Proceedings Act, SNB 2006, c C-5.15, since repealed and replaced by RSNB 2011, c 125. 
172 The correspondence between Basil Stapleton, Director of the New Brunswick Law Reform Branch, and 
Michael Cochrane is detailed in Chapter 4. Stapleton encouraged Cochrane to have Ontario class actions 
placed on the ULCC agenda.  
173 Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC), Proceedings of the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting, held at 
St Andrews, New Brunswick, August 1977, at 208-213, online: 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/images/stories/Past_Proceedings_PDF/1977ULCC0059.pdf>.  
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year.176 While the provisions had not been prepared by the time of the 1978 meeting, the 
committee was able to report that legislation had been introduced and passed in 
Québec177 that year.178 That legislation, which is detailed further below, was to prove a 
major influence on the movement for class proceedings reform in Ontario.    
 In 1979, BC passed the Trade Practice Act179 that empowered the Director of 
Trade Practices, or any other person, to bring an action for a declaration or an injunction 
on behalf of aggrieved consumers.180 The action could be brought on behalf of consumers 
generally, or on behalf of a specific group of consumers. This was not a class action 
statute of general application (such legislation would not be passed in BC until 1996),181 
and it allowed only equitable relief. However, several commentators at the time noted 
that section 18(3) allowed courts, in an action for a permanent injunction, to restore to 
consumers any property or money of which they had been deprived by an unconscionable 
act.182 Effectively, then, a consumer class action for damages could be brought under this 
statute. As such, it was very widely applicable and reflected the wider movement for 
consumer protection and class action reform. 
 
iii) Saskatchewan 
 
Similarly, in 1978, Saskatchewan passed The Department of Consumer Affairs Act,183 
pursuant to which the provincial Attorney General could maintain an action on behalf of 
any person or class of persons who alleged that they had suffered loss as a result of illegal 	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Chair of the OLRC at the time, and Chester was counsel at the Policy Development Division at the MAG.   
177 An Act Respecting Class Actions, RSQ, c R-2.1 [Québec CPA]. The passage of the Québec legislation 
will be detailed later in this chapter. 
178 Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Sixtieth Annual Meeting, held at St John’s, 
Newfoundland, August 1978, at 111-112, online: 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/images/stories/Past_Proceedings_PDF/1978ULCC0060.pdf> [ULCC 1978]. Marie 
José Longtin, Assistant Director of Legislation at the Department of Justice of Québec, who had replaced 
Daniel Jacoby, reported on the passage of the Québec legislation (at 111).  
179 RSBC 1979, c 406. 
180 Ibid at s 18(1). 
181 Class Proceedings Act, RSBC 1996, c 50. BC was reportedly waiting for the outcome of the debate in 
Ontario before enacting legislation: J Prichard, “Class Action Reform: Some General Comments” (1984) 9 
Canadian Business Law Journal 309 at 313. 
182 E Belobaba, “Unfair Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in Consumer Protection” 
(1977), 15 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 327 at 365 [Belobaba 1977]. 
183 RSS 1978, c D-9.  
	   38 
conduct affecting consumers.184 This statute was of narrower application than the BC 
TPA, because only the Attorney General could bring a consumer class action; however, 
unlike the TPA, class actions for damages could be brought with a view to compensating 
consumers.185 The provisions of the DCAA were partly the result of a study by the 
Saskatchewan Law Reform Commission as part of its Consumer Credit Law Project,186 
commenced in 1975, which looked at the potential for class actions as a means of 
protecting consumer credit rights.  
 Although Saskatchewan made some headway towards reform of its consumer 
protection laws, there appears to have been little other movement towards class action 
reform until after Ontario passed the CPA. In the end result, a class actions statute of 
general application was not passed in Saskatchewan until 2001.187 
 
iv) Australia 
 
In 1977, in its Thirty-Sixth Report Relating to Class Actions, 188  the Law Reform 
Committee of South Australia 189 recommended legislation enacting a class actions 
procedure. The proposals included a draft statute that was modelled on the new Rule 23 
of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, legislative amendments allowing 
for class actions were not passed until 1987.190 Under these provisions, a class suit may 
be commenced “where numerous persons have common questions of fact or law 
requiring adjudication.”191 The plaintiffs must bring a motion for certification and for 
directions, but certification will not be refused simply because the action involves 
individual damages or separate contracts.192 	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note 75 and accompanying text.  
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 The only other state to have undertaken its own reform initiative is Victoria.193 In 
1986, the Victorian Parliament introduced class actions by way of amendment to the 
Supreme Court Act.194 The procedure allowed for representative proceedings where three 
or more people had the right to the same or substantially the same relief against the same 
person, or where there were common questions of law or fact.195 However, the procedure 
was extremely limited. Firstly, it was opt-in and all represented persons had to consent to 
the procedure in writing196 and be named in the originating process.197 The statutory 
provisions did not provide any other guidance to the courts, but merely empowered them 
to give directions concerning the administration of a class action.198 As a result, the new 
procedure came under heavy fire from both the courts and the federal Australian Law 
Reform Commission. The latter was particularly critical of the limits posed by the opt-in 
procedure. The courts were frustrated by the vague nature of the provisions, combined 
with their restrictive nature that stopped the courts from using their discretion to 
overcome the deficiencies.199 No class actions ever reached trial under these provisions. 
 In 1997, the Victorian Attorney-General’s Law Reform Advisory Council 
recommended to the Victorian Government that comprehensive class actions legislation, 
similar to Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act, be introduced. The Victorian 
Government did not respond, so the Supreme Court of Victoria took the initiative and 
established a class action regime that was virtually identical to part IVA by way of a new 
Order 18A to the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996. A constitutional 
challenge to the validity of the new regime came about shortly thereafter, on the basis 
that Order 18A exceeded the Court’s power to draft rules of court.200 The challenge was 
rejected by the Court of Appeal for Victoria, but the fear that the High Court of Australia 
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might declare Order 18A invalid led the Victorian Parliament to intervene and introduce 
legislation.201  
At the federal level, the Commonwealth Attorney General first referred the 
question of class action reform to the Australian Law Reform Commission in 1977.202 In 
1979, the ALRC published a Discussion Paper calling for reform.203 The report discussed 
the arguments for and against class actions, before concluding that reform was necessary 
in order to keep up with the technological and marketplace developments of the 20th 
century.204 The proposals in this Discussion Paper were modelled closely on US Rule 23. 
Various consultations were conducted on these proposals, with draft legislation being 
released for public comment in June 1988,205 and the ALRC’s final report tabled in the 
legislature in December of that year.206 However, the legislation did not come into force 
until March 1992,207 just months before the Ontario CPA came into force.  
The federal legislation followed the ALRC Report and Discussion Paper, except 
for the fact that it did not include a class actions fund (publicly-financed or otherwise).208 
Like the ALRC Report and Discussion Paper, the legislation was based largely on US 
Rule 23, but differed from those provisions in several important respects.209 Firstly, it 
contained no certification requirement. Secondly, it did not require that common issues 
predominate over individual issues. Thirdly, it expressly provided for the determination 	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of individual issues such as causation, so that even personal injury claims could proceed 
as part of a class action.210 In this sense, the federal Australian legislation was more 
plaintiff-friendly than US Rule 23. 
 
v) Québec 
 
Class proceedings, a development of the equitable and common law traditions of English-
speaking countries, would not appear to fit comfortably with a Francophone civil law 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Québec was the first province in Canada to enact class actions 
legislation, and it spearheaded reform for the rest of the country. This was part of an 
increasing trend towards law reform in the province following the Quiet Revolution.211 
Québec had enacted other ground-breaking legislation such as An Act Respecting 
Matrimonial Regimes212 that, like class actions, was studied by the OLRC.213  
 The class action device does not seem to have been subject to a long-standing 
debate in Québec. 214  The Parti Québécois government was voted into power on 
November 15, 1976, on a platform of promoting access to justice and implementing 
social and remedial legislation.215 Bill 39 respecting class actions216 was introduced in the 
legislature just a few months later in 1977, as part of a wider reformist agenda that 
included labour reform and the enactment of a consumer protection statute.217 The Bill 
itself had a strong consumer protection purpose. During the legislative debates, one 
Member declared that it was “destined to re-establish a balance between the isolated 
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citizen and companies”.218 The Québec Council of Employers took issue with this 
characterization in its report on class actions,219 objecting to the  
 
[R]hetoric according to which all large companies are exploitative, profit is 
immoral, and (when profits have indeed been earned) they were acquired 
illegally and on the back of someone else ... Is it necessary, when seeking to 
protect the vulnerable, to automatically assume that the adverse party is a 
thief?220 
 
Nevertheless, there was wide public support for reform despite the concerns of employers 
and other business groups. This support extended to the legal profession, with the 
Barreau du Québec submitting its Mémoire in January 1978.221 The Barreau welcomed 
the introduction of class actions, having been studying the procedure since 1974,222 
although it pointed out that class actions should not create new substantive rights, and 
must be compensatory rather than punitive.223  
On June 8, 1978, An Act Respecting the Class Action224 was adopted in the 
legislature, adding an entire book to the Code of Civil Procedure.225 The Act was based 
heavily on US Rule 23, as well as the Civil Practice Law and Rules of the State of New 
York.226 As the Québec delegation to the ULCC reported at its annual meeting in 1978,227 
the salient points of the new legislation included the following: 
 
i) Only “natural persons” could bring a class proceeding (in other words, the 
remedy was foreclosed to corporations and other purely legal persons);228 
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ii) Leave of the court had to be sought for the bringing of a class action, in the 
form of a “motion for authorization”, which would not involve an 
assessment of the merits of the action;229 
 
iii) On the motion for authorization, the court would consider the allegations 
and whether “they seem to justify the conclusions sought”, the existence of 
a group, the existence of common questions of law or fact, whether other 
group proceedings would be difficult or impractical, and whether the 
plaintiff would adequately represent the group;230 
 
iv) Notice at the certification stage was compulsory;231 
 
v) Class members were included in the class unless they opted out, and they 
had a right to do so;232 
 
vi) Collective recovery (aggregate damages) was permitted, with discretion 
given to the Court as to the distribution of any residue;233 
 
vii) With regard to costs, traditional costs rules continued to apply – however, 
legal fees could be taken out of any settlement or judgment before 
distribution to the class;234 In addition, a Class Action Assistance Fund 
(Fonds d’aide aux recours collectifs or the “Fonds”) paid the plaintiff 
lawyer’s fees, the costs of notification and general disbursements.235 
 
There were some aspects of the Act that had not been borrowed from the US. These 
included the “natural persons” requirement, the requirement that the allegations “seem to 
justify the conclusions sought” (basically, a requirement that the facts as pleaded support 
one or more causes of action), and, most importantly, the Class Action Assistance Fund. 
The idea of a government-supported Fund to reimburse fees and disbursements did not 
exist in the US and was completely new to Québec. It was to form an important precedent 
for Ontario and was significant in facilitating class proceedings legislation there. 
The Québec legislation had rather an uninspiring start. In the first five years 
following its enactment, an average of only 20 class actions per year were commenced 
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(compared to an average of 55,000 cases brought annually in Québec Superior Court).236 
The Fonds was also vastly underutilized, with only $15,500 of the $100,000 available to 
claimants being used in 1979.237 As a result, amendments were introduced in 1982 upon 
the advice of consumer groups and the Fonds.238 Cooperatives were added to the 
organizations entitled to act as class representatives, without requiring that someone in 
the class had to have been a member of that organization when the action arose. 
Immediate appeals as of right from certification orders were repealed for defendants. 
Most importantly, the powers of the Fonds to finance class actions were extended, and a 
controversial supplementary counsel fee was repealed. These changes retained the 
traditional two-way costs rules, but provided greater protection from costs risks for 
representative plaintiffs. 
 Unfortunately, however, the Québec courts showed reluctance to give the 
legislation full effect. This persisted even into the 1980s, with two major decisions from 
that decade showing the courts’ cautious approach. In both Nault v Canadian Consumer 
Co Ltd239 (a consumer class action) and Comité de citoyens et d’action municipale de St-
Césaire c Ville de St-Césaire240 (an action by residents against a municipality for passing 
a series of by-laws), the courts stated that a class action was not the appropriate vehicle 
for resolution of the class members’ claims.241 In the same conservative manner as the 
Ontario courts prior to the early 1970s, the Québec courts emphasized the differences 
between class members (different contracts in Nault, and different interests in the 
outcome in St-Césaire) rather than the common issues that bound them together. 
This approach changed in 1990, at the same time as Ontario was debating the 
CPA in the legislature. Tremaine c AH Robins Canada Inc242 involved the notorious 
Dalkon Shield, a contraceptive device that the plaintiffs alleged was faulty and that had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Glenn, supra note 40 at 255. 
237 Canadian Press, “Class action fund plan needs better publicity, Québec officials say”, Canadian Press 
(January 31, 1981), P3, B380543, supra note 160.  
238 Glenn, supra note 40 at 257-259. See also Bogart 1987, supra note 46 at 687. 
239 [1981] 1 SCR 553 at 354-355, cited in Finn 2005, supra note 20. 
240 [1986] RJQ 1061, cited in Finn 2005, ibid, at 355-356. This proceeding was commenced under the class 
action provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, although there were alternative avenues of redress for the 
petitioners (plaintiffs) under the Code (for example, by way of joinder under Articles 59 or 67). The Court 
pointed to these alternative avenues when denying the petitioners’ motion for authorization. 
241 Canadian Press, “Court denies class action”, Globe and Mail (May 12, 1981), p 11, B380543, supra 
note 160. 
242 [1990] RDJ 500 [Tremaine], cited in Finn 2005, supra note 20 at 357. 
	   45 
led to pregnancies and pregnancy-related complications among class members. The Court 
of Appeal held that differences between class members should not prevent the 
authorization of a class action, and stated that the plaintiffs’ case rose and fell on the 
question of whether the design of the Dalkon Shield was faulty. It disagreed with the 
court of first instance when it called the class action “an extraordinary procedure”, 
holding instead that a class proceeding was purely a procedural vehicle like any other 
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure.243 This reasoning was followed in numerous 
subsequent cases,244 showing that the class action provisions of the Code were receiving a 
more liberal interpretation consistent with consumer rights and corporate responsibility.  
The Québec class action began to be truly effective just when the CPA came into 
force in Ontario. While Québec’s reform had blazed a trail for the rest of Canada, its 
courts’ tardiness in recognizing and giving effect to the innovative nature of the device 
meant that Ontario caught up quickly. 
 
E. Conclusion 
 
The rise of class actions in North America and Australia was accompanied by a rising 
sympathy towards the device in the Ontario courts. The liberal interpretation of the 
“common success” test meant that class actions could proceed under Rule 75 even where 
class members did not all have the same contract (as long as their contracts were 
substantially identical) and even if damages were claimed (as long as those damages 
could be assessed in the aggregate). 
 However, despite these developments, it became increasingly clear to all 
observers that Rule 75 was inadequate to deal with complex litigation such as the modern 
class action. Academic commentators noted that courts were procedurally ill-equipped to 
deal with issues such as damages assessments and distribution,245 notification of absent 
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class members and disposition of unclaimed awards.246 Even the Court of Appeal in 
Naken, although it allowed that class action to proceed, asked for legislative intervention: 
 
[T]he plaintiffs face many procedural and evidentiary difficulties if this 
action is allowed to proceed. If we are to have consumer class actions in 
Ontario it would be highly desirable that there be enacted legislation or rules 
of practice or both, pursuant to which such actions could be conducted.247 
 
Such a plea was highly prescient, and would be echoed by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the same case. The Supreme Court’s decision in Naken was one of the many catalysts 
to reform that would occur in the years leading up to the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee Report and the passage of the CPA.  
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Chapter 3 
The Early Campaign for Reform and the OLRC Report 
 
 
 
The later part of the 20th century, particularly from the late 1960s onwards, saw an 
expansion of bureaucracy in public administration, while mass production became ever 
more pervasive in private industry.248 As the size of institutions and businesses grew, 
they became increasingly distant from the citizens that used them.249 A wider swath of 
citizens was become affected by the actions of those institutions and businesses, at the 
same time as it was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain recourse against those 
bodies. This era saw the rise to prominence of activists such as Ralph Nader, who 
campaigned for consumer, environmental and other rights, as well as recourse for breach 
of those rights. The cost of litigation meant that very few individuals would be willing to 
sue the government or a multi-national corporation for a wrong done to them; however, 
class actions rose in popularity as people began to see that there was strength in numbers. 
As Neil Williams has observed: 
 
No matter how just the claim, it is the exceptional person who will embark 
on litigation against an intransigent business corporation or government 
agency, particular if the individual stake is only small. However, a 
vindication of rights becomes a realizable prospect when the citizen sues not 
just for himself but also for hundreds and possibly thousands of others in an 
identical position.250  
 
This enthusiasm occurred not only in the United States with the enactment of the new 
Rule 23 that allowed for class actions for damages; as noted in the previous chapter, it 
arose in numerous jurisdictions including Canada. Following the developments occurring 
in their neighbour to the south, the passage of the new Rule 23 was viewed with interest 
by Canadian advocates of consumer, environmental, and civil rights. With the 
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increasingly liberal attitude of the courts towards class actions, these advocates were 
encouraged to press for a similar remedy in Canada.  
 
A. The Fight for Consumer Rights 
 
Consumer rights were on the rise in the late 1960s and 1970s in North America, with the 
enactment of public regulation such as the Ontario Consumer Protection Act251 and the 
establishment of consumer protection agencies such as the federal Department of 
Consumer and Corporate Affairs.252 These measures were taken to redress the imbalance 
of power between consumer and producer, and to protect consumers against economic 
losses.253 As consumer rights proponents occupied the vanguard for the campaign for 
class actions in Canada,254 the issue was increasingly debated in the press. Consumer 
advocates argued that expanding rights was pointless without a machinery to enforce 
those rights. Because consumers would not bother bringing a small individual claim 
arising from shoddy goods because of the expense, delays and inconvenience, an 
effective machinery should include class actions.255 Class actions under Rule 75 were 
brought against corporations such as GM256 and Ford.257 The lawyers in those cases rose 	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to prominence as consumer rights advocates, with Jeff Lyons (counsel for the plaintiffs in 
the Ford action and the Naken case against GM) being dubbed “Canada’s Ralph 
Nader”.258 
On the other side, business interests argued that allowing class actions would 
harm legitimate businesses, place an enormous burden on the courts, and prove 
expensive, slow, cumbersome and ineffective for consumers.259 The case for consumer 
class actions was also made in several working papers commissioned by the Canadian 
Consumer Council in the early 1970s. Two of those papers looked at the subject of 
consumer advocacy, and both recommended the facilitation of class actions for the 
purpose of enforcing consumer rights.260  
As the debate continued and complaints about the condition of manufactured 
goods (particularly vehicles) increased, the Ontario government asked the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission to study the subject. 261  The OLRC’s Report on Consumer 
Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods262 was tabled in the Ontario legislature 
in June 1972. The OLRC Consumer Report made various recommendations in order to 
increase the availability of consumer remedies in Ontario, including giving the Consumer 
Protection Bureau the power to mediate all warranty disputes, and also to bring test cases 
to determine important questions of law.263 However, although the OLRC considered 
whether to recommend amending the Ontario law to allow for the bringing of consumer 
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263 Ibid at 108-109. 
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class actions, it ultimately decided that class actions needed to be investigated separately 
as they raised broader questions of a substantive and procedural nature.264 
The question of class actions in the consumer context was raised again in July 
1974, in a study directly on the subject commissioned by the Consumers’ Association of 
Canada.265 The CAC Study recommended class action reform in order to facilitate 
consumer claims. Specifically, the study stated that class action provisions should include 
a certification test; class members should receive notice following certification and be 
permitted to opt out; that discontinuance, dismissal or settlement only occur with court 
approval; and that class actions should not be barred simply because they make a claim 
for individual damages. 266  With regard to costs, the CAC Study was particularly 
controversial in that it recommended a “one-way” costs rule – so that costs could be 
awarded to a successful plaintiff, but the plaintiff would not have to pay costs to a 
successful defendant.267 
These numerous reports gradually built up the case for consumer class actions 
throughout the 1970s. However, consumers were not the only group advocating for 
reform. As consciousness of consumer rights grew, so did consciousness of the 
environment and the damage that was being done to it.  
 
B. Environmental Rights and Standing 
 
The late 1960s and early 1970s also saw the rise of environmental awareness in Canada. 
The formation in the US of groups such as Friends of the Earth, as well as the publication 
of books such as Silent Spring (on the damage caused by the spraying of pesticides)268 led 
to a parallel movement in Canada, with the foundation of movements such as Greenpeace 
and Pollution Probe, and the establishment of government agencies such as Environment 
and Climate Change Canada. Similarly, disasters such as the nuclear meltdown at Three 
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Mile Island in the US269 and stories of widespread pollution in Canada270 led to increased 
awareness of the harm that increasing industrialization could cause to both humans and 
their environment.271  
 For those wishing to sue corporations for widespread environmental harm, 
however, there was virtually no recourse.272 Three barriers stood in the way of these 
environmental actions.273 The first was the “common interest” requirement that prevented 
many such actions in the 1970s.274 Class actions for private nuisance involved numerous 
individual issues and therefore did not satisfy this requirement;275 class actions for public 
nuisance were problematic for different reasons, as described below.  
The second barrier was financing, as the application of traditional costs rules 
would have prevented many litigants from undertaking the risk of an environmental 
action.276 The 1970s saw the advent of a publicly-funded legal aid program in Ontario as 
well as the establishment of clinics (partly funded by the government) such as the 
Canadian Environmental Law Association.277 The financing of public participation in 
environmental actions was a subject dear to Ian Scott (then in private practice).278 When 
he later became Attorney General, he oversaw the introduction of the Intervenor Funding 
Project Act279 that provided qualified interveners with advanced funding.280 	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The third and major obstacle was that of standing. Environmental suits at 
common law were generally brought by way of an action for public nuisance, because 
they involved interference with a public right (such as the right to fish or the right to 
clean air).281 However, the infringement of public rights was a matter for the Attorney 
General, who was guardian of public rights and therefore the only one who could sue to 
remedy their breach.282 The only way anyone else could have standing to sue is if he or 
she suffered particular direct damage over and above that suffered by the public 
generally.283 This was a major impediment to environmental class actions, as many 
interest groups readily acknowledged.284 
 This rule was relaxed throughout the 1970s, in a series of cases beginning with 
Thorson v Canada.285 Thorson was an action brought by a taxpayer who was suing on the 
basis that the Official Languages Act was unconstitutional, as was the Appropriation Act 
that provided money to implement the OLA. While the lower courts decided that Thorson 
did not have standing, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that he did. They 
reasoned that the question sought to be adjudicated would otherwise be immune from 
judicial review, because there was no-one particularly aggrieved, the government was 
unwilling to direct a reference, and the Attorney-General was unwilling to institute 
proceedings on behalf of the public. Two subsequent decisions, Nova Scotia Board of 
Censors v McNeil286 and Canada (Minister of Justice) v Borowski,287 were decided on a 
similar basis. According to the three cases, the requirements for public interest standing 	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would be met where there was a serious issue as to the validity of the Act in question; 
where the applicant was directly affected by the Act or had a genuine interest in its 
validity; and where there was no other reasonable and effective way of bringing the issue 
before the Court.288  
In making these decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada loosened the reins on the 
requirement that the ability to sue must be based on a traditional legal interest and the 
one-to-one adversarial model.289 This would have important ramifications for class 
actions. Indeed, many of the actors involved in the later work on class actions by the 
Ministry of the Attorney General were involved in the efforts to change the law on 
standing – including Ian Scott.290 In addition, the rapidly evolving law of standing led the 
Ontario Law Reform Commission to commence a study of the subject, although the 
report was not completed until long after the OLRC Report on class actions.291 
In the midst of this rise in consumer and environmental activism, combined with 
developments in the US and changes in the common law to accommodate the cases that 
were increasingly being brought before the courts in Ontario, Attorney General Roy 
McMurtry decided that the time had come for the OLRC to study class actions as well. In 
his letter to the Commission,292 McMurtry acknowledged that court decisions in Ontario 
would continue to change the law on class actions, and also that the Commission was 
studying the related law on standing. He also referred to the OLRC Consumer Report and 
its position that class actions was a complex area of the law that merited separate 
study,293 before concluding that, “I think that the time has come for a comprehensive look 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Ibid at 575-576. 
289 Bogart 1987, supra note 46 at 667-668. 
290 R Furness, “Inquiry must hear waste site opponents”, Globe and Mail (November 3, 1977), in Ontario 
Law Reform Commission files, Nov 1976 - Dec 1982, Project name: class actions, RG 4-66, BA77, Box 
No B380538, Archives of Ontario [B380538]. The article reports on the efforts of north Toronto residents 
to have standing to appear before the Royal Commission on Waste Management to challenge the approval 
of a landfill permit. The Divisional Court granted them standing. Ian Scott appeared as counsel on that 
case, along with John Swaigen of the Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA). CELA was later 
to participate in the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform.  
291 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law of Standing (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 1989). Curiously, there is no evidence that the OLRC Report on Standing influenced the 
deliberations of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform, whose report was 
released in 1990 (AGAC Report, supra note 6). 
292 Letter from Attorney General Roy McMurtry to Allan Leal, Chairman of the OLRC, November 17, 
1976 [AG Reference], B380537, supra note 255. 
293 In fact, H Allan Leal, then Chairman of the OLRC, had sent the class actions section of the OLRC 
Consumer Report to the MAG Policy Development Division just six days before McMurtry wrote the AG 
	   54 
at the nature of the class action and the advisability or inadvisability of its development, 
in one form or another, in Ontario.”294 It was to be another six years, however, before the 
Commission released its recommendations. In the meantime, there would be further 
significant developments in the debate on class actions. 
 
C. Class Actions and the Combines Investigation Act 
 
In 1975, the federal government amended the Combines Investigation Act295 to permit 
civil actions for violations of the Act. Persons who had suffered loss or damages as a 
result of a failure to comply with the Act, or an order of the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission or a court, could sue the person who had failed to comply. Offences 
included conspiracy, bid-rigging, discriminatory pricing, and misleading or false 
advertising. Consumers and corporations alike could use these provisions.296   
 Two years later, in March 1977, the government proposed further amendments to 
the CIA, including provisions specifically for class actions. The provisions not only 
allowed people to sue as a class for damages sustained as a result of competition-related 
offences, but also provided a detailed guide as to the procedural and substantive rules 
governing such class actions.297 This was the first time any comprehensive class actions 
legislation had been introduced in Canada.298 Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada 
Minister Anthony C. Abbott299 announced that the Act’s framework for class actions 
would include the following:300 
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• Requirement for certification, including whether the proceedings were brought in 
good faith and appeared to have merit; 
• Plaintiffs who were unsuccessful on certification, on an interlocutory motion or at 
an individual issues trial would have costs awarded against them; however, no-
way costs rules would apply at a common issues trial; 
• Counsel fees would be paid out of individual damage awards on a pro-rata basis; 
• Where a court refused to certify an action, the Competition Policy Advocate could 
bring a substitute action on behalf of class members, and damages would be paid 
to the Federal Treasury to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant; 
• Jurisdiction would initially vest with the Federal Court, but the Superior Courts of 
the provinces could be empowered to hear such cases once agreement had been 
reached with the provincial Attorneys General. 
 
Certification would not be denied based solely on the fact that an action involved 
individual damages or separate contracts; class members would be included in the class 
unless they opted out; and notice at any stage of the action would be optional and within 
the court’s discretion. 301  In addition, leave of the court would be required for 
discontinuance, abandonment or settlement. 302  The Act would be renamed the 
Competition Act.  
 The class actions proposals for the new Competition Act were based substantially 
on a report written for Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada.303 The recommendations 
on costs for the new Competition Act were particularly interesting. The proposals and the 
report assumed that giving plaintiffs immunity for costs at the common issues trial would 
remove the financial deterrent to bringing class actions.304 However, they failed to 
consider that the certification stage, especially where (as in this case) there was a prima 
facie assessment of the merits, could be just as cost prohibitive for plaintiffs. This was a 
sign of Canada’s inexperience with class actions at this point. The new Rule 23 in the US 	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(where parties bore their own costs) had only been in existence for just over a decade, 
and class action legislation had not yet been enacted in Québec. There was very little 
indication that certification would one day become the main battleground in class actions. 
Canada still had a lot to learn. 
 The reaction to the class actions proposals for the new Competition Act was 
indicative of the later debate that was to rage over the Class Proceedings Act. The press 
was mostly positive about class action reform, but lukewarm as to the provisions of the 
Competition Act. Criticisms were directed towards the restrictions on class actions (for 
example, limitation periods and the inability to sue for breach of implied warranty and 
defective products),305 and other provisions of the Act, such as the wide and arbitrary 
powers given to the Competition Board. 306  The Canadian Consumer magazine 
encouraged its readership to lobby their provincial governments for class actions reform 
instead.307 Jeff Lyons, class counsel in Naken, stated that the certification requirements 
were too restrictive and that the legislation as a whole made “too many concessions to big 
business.”308 Consumer advocates and the press mostly agreed.309 
 For its part, “big business” strongly opposed the proposals. The Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce called for the complete deletion of the provisions on class and 
substitute actions.310 It disagreed with the findings of the Whybrow Report and the 
legislation that there was a pressing need or public demand for widespread civil 
enforcement of the Act’s provisions.311 It took particular issue with the costs proposals, 
stating that making defendants pay their own costs whatever the outcome was 	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“iniquitous” and as a result “a powerful weapon has been added to the ‘legal blackmail’ 
arsenal”; instead of discouraging frivolous suits, the costs provisions would make class 
actions “a vehicle for harassment.”312 The Chamber submitted that, if class and substitute 
actions were to be permitted, then the actions should be on an opt-in basis and traditional 
costs rules should apply.313 The Independent Petroleum Association objected to “[t]he 
prejudice against business underlying the Act”, and stated that “class actions in the 
United States of America have proved to be highly beneficial to lawyers and of little use 
to anyone else.”314 Like the Chamber, it took issue with the costs provisions of the Act,315 
stating they were consistent with “the philosophy that business, being per se undersirable 
[sic], should be penalized more heavily than others.”316 It too recommended total deletion 
of the sections on class and substitute actions.317 
 Other business interests, however, were a little less categorical in their opposition. 
While the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association (CMA) stated that substitute actions 
should not be allowed, it would permit class actions if they were limited to prevent 
abuse.318 It particularly objected to the possibility of aggregate damages assessments,319 
although, surprisingly, it made no submissions on the issue of costs. The Retail Council 
of Canada similarly called for the scrapping of the substitute actions provisions, and 
stated that class actions “involving large classes who have individually suffered small 
losses [are] anomalous, unfair to defendants and should not be permitted.”320 However, it 
acknowledged that class actions had limited value in certain circumstances,321 provided 
that certain protections were built-in. These included a requirement to opt in, to 
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individually prove damages, and the application of traditional costs rules,322 as well as a 
stringent and mandatory requirement for notice.323  
 The legal profession also objected to the class actions section of the Competition 
Act, because class actions would involve procedural and substantive changes to the law, 
and a wider review of the subject, as well as consultations with the provinces, was 
required.324 More importantly, the Canadian Bar Association also voiced a concern that 
was held by many in the bar and the wider population,325 and which posed a cultural and 
philosophical barrier to the institution of class actions in general – that the Competition 
Act would lead to an undermining of the power of the democratically elected legislature: 
 
To the extent that class action damage suits might in time become the 
predominant method of enforcement of the [Competition Act], the direction 
of public policy in this area of the law may be taken to a substantial degree 
out of the hands of law enforcement officers and Ministers of the Crown and 
placed in the hands of aggressive and innovative plaintiffs’ counsel and the 
courts, which appears to have been the experience in the United States.326 
 
The concerns of the bar and the business community were made even clearer in the oral 
submissions to the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs. The 
Vice-President for Canadian Pacific submitted that the provisions on class and substitute 
actions were “certainly over-kill. More than that, we certainly do not know of any real 
basis that would indicate that that kind of provision is necessary at this time… [it] should 
be completely deleted.”327 As in its written submission, the Canadian Chamber of 
Commerce stated that the benefits of class actions had not been proven and that, on the 
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323 Ibid at 8. 
324 Canadian Bar Association, Submission on Bill C-42, The Competition Act, to the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, June 7, 1977, at 2 [CBA Competition 
Submission], B380538, supra note 290. 
325 See, for example, the following opinion editorial on the introduction of an Environmental Rights Bill: 
“Smith’s idea fatally flawed”, Toronto Star (December 6, 1979) [Star December 1979], B380543, supra 
note 160. The opposition to judicial activism will be covered in more detail in the section on the Charter 
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326 CBA Competition Submission, supra note 324 at 6-7. 
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contrary, the US experience showed it to be “a circus”.328 These business groups were not 
reassured when Robert Bertrand, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Competition Policy, 
made it clear that they did not have to fear frivolous suits because protection would be 
provided by the certification test in the Act.329 The business groups responded by stating 
that the main deterrence to frivolous suits were traditional costs rules, and they expressed 
their concern that the Act was departing from these rules in the context of class actions.330 
They also reiterated their desire that the mechanism, if enacted, be on a strictly opt-in 
basis,331 otherwise class actions could be used as a “club against corporate defendants” 
and would “end up clogging the courts.”332 The Standing Committee recommended 
amendments to the class actions provisions, including a requirement that the plaintiff 
demonstrate that a certain proportion of the class supported her claim, as well as 
restrictions on damages.333  
 It was the Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce,334 however, which sounded the death knell of the Competition Act’s class 
action provisions. While the advocates for class actions had been active in the preparation 
of the legislation and in the media, it was the business interests that predominated at the 
Senate Committee hearings. Representatives of Imperial Oil and Dominion Foundries 
and Steel (Dofasco) made submissions regarding the “legalized blackmail” and 
“undesirable temptation to have litigation” posed by class actions.335 They asserted that 
representative plaintiffs would not be truly representative of the class, who would not 
even be well-informed enough to make a claim, and even the Committee Chair agreed 
that to think otherwise would be “a pious hope”.336 The business groups strongly 
submitted that traditional costs rules should apply to class actions, and if the government 	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331 Ibid. 
332 Ibid (Alasdair McKichan). 
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thought plaintiffs should be subsidized, it should provide a public fund for that 
purpose.337  
 The business groups referred frequently to the US experience with class actions, 
and, from the Senators’ response, this appears to have been the most persuasive part of 
their submissions. Dofasco obtained an opinion letter from a Buffalo-based law firm that 
had worked in this area.338 The firm supported the submissions made by the business 
interests, describing its experience with US federal class action procedures as 
“horrible”.339 It provided statistics demonstrating the substantial increase in the courts’ 
caseload following the enactment of the new Rule 23,340 and stated that the Rule had been 
plagued by the fact that there was no meaningful standard for certification, so that broad 
classes would be certified and would drive defendants to settle even unmeritorious 
actions.341 In light of this dire warning from the US, the Senators asked the business 
groups why they accepted class actions at all – to which they responded that “we accept 
the inevitable.”342 
 The business community’s serious reservations persuaded the Senate Committee 
to recommend that the class actions section of the Competition Act be deleted.343 In the 
alternative, if the section were to be retained, then the Senate Committee recommended 
that traditional costs rules should apply and that representative plaintiffs should put up 
security for costs. The Committee cynically reasoned that these costs rules would not 
form an insuperable barrier to class actions, because plaintiffs would probably be 
bankrolled by a consumer organization or a class actions lawyer.344  
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Unfortunately for advocates of class actions, the Senate Committee’s 
recommendations carried the day.345 On November 18, 1977, a watered-down version of 
the Competition Act was introduced in the legislature346 in order “to head off an angry 
confrontation with Canada’s business community”.347 However, even that version of the 
Act drew heavy fire from business.348 The entire statute eventually died on the Order 
Paper prior to the general election in 1979, and the next Progressive Conservative 
government did nothing to revive it.349 Class action reform would not be debated again in 
the legislature until well into the next decade. 
 
D. The Report of the Williston Committee 
 
Nevertheless, the device was being discussed in many other contexts in the intervening 
period. In 1980, the Civil Procedure Revision Committee released its report on the 
revision of the rules of court.350 Chaired by Walter Williston, a Bay Street QC,351 the 
Committee had begun its work in December 1975352 and was directed by Attorney 
General McMurtry to simplify the procedure and reduce the number of Rules in order to 
decrease costs and delay.353 McMurtry had mentioned the Williston Committee’s work in 
his reference to the OLRC in 1976, but had decided that a subject as complex as class 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 These advocates included Simon Chester at the Policy Development Division. Chester wrote to his 
colleague at the Ministry of the Attorney General, enclosing the minutes of the Senate Committee hearings 
pertaining to class actions (supra note 334), stating that they were “for our ‘Know your Enemies – Who 
Killed C-42’ file” (Letter from Chester, September 27, 1977, B319672, supra note 300). 
346 Wildsmith, supra note 333 at 91-92. This new version of the Bill required that the representative 
plaintiff provide proof that a certain portion of the class supported the action, and that the claims of the 
class were likely to be large enough to justify the cost in administering them. It also removed the substitute 
action provisions. See also J Ziegel, “Consumer has little muscle in court”, Toronto Star (November 1, 
1978), B380543, supra note 160. 
347 J Honderich, “Trust-buster’s powers limited under new bill”, Toronto Star (November 18, 1977) B7, 
B380543, ibid. 
348 Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce on the Subject Matter of 
Bill C-13, Debates of the Senate, Vol 125, No 91, June 29, 1978, pp 1004-1020, cited in W Stanbury, “Half 
a Loaf: Bill C-29, Proposed Amendments to the Combines Investigation Act” (1985) 10:1 The Canadian 
Business Law Journal 1 at 6 [Stanbury]. 
349 Stanbury, ibid, at 6.  
350 WB Williston, Report of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 1980). 
351 Williston was an early proponent of contingency fees in Ontario: see Williston Contingency Fees, infra 
note 365. 
352 WB Williston, “Revising the Ontario Rules of Practice – The Work of the Civil Procedure Revision 
Committee” (1977) 1 Advocates’ Quarterly 18 at 18.	  
353 Ibid at 21-22. 
	   62 
actions merited separate study.354 For the same reason, after the OLRC commenced its 
study, McMurtry asked the Committee to stop its work on a class actions rule.355  
While the final Williston Report contained no reform of the existing Rule 75 on 
representative actions, the Committee’s draft of the class actions rule is revealing. The 
Williston Committee recommended, among other things, a certification test (but not on 
the merits),356 notice within the discretion of the court,357 and the ability to award 
aggregate damages.358 However, it contained no provisions for opting-out (or in),359 or 
for costs, in which case traditional costs rules would have continued to apply. The rule is 
fairly skeletal and reflected the preliminary nature of the Committee’s work on the 
subject. The Committee knew enough, however, to conclude in its final Report that, “we 
are convinced that the present procedure concerning class actions is in a very serious state 
of disarray.”360 This phrase would be picked up time and again by advocates seeking to 
reform the law on class actions.361 
 
E. Private Members’ Bills on Class Actions 
 
Two of these advocates attempted to bring about reform by way of three Private 
Members Bills (PMBs), all of which were worded exactly the same. NDP MPP Patrick 
Lawlor introduced the first two bills in 1977362 and 1980,363 and Mel Swart (also NDP) 
introduced the third in 1982.364 None of them progressed past first reading.  
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The bills contained a certification requirement, including a requirement that it is 
prima facie in the interests of the class that the action be brought as a class proceeding. 
They also stated that individual damages or separate contracts were not to be an 
impediment to certification. Notice would be within the discretion of the court, and class 
members would have a right to opt out. Cases could not be settled or discontinued 
without court permission. Other than these provisions, however, the bills were very bare 
indeed. They said nothing about rights of discovery or how damages were to be 
determined, and they were silent on costs (meaning that traditional costs rules would 
apply). Given these deficiencies, it is likely that these bills would have done little to 
encourage class actions or clear up the confusion in the case law, even if any of them had 
been passed. 
 
F. Class Actions Legislation in Québec 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, in 1978 Québec became the first province in Canada to 
enact class actions legislation. This was a major boost to the movement for reform in 
Ontario, as the advocates of class actions could now point to an example other than the 
United States (a jurisdiction that Canada had been historically reluctant to emulate on this 
matter). The authors of the OLRC Report relied heavily upon the Québec experience as 
an example of how class actions could work, as did the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee. Although the Québec courts were initially restrictive in their interpretation of 
class actions, they eventually began to interpret the device more liberally, and this helped 
prepare the ground for reform in Ontario. 
 However, although the Québec experience demonstrated how class actions could 
work outside the US, there were still several barriers to class action reform in Ontario, 
and the breaking down of those barriers would require a change in the legal culture. One 
of them was contingency fees, another US device to which the Ontario bar was 
historically averse.  
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G. The Debate on Contingency Fees 
 
Contingency fees were regarded with hostility and suspicion by many of the business 
groups and others involved in the class actions debate, such that they were seen as “legal 
leprosy”.365 An agreement to charge fees on the contingency that the lawyer won or 
settled the case was traditionally seen as champerty (where a plaintiff pursues a lawsuit in 
her own name in return for sharing any eventual award with her lawyer) and maintenance 
(where, for improper motives, a person assists someone else with a lawsuit in which the 
person has no interest).366 They were also forbidden by statute in Ontario, pursuant to the 
Solicitors Act 367  and An Act Respecting Champerty. 368  However, there was some 
evidence in the later part of the 20th century that lawyers were pursuing cases on a de 
facto contingency basis, only collecting their fees from the client once a case had been 
resolved successfully.369 
 To fully understand the debate, however, the term “contingency fee” must be 
clarified, as there are several ways in which such fees can be calculated: 
 
i) Fee as a percentage of the client’s net recovery; 
ii) Fee based on hourly billing; 
iii) Fee based on hourly billing, multiplied by a certain number agreed in advance 
(a “multiplier”) in order to reflect the risk assumed by the lawyer. 
 
It is apparent that the de facto contingency basis which was largely accepted in Ontario in 
the later 20th century was a simple fee based on hourly billing (lawyers simply collected 
their fee once the litigation was successfully resolved).370 During the course of the 
contingency fee debate that began in the late 1960s in Ontario, some commentators 
expressed support for a “controlled” contingency fee, ie the third option above, with the 	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added requirement of court approval.371 Because of the perceived excesses of their US 
counterparts, very few in the legal profession were in favour of the first option – a fee as 
a percentage of the client’s net recovery – at least until the 1980s.372 When commentators 
referred to classic US-style contingency fees, it was invariably the first option to which 
they were referring.373 
 The prevalence of contingency fees in the US was a major reason why they were 
regarded with such repugnance in Ontario.374 Courts decried the “‘American Ambulance-
Chaser’ [which] has become a visible factor in so called professional life.”375 Law reform 
advocates assured their opponents that Ontario was not a “California North”,376 full of 
“bounty-hunter lawyers looking … [for] a fat contingent fee”377 because such fees were 
not permitted there. Even newspapers sympathetic towards class actions bore headlines 
stating, “Don’t give lawyers a cut” and opposing US-style contingency fees.378 The 
Canadian Bar Association – Ontario (CBA) stated that, “contingent fee systems are 
typically American and sprang from a legal system which did not have court costs or 
Legal Aid.”379  
The CBA also took the position, as many other opponents did, that contingency 
fees would compromise the integrity of the legal profession because “a lawyer becomes a 
litigant rather than an officer of the court”380 and the lawyer would be put in a position of 	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conflict with his or her client.381 The overall position of the CBA was that the drawbacks 
of contingent fees outweighed their advantages.382 The Attorney General himself was 
opposed to any change in the law,383 and as a result the Law Society of Upper Canada 
decided not to conduct an in-depth study of the issue,384 having received “considerable” 
correspondence almost all of which was opposed to contingency fees.385 Finally, in April 
1980, the Professional Organizations Committee recommended that, “[t]here should be 
no relaxation of the current prohibition of contingent fees as a payment mechanism for 
legal services in Ontario.”386 
 Even into the 1980s, therefore, there was staunch and widespread opposition to 
the introduction of contingency fees in Ontario. The issue was to prove a major point of 
contention in the continuing debate on class actions, as well as in the eventual 
deliberations of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee.387  
 
H. The Charter and its Impact on Legal Culture 
 
Not all opposition to class actions was purely pragmatic or self-interested. Some of the 
opposition was also on the basis of principle. A significant concern of business interests 
and other opponents was the discretion and case management power that the device gave 
to judges. Commentators observed that class actions legislation would take power out of 
the hands of the democratically-elected legislature and place it in the hand of the 
judiciary. They stated that the class action was not “merely a new adjudicative procedure. 
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It is highly exceptional in character … and it is quite possible to see in it … a ‘serious 
judicial usurpation of the functions of the legislature.’”388  
 This was a concern that was not limited to class actions. It also related to other 
statutes that gave judges a high level of discretion, such as the proposed Environmental 
Rights Bill outlined above. The power this Bill would have given to the courts was 
remarked upon with concern even by the Toronto Star, traditionally a more left-leaning 
newspaper: 
 
Judges would be given legislative powers … This clashes with a primary 
principle of democracy: That laws can only be made by popularly elected 
legislators, and that they are implemented by government ministers who are 
directly accountable to those legislators. The function of the courts and their 
judges is to arbitrate disputes over what the law is and to determine fact. It 
is not to make the law.389 
 
Of course, the main focus of fears about judicial activism in the late 1970s and early 
1980s was the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.390 Historically, Canadian 
courts had not been nearly as activist as their American cousins; while the American 
courts played a unique role created by their constitutionally-entrenched Bill of Rights, 
prior to 1982 the Canadian courts had had no such role (and in fact the highest court in 
Canada had, until 1949, been in England).391  
However, with the advent of the Charter in 1982, the courts began to have a role 
not simply in interpreting law but in articulating fundamental values, and the legal culture 
of Canada took one step closer to that of the United States.392 Indeed, after a few years, 
legal academe, the bar and the public in general came not only to acknowledge that the 
judiciary was taking on a legislative function, but also to accept and perhaps even 
welcome it.393 The class action simply fit conveniently into this contemporary judicial 	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role,394 as a more activist judiciary (together with changes to the classic two-party 
adversarial model of litigation that Charter litigation began to entail)395 was an essential 
ingredient of the class action device.396 The Charter, therefore, caused many of the more 
philosophical arguments against class actions to fall by the wayside. 
 This marked change in legal culture began in 1982, the same year the OLRC 
Report was released. With the Charter still in its infancy, however, the ground was not 
yet sufficiently prepared for the OLRC Report to take root. It was released into a world 
that still clung to traditional modes of litigation and a conservative role for the judiciary, 
and therefore, to a significant extent, fell on deaf ears. 
 
I. The OLRC Report 
 
Six long years after the Attorney General referred the subject of class actions in 
November 1976, the OLRC released its Report. There appear to have been no public 
consultations during this time, except for one advertisement in the Ontario Reports 
inviting submissions,397 and very few announcements or public statements regarding the 
project. As far as the outside world was concerned, nothing was heard until June 1982 
when the Attorney General tabled the OLRC Report in the Ontario legislature.398 Any 
momentum that the movement for class action reform had had when the Report was 
commissioned had been lost by the time it was released. There is very little explanation 
as to why the Report took so long,399 and why, when it was finally released, it was 880 
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pages of unnecessarily long and repetitive “dense legal prose”400 that likely discouraged 
many less well-resourced groups from commenting on it.401 
 Despite the warm reception the Report received, therefore, it is very unlikely that 
most of the people praising it had read it in its entirety. Attorney General McMurtry 
praised it as “the culmination of [a] massive project of research and scholarship [that] has 
reviewed every aspect of the law relating to class actions” and a major contribution to the 
class actions debate.402 Academics stated that it “deserves to become a basic reference 
work on the subject”403 and that it “demands the attention of all procedural reformers.”404  
Consumer advocates and the wider public welcomed the Report’s call for class action 
reform in Ontario.405 However, Andrew Roman, head of the Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre who was later to sit on the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, stated that, 
“the OLRC’s proposals for reform were not as persuasive as its research.”406 
 Not only was the OLRC Report so long that it was virtually unreadable for most 
people,407 but its template for class actions reform departed substantially from the 
traditional model of litigation, so much so that the business community and the legal 
profession strongly opposed many of its recommendations. The Report’s draft legislation 
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adopted a procedure similar to that of Rule 23 in the US,408 but in addition it made 
several quite controversial recommendations, including the following: 
 
• The Attorney General was to be given notice of every class action brought in the 
province, with a right to intervene in any case that raised a matter of public 
interest, and a discretion given to the court to allow the AG to act as the 
representative plaintiff in certain circumstances;409 
 
• A certification requirement that included a preliminary merits test, which would 
only certify those actions “brought in good faith with a reasonable possibility that 
material questions of fact and law common to the class will be resolved at trial in 
favour of the class”;410 
 
• The certification test would also allow the court to determine whether the 
representative plaintiff had competent legal representation that was adequate to 
protect the interests of the class;411 
 
• Another part of the onerous certification test would involve a “cost-benefit” test, 
which would be different from the “superiority” test (also a requirement); this 
would allow the court to embark on a wide-ranging enquiry into whether the 
impact of the litigation on the administration of justice would be outweighed by 
the compensatory or deterrent value of the suit (the draft legislation gave very 
little other guidance to the courts in this regard);412 
 
• Class members would not be allowed to opt out without leave of the court;413 
 
• Traditional costs rules would not apply to class actions – no costs would be 
awarded to any party (unless it would be unjust to deprive the successful party of 
costs; in the event of vexatious, frivolous or abusive conduct; and in the case of 
interlocutory proceedings); traditional costs rules would apply to individual 
proceedings;414 
 
• A modified contingency fee arrangement would be allowed, to be approved by the 
court; a lawyer’s fee would come out of any recovery to the class;415 and 
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• Aggregate damages could be awarded, and any unclaimed residue of a damages 
award could be distributed in a way that would benefit uncompensated class 
members, or could even be forfeited to the Crown.416 
 
In addition, the OLRC specifically rejected the concept of a publicly financed Fund to 
assist plaintiffs in class actions, because the start-up costs would be too high and the only 
experience of such a Fund was in Québec, where it had only been running since 1978.417 
The Attorney General invited interested parties to make submissions regarding the OLRC 
Report,418 and the business community was very quick to take him up on his offer.  
These groups were unanimous in their opposition to class action reform that 
departed from the traditional model of litigation,419 stating that any changes should 
merely be to the existing Rules of Civil Procedure and not involve an entirely new 
statute.420 They stated that the OLRC had acted outside the bounds of its mandate by 
making policy decisions.421 Others resurrected the “legalized blackmail” epithet, stating 
that the social costs of class actions far outweighed their benefits.422 They also raised 
fears that class actions would impact their sector specifically, expanding liability, adding 
to costs, reducing competition and leading to overly risk-averse practices.423 Some 
business opponents were particularly critical of the fact that the Report had been written 	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largely by academics with little practical experience of the legal system,424 with the 
Canadian Manufacturers’ Association stating that “the Commission has departed from 
attempting to develop a workable procedure to address real world issues. Rather it has 
succumbed to some form of academic perfectionism which will not correct real world 
problems but only complicate them.”425 
 Overall, the business groups took issue with the following recommendations of 
the OLRC: 
 
• No-way costs: the business groups all maintained that traditional costs rules 
should apply to class actions,426 and some even stated that plaintiffs’ groups 
should be made to put up security for costs;427 
 
• Contingency fees were strongly opposed by all the interest groups, largely on 
ethical grounds and the fact that such fees would give lawyers a financial 
incentive to encourage litigation;428 
 
• Opting-out: all the business groups stated that class actions should be on a strictly 
opt-in basis, to avoid the spectre of indeterminate classes, and to avoid binding the 
rights of unwilling class members;429 
 
• Aggregate damages: the business groups unanimously opposed the OLRC’s 
proposal to allow aggregate damages (or “fluid recovery”), on the basis that this 
compromised defendants’ procedural rights;430 
 
• Common interest: the submissions from the business groups stated that class 
actions should only be permitted when there was a common interest, such as 
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identical contracts, between members of the class;431 individual damages should 
be tried in individual actions;432 
 
• Certification test: the business groups did not want certification to involve an 
assessment of the merits, because then they would be forced to reveal their 
defence strategy to the plaintiffs;433 
 
• Notice: all of the business groups recommended mandatory post-certification 
notice to every member of the class, in order to enable them to opt in if they 
wished;434 
 
• Finally, there was all-round opposition to the involvement of the Attorney 
General in class actions, other than as an intervener and with leave of the court.435 
 
It was not only the business groups that opposed several of the OLRC’s key 
recommendations. Even those who were sympathetic to the case for reform found the 
OLRC’s draft legislation overly complex, setting so many hurdles in the way of a 
prospective plaintiff as to “make it improbable that anyone in Ontario would ever 
commence a class action.”436 The Report appeared to be the product of divided minds, a 
prospect that the Committee itself foresaw as early as 1979.437 In the final report, the 
Chairman himself wrote a reservation, dissenting on significant aspects of the OLRC 
Report including the vital subject of costs (he opposed the no-way costs proposal and 
contingency fees because they treated plaintiffs and defendants unequally). 438  The 
Commission’s previous Vice Chairman, GA Gale, who had retired due to ill health, 
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disagreed with the costs recommendations for the same reasons, a fact acknowledged at 
the very beginning of the Report itself.439  
The CBA/PIAC Report was particularly critical of the OLRC Report because of 
its equivocal nature. The CBA/PIAC were somewhat supportive of the OLRC’s 
recommendations. They agreed that no-way costs rules were necessary in order to make 
class actions economically realistic for plaintiffs.440 They therefore recommended a 
modified no-way costs rule, where the judge could retain her discretion to award costs, 
but would take various factors (such as the conduct of the parties) into account in doing 
so. 441  They too rejected the idea of a publicly-supported Fund. 442  However, the 
CBA/PIAC also opposed some of the OLRC’s proposals, stating that certification should 
require plaintiffs to demonstrate a “reasonable probability of success”,443 notice should be 
mandatory,444 the Attorney-General should have no special role in class actions,445 and 
that contingency fees should not be allowed on ethical grounds.446 The Submission of the 
Advocates’ Society was also critical on the issue of costs, opposing the OLRC’s 
recommendations on no-way costs and contingency fees, although it did support the idea 
of a public fund for class actions.447 
 Very few people wholeheartedly supported the OLRC’s recommendations.448 The 
media coverage of the Report’s release evinced wide public support for class action 
reform. However, the news articles rarely went into detail about the Report’s actual 	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recommendations.449 They focused instead on the well-known examples of mass wrongs 
referred to by the ORLC,450 which had awakened the public consciousness to the concept 
of group injury and group litigation in previous years. These included the Re-Mor and 
Astra Trust investment scandal, as well as the Mississauga Train Derailment.451 The Re-
Mor and Astra Trust scam involved the collapse of several financial institutions, leaving 
more than 300 investors with losses of approximately $6 million. Legal proceedings were 
subsequently commenced, including several class actions, which alleged that the Ontario 
government had been negligent in its licensing of Re-Mor.452 The scandal prompted 
numerous calls for law reform, including reform of the Ontario Securities Act.453 
The Mississauga Train Derailment occurred on November 10, 1979, when a train 
carrying several tankers of explosive and flammable chemicals derailed and subsequently 
exploded, leading to a chlorine leak that necessitated the evacuation of 250,000 people 
for six days. The damages in terms of lost income and business profits were estimated at 
$80-100 million.454 Roy McMurtry, Attorney General and Solicitor General at the time of 
the derailment and when the OLRC Report was released, was commended for his 
response as Chair of the Emergency Response Committee.455 The response of Canada 
Pacific Railway in terms of compensating the victims, however, was not as impressive. 
CP only made payouts to approximately half the people evacuated, and even they had to 
sign releases in exchange for compensation, with the Law Society of Upper Canada 	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Canadian Press (June 24, 1982), B380537, supra note 255. 
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452 OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 97-99. 
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455 S Grange, Report of the Mississauga railway accident inquiry (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 
1980), cited in McMurtry, supra note 56 at 271-276. 
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establishing an emergency legal clinic to advise claimants.456 The consequent coverage in 
the press expressed frustration at the unwillingness of the insurance companies to pay 
claims and the fact that full compensation was not forthcoming from the train companies, 
as well as the logistics of coordinating the hundreds of lawsuits that were filed.457  
In light of incidents such as this and the consequent delays in getting 
compensation to the numerous victims, the media and the public began to favour class 
action reform as a mechanism for addressing mass claims. However, none of the news 
articles show a detailed grasp of the OLRC Report’s recommendations. Given the later 
support for the Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee – which was quite 
different from that of the OLRC – it is likely that the media would have supported the 
concept of reform even if the recommendations had been somewhat different.  
Upon tabling the OLRC Report in the legislature, the Attorney General stated 
that, “[t]he government will be studying the report with interest”.458 However, apart from 
a couple of submissions from business groups that were met with a token response,459 
there appears to have been very little activity in the MAG for the better part of a year. 
Finally, in February 1983, the Ministry was jolted into action by a decision from the 
Supreme Court of Canada that effectively ended the common law evolution of class 
actions in Ontario. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 91-92; Canadian Press, “Claims to pile up next as result of derailment”, 
Montreal Gazette (November 19, 1979), p 7, Google Newspaper Archives 
<https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=w2UxAAAAIBAJ&sjid=nqQFAAAAIBAJ&pg=4104%2C3700
674>. One group of Mississauga residents retained Jeffery Lyons, the lawyer who represented the plaintiffs 
in the Naken action: D Dowling, “Mississauga Aftermath: Legal Settlements Could Take Years”, Financial 
Post (November 1979) [Aftermath], B380543, supra note 160. 
457 Aftermath, ibid; P Rickwood, “Insurance unlikely for evacuation losses”, Toronto Star (February 1, 
1980); N Louttit, “Battle of Mississauga: The next step is up to the courts”, Toronto Star (undated); Z 
Kashmeri, “128 firms, 735 people suing over derailment”, Globe and Mail (April 16, 1981), p 1; K. Makin, 
“Derailment suits to be heard together”, Globe and Mail (September 24, 1982), p 3; all these articles can be 
found in B380543, supra note 160. 
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J. Naken and the Supreme Court of Canada 
 
Hopes were high for the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Naken.460 As detailed in 
the previous chapter, the case had moved through the lower levels of court until the Court 
of Appeal for Ontario had decided that it could proceed. There were hopes that the 
Supreme Court of Canada would uphold that decision, confirming at last that class 
actions for damages under Rule 75 could proceed in Ontario. 
 Those hopes were dashed. The plaintiffs had attempted to fit their claims within 
the “same interest” requirement of Rule 75 by placing a flat limit on individual damages 
($1,000 per class member)461 and, in response to the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
limiting the class to owners who responded to and relied on GM’s advertisements.462 
Justice Estey, writing for the Court, held that this was insufficient to enable the action to 
be conducted under Rule 75. He held that the class members had varying contractual 
arrangements with the defendant, giving rise to different claims in contract. These 
differences mean that the “same interest” requirement was not met even though some of 
the contracts were similar and they related to the same model of car (ie 1971-1972 
Firenzas).463  
Justice Estey stated that the differences between class members meant that they 
would each have to prove that they had entered a unilateral contract with the defendant, 
and each would have to prove the damages arising from the breach of that contract.464 
This would involve a long and complex procedure and a “new and distinct method of 
proceeding” that was simply beyond the scope of Rule 75, or indeed any of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure.465 Rule 75 did not provide for the assessment of damages arising from 
different circumstances; costs, especially with respect to non-parties; the involvement of 
non-parties in pre-trial procedures; the effect of a class action on class members’ own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Naken, supra note 23. 
461 Ibid at 76. 
462 Ibid at 77. However, no amended statement of claim had yet been delivered, despite the Court of 
Appeal’s order: General Motors of Canada Ltd v Naken et al, Appellant’s Factum, at para 7, Naken 
Records, Supreme Court of Canada Archives [Naken Appellant’s Factum]. 
463 Naken, ibid, at 103-104. See also General Motors of Canada Ltd v Naken et al, Respondent’s Factum, at 
paras 10-14, Naken Records, Supreme Court of Canada Archives. 
464 Naken, ibid at 104; Naken Appellant’s Factum, supra note 462 at paras 14-15. 
465 Naken, ibid, at 104. 
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rights of action; and the effect of the Statute of Limitations on class and individual 
proceedings.466  
Justice Estey referred to the detailed and comprehensive legislation that allowed 
for class actions in other jurisdictions, and compared it with the sparseness of Rule 75.467 
He also picked up on the comments in the OLRC Report regarding the procedural 
inadequacy and “skeletal nature” of Rule 75,468 as well as the comments from the Court 
of Appeal for Ontario to the same effect.469 Reviewing the jurisprudence, Justice Estey 
concluded that previous actions under Rule 75 had been permitted because either they 
claimed damages as a class (ie damages that could be awarded to the entire class without 
the need for individual assessments), or claimed a common interest in a statutory right.470   
He concluded that the Naken action could not be framed as a class action under 
Rule 75, but had to proceed as a joined action involving the named plaintiffs.471 A rule 
consisting of thirty words could not be used as a base from which to launch such a 
complex and uncertain proceeding.472 While class actions might be a desirable device in 
the modern market place, “[t]hese … are matters of policy more fittingly the subject of 
scrutiny in the legislative rather than the judicial chamber.”473 
In its judgment in Naken, the Supreme Court of Canada clearly stated that class 
actions could not proceed under Rule 75 and that, if such actions were to be allowed in 
Ontario, they would instead have to be permitted by legislation.474 The ball was back in 
the court of the Ministry of the Attorney General. The Attorney General was 
subsequently quoted in several news reports stating that class actions was a priority for 
his Ministry, 475  that there was now a stronger impetus to introduce class actions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Ibid at 93-94; 96-102; 104-105. 
467 Ibid at 78, 88-92. 
468 Ibid at 93, citing the OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 76. 
469 Ibid. 
470 Ibid at 79-88; 94-96; 98. The jurisprudence on class actions reviewed in Naken is covered in Chapter 2.  
471 Ibid at 105. 
472 Ibid. 
473 Ibid at 102. 
474 As a result, very few class actions were litigated in Ontario in the decade between the Naken decision 
and the proclamation into force of the CPA on January 1, 1993. For a list of those actions, see Bogart 1987, 
supra note 46 at 683-684 and accompanying notes. The cases that distinguished Naken and allowed class 
actions to proceed were, for the most part, either those involving a common fund (eg Swift Canadian Co 
Ltd v Alberta Pork Producers Marketing Board, 1984 ABCA 175) or those involving a statutory right (eg 
Sparling et al v Royal Trustco Ltd et al, 1984 CanLII 2040 (ON CA)). 
475 Hansard June 17, supra note 3.  
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legislation,476 and that he hoped it would be possible to bring forward legislative 
proposals within the next year.477 That was also the hope of the general public as 
expressed in the media. Newspaper reports expressed disappointment in the Supreme 
Court’s judgment, and particularly focused on the injustice of the fact that large groups of 
consumers and other wronged groups (such as victims of the Mississauga train 
derailment) would now have little recourse.478 Some suspected that the government’s 
hesitancy to act on the OLRC Report was due to the influence of big business.479 
The MAG began consulting with interested groups on the same day that Naken 
was released. Simon Chester, Counsel to the Policy Development Division at the MAG, 
met with the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association on February 8, 1983,480 rightfully 
acknowledging that the Naken decision “may … heighten public awareness of the class 
action issue.”481 While the CMA was in favour of a “balanced mechanism” to enable 
class actions, they were of the position that this could be achieved by an amendment to 
the Rules of Civil Procedure; yet they also told the MAG that class actions would entail 
substantive changes that would dramatically affect the economy of the province. Chester 
saw this position as inconsistent, because substantive changes to the law could not be 
made by the Rules Committee.482 Furthermore, the CMA’s position that class actions 
should only be allowed on an opt-in basis and where damages were identical, with 
discovery rights and the requirement for security for costs from all class members, was, 	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(February 9, 1983), pp 1-2 [Strauss], B380537, ibid. 
477 Letter from Chester to DW Montgomery, Director, Government Relations and Legislation, CMA, 
February 9, 1983 [Chester to CMA February 1983], B502275 – Consultations, supra note 401; “Class 
Action Reform: Notes for an Address to the Canadian Bar Association (Ontario) Council,” by Andrew 
Roman, Executive Director, Public Interest Advocacy Centre, June 10, 1983, at 3 [Roman address], 
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478 Strauss, supra note 476 at 2; J Ziegel, “Class action dealt a legal blow”, Globe and Mail (March 29, 
1983), p 7 [Ziegel Globe and Mail]; Editorial, “10 Years is Enough”, Kitchener-Waterloo Record (March 
1983); Editorial, “We need class-action suits”, Toronto Star (February 10, 1983); S Thorne, “Court 
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479 Ziegel Globe and Mail, ibid. 
480 Chester to CMA February 1983, supra note 477; Norm Stewart, who would later sit on the Attorney 
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preliminary brief on class actions from the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association, February 14, 1983, at 1 
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by its own admission, “unduly restrictive” 483  and “little more than a system of 
‘permissive joinder’.”484 By the MAG’s assessment, the CMA’s proposals on costs and 
discovery were, “even more prohibitive than the procedures presently in place,”485 and 
the other proposals differed little from the current law, with a prohibition on individual 
damages and separate contracts.486 This first meeting with the CMA on the subject of 
class actions reform was not promising; essentially the CMA was acknowledging the 
need for limited reform, while being resistant to the changes such reform would entail.  
 Following the Naken decision, however, the MAG had to make some formal 
announcement about reform, in response to the Supreme Court’s hint that legislation was 
required to bring about class actions in Ontario. McMurtry made this announcement on 
June 17, 1983.487 He regarded class action reform as “a high priority. I would expect to 
be discussing these issues … with my cabinet colleagues in the early autumn, with a view 
to possibly bringing first reading legislation before the House by the end of the year.”488 
McMurtry expressed his commitment to reform and to “develop[ing] progressive and 
effective legislation”.489 The only issue was the form this legislation would take.490 
 In the wake of this announcement, Chester next turned to the Canadian Bar 
Association, anticipating (correctly) that it might be somewhat more open to class action 
reform than the CMA,491 given its positive take on the class proceeding provisions of the 
ill-fated Competition Act.492 His invitation to the CBA to comment on the OLRC 
Report,493 coupled with McMurtry’s formal announcement, led to the release of the joint 
report between the CBA and the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, detailed above.494 This 	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report, while critical of many of the OLRC’s recommendations, was supportive of class 
actions reform in general. The CBA and the PIAC supported the MAG in its view that 
specific legislation, rather than a mere tinkering with the Rules, was necessary for 
reform.495 They were also of the view that class actions were economically incompatible 
with the traditional costs rules in Ontario.496 The release of the CBA/PIAC Report in 
December 1983 was accompanied by a fair amount of publicity in favour of class action 
reform.497 The MAG was successfully shoring up its position, and was creating a climate 
in which it could potentially introduce class actions legislation.  
However, it never actually did so. In fact, there was very little activity in the 
MAG following the release of the CBA/PIAC Report. There was some discussion of 
class actions in the business and academic communities.498 The Advocates’ Society 
released its report in February 1984 that, as noted above, strongly opposed the OLRC’s 
recommendations on no-way costs and contingency fees. There was some discussion the 
following month between Chester and his direct superior, Doug Ewart (Director of the 
Policy Development Division at the MAG) regarding the CBA/PIAC Report,499 and 
Chester also began drafting a Policy Submission that was completed by June 1985.500 In 
terms of related legislation, there was talk in the legislature of enacting statutes that 
would enable certain groups – namely, employees seeking pay equity501 and members of 	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defamed groups502 – to bring class actions. However, the Attorney General made no 
further formal statements on the OLRC Report, and no class actions legislation was 
introduced. Indeed, in the debates on the pay equity legislation, certain MPPs complained 
about the “long wait for class action legislation by the Attorney General”503 and stated 
they had little confidence that the government would ever enact such legislation.504 
The delay may have been caused by business groups’ strong opposition to class 
action legislation in the form put forward by the OLRC, which would have stymied any 
political will on the part of the Conservative government to implement the OLRC draft 
Act. More likely, both these factors delayed the introduction of any legislation, following 
which Premier Bill Davis announced in October 1984 that he would be stepping down 
after more than a decade in office. This announcement led to the short-lived premiership 
of Frank Stuart Miller and eventually a general election in May 1985. Following that 
election, the minority Conservative government was defeated in a no-confidence motion 
by an unofficial Liberal-NDP alliance on June 26, 1985. This saw the entry into power of 
a government that was much more sympathetic to class actions, and in time, would show 
itself to have the political will to bring about reform. 
 
K. Conclusion 
 
In 1970, class actions were virtually unknown in Ontario. A decade and a half later, they 
had become firmly implanted in the legal and political culture, as well as the public 
consciousness. They did not win favour with everyone and there was controversy over 
precisely what form they would take. However, the rise of consumer and environmental 
activism, the debate over the Competition Act, and the enactment of class actions 
legislation in Québec, meant that, by the early 1980s, they were actively under discussion 
and no longer seen as a uniquely American device. This process was accelerated by the 	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release of the OLRC Report and the Naken decision. While the Report heightened public 
awareness of class actions and indicated to lawyers, politicians and the public at large 
that class actions in Ontario were possible and even perhaps desirable, Naken sent a 
strong message that reform could only come about through legislation.  
This put pressure on the MAG to introduce such legislation. The fact that it never 
did was a wasted opportunity. Perhaps the conditions were not quite right: the 
labyrinthine provisions and unrealistic recommendations of the OLRC Report, the 
staunch opposition to contingency fees, and the fact that the Charter had not yet 
permeated the legal culture, meant that the ground was not ready for the seed and vice 
versa. With the change of government, however, an Attorney General was appointed who 
had a strong commitment to access to justice combined with unsurpassed political savvy. 
Perhaps more than any other factor, class actions came about in Ontario when they did 
because of Ian Scott. 
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Chapter 4 
The Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on  
Class Action Reform (1985-1993) 
 
 
A. Ian Scott’s early years as Attorney General (1985-1988) 
 
On June 18, 1985, after more than four decades in power, the provincial Progressive 
Conservative government was defeated in a vote of no confidence. In its place and with 
the support of the NDP, David Peterson’s Liberals formed a minority government.505 
When the government was sworn in on June 26, Ian Scott was appointed Attorney 
General. Scott had helped to negotiate the accord with the NDP that made the Liberal 
victory possible and was one of Peterson’s right-hand Ministers, part of an inner circle 
that had an important influence on the Premier.506 Peterson ran his Cabinet informally, 
often bypassing formal channels of communication and allowing his Ministers to make 
submissions to Cabinet without prior approval.507 He gave Scott a free hand in the 
running of the Ministry of the Attorney General508 and supported all of his major 
decisions.509  
Driven, ambitious and a master tactician,510 Scott would be instrumental in 
implementing the government’s reform agenda. He had a disproportionate influence on 
the government’s work, 511  regularly reviewing the Cabinet submissions of other 
Ministries and putting forward his views on them, or requiring Cabinet colleagues to 
consult with him before publicly opining on certain subjects.512 Not only was Scott an 
excellent negotiator,513 but he was also a fearsome debater who never lost the cross-	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examination style he had developed as counsel.514 Disagreeing with him was not a 
pleasant experience, and he used this power of persuasion to get his policies through 
Cabinet.515 
At his right hand516 stood Michael Cochrane, a young lawyer in the Policy 
Development Division, one of the chief sections of the MAG.517 Called to the Bar just 
five years previously, Cochrane had arrived at the Ministry a couple of weeks before 
Scott. The two men equalled each other in energy, ambition and a desire to bring about 
law reform in numerous areas. Both possessed the key to any successful career in law: a 
seemingly endless capacity for work. Scott and Cochrane demonstrated an uncanny 
ability to persuade and, where persuasion failed, to get people where they wanted them 
through swift manoeuvring, political savoire-faire and sleights of hand at the negotiating 
table. Cochrane made full use of Scott’s openness to policy ideas and his desire to rapidly 
advance the government’s progressive agenda, often drafting statutes over the course of a 
weekend so they could be introduced as soon as possible.518 Cochrane facilitated Scott’s 
reform agenda in areas such as consumer rights and environmental protection; but one of 
his greatest achievements was class action reform. 
Despite Cochrane’s statements to the contrary,519 class actions do not seem to 
have been high on the agenda of the new Attorney General.520 This is not surprising: in 
their first term of office, the Liberals were also busy bringing in full funding for Catholic 
schools, banning extra billing by Ontario’s doctors, approving the Darlington nuclear 
power plant, introducing pay equity, addressing aboriginal rights, dealing with the issue 
of abortion and abortion clinics, and participating in the Meech Lake Accord,521 among 
numerous other changes. Class action reform had been effectively in limbo since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Naken, and continued to be so for a few years after the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Ewart Interview, supra note 512; interview with Peter Woolford (representative of the Retail Council of 
Canada on the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee), April 29, 2016 [Woolford Interview]; Scott, ibid, 
at 79. 
515 Ewart Interview, ibid; Woolford Interview, ibid.	  
516 AC Member Interview, supra note 12. 
517 Scott, supra note 56 at 130. 
518 Ibid at 128-129, 134; Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7; Cochrane Interview 2, supra note 4.	  
519 Letter from Cochrane to Julian Polika, Director, Crown Law Office – Civil, August 8, 1985, stating that 
a class actions bill is one of Ian Scott’s priorities for the upcoming session of the legislature, B248633 – 
General File #1, supra note 388.  
520 Ewart Interview, supra note 512. 	  
521 Scott, supra note 56 at 145.	  
	   86 
change of government. In fact, the Ministry of the Attorney General did not take any 
public action on the issue until the middle of 1988. 
Nevertheless, Cochrane began working in the background as soon as Scott was 
appointed. On that same day in June 1985, Cochrane received a draft policy submission 
from his predecessor, Simon Chester. That submission laid out the various options for 
class action reform, and provided the basis for Cochrane’s early work on the issue. 
Chester’s submission considered the OLRC Report and its most controversial 
recommendations. He observed, and Cochrane was to find out before long, that the 
thorniest issue in bringing about any kind of consensus on class actions was the issue of 
costs. Chester summarized the conclusions of many commentators when he noted that 
reform would be futile if traditional costs rules continued to apply.522 However, while the 
submission touched on the OLRC recommendation of a no-way costs rule, as well as 
contingency fee arrangements and assisting plaintiffs with their costs by way of a 
government-financed Fund, it stopped short of making any recommendations on costs.  
Using this unfinished policy submission as a basis, Cochrane began to conduct his 
own research into class actions.523 He emphasized what he saw as a “consensus” that the 
existing rules of procedure were defective with regard to class actions, from the Williston 
Committee that noted the “disarray” in the state of the jurisprudence, to the Supreme 
Court in Naken that stated that Rule 75 could not be read to permit class proceedings in 
Ontario. This emphasis on consensus, and minimizing of the novel and controversial 
nature of class actions, was to be a recurring theme in Cochrane’s writing and discussions 
on the subject.  
Nevertheless, Cochrane could not deny that an attempt to change the status quo 
would be met with opposition from several camps. Outlining the positions of the 
Canadian Manufacturers’ Association (CMA) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(who opposed significant reform), as well as that of the Canadian Bar Association and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522 Chester Paper, supra note 500 at 32.	  
523 While the Policy Development Division was originally tasked with drafting a class actions bill, 
Cochrane was instead asked to draft a policy submission presenting various options: letter from Cochrane 
to Doug Ewart and Craig Perkins, August 8, 1985, with handwritten notes (undated) from Ewart regarding 
the policy submission, B248633 – General File #1, supra note 388.  
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Public Interest Research Centre524 (who wanted reform, but on different terms than 
outlined in the OLRC Report), Cochrane found that there was no common ground 
between the interest groups, and that change in any form would offend at least some of 
them.525 Nevertheless, because Scott considered access to justice a priority, some change 
had to happen.526 Cochrane’s commitment to change was further exemplified in his 
drafting, in 1985 or early 1986, of what would eventually become the CPA.527 The 
amount of opposition he faced, however, meant he had his work cut out for him.  
The CMA reiterated its opposition shortly after Scott became Attorney General. 
Norman Stewart, Director of Government Relations for General Motors Canada and 
Chair of the CMA Subcommittee that submitted its earlier report to Roy McMurtry, 
wrote to Scott on November 7, 1985. Stewart was the business community’s most vocal 
and active opponent of class actions, and remained the major voice of those interests even 
as he later sat on the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, influencing the 
considerations of other members of the Committee and ensuring that the reform was as 
conservative as possible. In 1990, in the middle of the Advisory Committee’s drafting 
process, Stewart was to become Vice President of Government Relations and General 
Counsel at Ford Canada. As detailed above, both GM and Ford had been the subject of 
class actions in Ontario for alleged manufacturing defects in their vehicles. 
In his letter to Scott, Stewart pointed out that all of the submissions he had seen 
concluded that the OLRC’s draft legislation should not form the basis for a statute. He 
offered to discuss the OLRC Report, but hoped that Scott had no intention of introducing 
class action legislation.528 Scott agreed that there was very little common ground among 
the groups that submitted briefs, and that Rule 12 was inadequate for the purposes of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 The Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC) was at this time the research arm of the Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre (PIAC): PIAC, 25 Years Representing the Public Interest (Ottawa: PIAC, 2001), online: 
<http://www.piac.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/25years.pdf>, at 10. 
525 Cochrane handwritten notes August 28, 1985, at 18 [Cochrane handwritten notes], B248633 – General 
File #1, supra note 388. 
526 Ibid at 19. 
527 “Master Redraft: Class Actions” is a photocopy of the OLRC draft Act, with Cochrane’s handwritten 
annotations. According to those annotations, the draft Act was to come into force in 1986. Policy 
Development Division Counsel correspondence files, Class Actions – Background Papers 1, 1983-1990, 
RG 4-40, Box No B501822, Archives of Ontario [B501822 – Background Papers]. 
528 Letter from Stewart to Scott, November 7, 1985, B248633 – General File #1, supra note 388. 
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class action.529 For the time being, however, he was keeping the issue under review.530 In 
the meantime, Cochrane continued to look into the possibility of reform. 
The main battleground, as far as Cochrane could see, was the issue of costs. He 
knew that the OLRC and other observers had found costs to be both the most serious and 
the most controversial single issue confronting class actions reformers.531 However, 
without costs reform, class actions legislation would be pointless.532 Cochrane noted the 
dilemma whereby traditional costs rules could deter plaintiffs with meritorious suits, but 
the absence of such rules would be unfair to successful defendants. Scott also 
acknowledged that the issue of costs was a significant barrier to class action reform.533 
The various interest groups also had widely diverging views on this issue.534 As 
noted in Chapter 3,535 the representatives of corporate interests as well as the Advocates’ 
Society opposed no-way costs, while most interest groups rejected the concept of 
contingency fees. The CBA/PIAC favoured a modified costs rule, but did not support a 
public fund for class actions (while the Advocates’ Society did support such a fund). 
Opinions on costs differed not only between the various groups, but also were in stark 
contrast to the OLRC recommendations of no-way costs, contingency fees and no public 
funding. If class action reform was going to take place at all, Cochrane had to find a 
compromise between these positions that would be palatable to all concerned.   
 By June 1986, Cochrane’s review of the class action debate was largely 
complete.536 However, despite his observations on costs,537 he made no recommendations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529 Letter from Scott to Stewart, November 26, 1985, B248633 – General File #1, ibid. 
530 Ibid. More than a year later, in December 1986, Scott told the House that, “I have been looking at the 
class action problem”, but did not anticipate that a solution would be available for the House’s 
consideration before the late spring of 1987: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates 
(Hansard), 33rd Parl, 2nd Sess (December 3, 1986) (Ian Scott), online: 
<http://www.olip.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/33-2/l074.htm>. 
531 Cochrane handwritten notes, supra note 525 at 14. 
532 Memorandum from Cochrane to Scott, March 5, 1986, at 14, B248633 – General File #1, supra note 
388.	  
533 Letter from Allan Hutchinson to Scott, March 24, 1986; letter from Scott to Hutchinson, April 2, 1986, 
both in B248633 – General File #1, ibid. 
534 They laid out these views in briefs that they had previously submitted to Roy McMurtry (and re-
submitted to Ian Scott when he became Attorney General), which were summarized in an April 23, 1986 
research memo to Cochrane: B502275 – Consultations, supra note 401.  
535 Chapter 3, supra, at 70-71. 
536 AG Policy Development Submission, June 8, 1986, B248633 – General File #1, supra note 388. The 
submission appears to have been finalized on August 6, 1986. Cochrane’s submission borrowed heavily 
from Chester’s. An exception is Chester’s recommendation that the court screen counsel for adequacy of 
representation; Cochrane rejected such an approach, on the basis that it raised numerous awkward 
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on this issue – with one exception. The submission did recommend that a Fund be 
established for public financing of class action litigation, along the lines of the Fonds 
d’aide aux recours collectifs in Québec.538 This was an important development, as the 
OLRC Report had rejected this idea, and little further exploration had been done on the 
issue. Cochrane’s recommendation showed that the Fund was once again among the 
range of options open to the MAG,539 and it would later prove to be an important tool in 
orchestrating a compromise. For now, however, Ewart told Cochrane that he had 
significant difficulties with the concept of a Fund, and wanted to leave that question open 
for the Attorney General’s consideration.540 
 Despite the completion of its review, progress at the MAG on the issue of class 
actions continued to be sluggish. Class actions received some attention in the Legislature 
in December 1986, when a Private Member’s Bill was introduced, calling for an 
Environmental Bill of Rights that included the right of citizens to sue on a class basis for 
environmental pollution.541 However, this Bill was not passed until 1993, after the Class 
Proceedings Act.  
There was also a brief flurry of activity at the beginning of 1987 when Cochrane 
learned, in a call from Arthur Stone (head of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada 
(ULCC)), that New Brunswick was considering the introduction of class actions 
legislation.542 Encouraged by the fact that reform was gaining traction elsewhere in 
Canada, Cochrane sought to have class actions put on the agenda of the 1987 ULCC 
Conference. He also wrote to Basil Stapleton, head of New Brunswick’s Law Reform 
Commission and Provincial Policy Development Division (and, that year, Chairman of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
questions, and also that the Court could sanction counsel by awarding costs against her personally under 
Rule 57.07. In addition, the plaintiff would have recourse against his own counsel through a professional 
negligence action. 
537 Ibid at 47. 
538 Ibid at 59. Cochrane was later in touch with Yves Lauzon, Director General of the Fonds in Québec, 
regarding the details of the Fonds: letter from Lauzon to Cochrane, August 7, 1986; letter from Cochrane to 
Lauzon, August 21, 1986, both in B248633 – General File #1, supra note 388. 
539 See also Memorandum from Cochrane to Scott, March 5, 1986, at 15-16, B248633 – General File #1, 
ibid. 
540 Draft policy submission from Cochrane to Ewart, May 1, 1986, with handwritten note (undated) from 
Ewart, stating his concerns regarding the Fund, in B248633 – General File #1, ibid. 
541 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 33rd Parl, 2nd Sess (December 
10, 1986) (Ruth Grier), online: <http://www.olip.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/33-2/l078.htm>. 
542 Memo to File from Michael Cochrane, January 15, 1987, in Policy Development Division Counsel 
correspondence files, Class Actions – Draft Policy Submission file # 1, 1986-1989, RG 4-40, Box No 
B248501, Archives of Ontario [B248501 – Draft Policy Submission file #1]. 
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the Uniform Law section of the ULCC), in order to discuss the push for reform.543 
However, despite Cochrane’s expressed intentions,544 he did not present a paper. The 
ULCC’s discussion of class actions was delayed until the summer of the following 
year,545 when the Ontario MAG’s activity on the issue would begin to accelerate 
significantly following the general election.546 
 Until then, there were two further developments that informed the debate on 
reform, although neither of them was due to action on the Attorney General’s part.547 The 
first, in July 1987, was the Legislative Review Project (LRP) of the Ministry of 
Consumer and Commercial Relations.548 The LRP reviewed existing consumer protection 
mechanisms with a view to drafting a comprehensive Consumer Protection Code. In its 
section on “Procedural Mechanisms”, the report addressed class actions. It noted the 
strength and divergence of opinions on the issue, developments in other jurisdictions such 
as the US and Québec, as well as the history of the debate in Ontario. It noted the pros 
and cons of class action reform in Ontario, before specifically recommending that class 
actions be made available. It further recommended that contingency fees be allowed in 
order to facilitate class actions and other procedural remedies.549   
 Various interest groups responded to the report by submitting briefs to the 
Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations. The submissions were overwhelmingly 
from the business community, a pattern that would be continued into later consultations 
on class actions reform, and which likely reflected the fact that these organizations were 
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to Cochrane dated February 11, 1987, in B248633 – General File #1, supra note 388). 
544 Letter from Cochrane to Stapleton, February 18, 1987, in B248633 – General File #1, ibid.	  
545 Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Sixty-Ninth Annual Meeting, held at Victoria, 
British Columbia, August 1987, at 27, 316-17, online: 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/images/stories/Past_Proceedings_PDF/1987ULCC0069.pdf>. Cochrane was one of 
the Ontario Commissioners from 1985-1989: see MG Cochrane, “Class Action Reform in Ontario: A 
Breakthrough”, July 1989, at 1 [Breakthrough], in Policy Development Division Counsel correspondence 
files, Class Actions – Articles by Cochrane, 1988-1989, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B248633, Archives of 
Ontario [B248633 – Cochrane Articles]. 
546 The Liberal-NDP accord expired at the end of May 1987, and the Liberals called an election at the end 
of July: Scott, supra note 56 at 170.	  
547 In a letter to Ewart dated August 6, 1987, Roman reminded Ewart of the briefs he had sent to the 
Attorney General on behalf of the CBA/PIAC, and observed that, “Since that time, everything appears to 
have stalled” in B248633 – General File #1, supra note 388. 
548 G Crossman, Consumer Remedies and Government Redress (Toronto: Legislative Review Project, 
Ministry of the Attorney General, 1987) [LRP Report]. 
549 Ibid at 15-23.	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better resourced than those on the other side of the debate. The only brief from the pro-
consumer side of the debate was from the Consumers’ Association of Canada, which 
enthusiastically supported the introduction of class actions.550 The other briefs from the 
business community objected to the LRP Report’s recommendations on costs. They 
opposed the introduction of contingency fees on the basis that such fees would encourage 
litigation and line lawyers’ pockets.551 There was also opposition to any change to the 
traditional costs rules, which were seen to perform a gatekeeping function to screen out 
unmeritorious actions.552 
 There was some concession among the business interests that minor changes were 
needed to the current Rules in order to allow for more class actions,553 as long as 
successful defendants would be able to recover their costs.554 However, those groups 
were generally against broad-based reform.555 They stated that more consultations were 
needed before introducing consumer protection legislation containing a class actions 
mechanism,556 because there was still no consensus regarding class actions reform in 
Ontario.557 There was clearly significant opposition to overcome in any effort toward 
such reform. When Scott began consultations the following year, it was agreed that the 
previous LRP work on class actions would be overtaken by the work of the Ministry of 
the Attorney General.558 
The second development related to contingency fees. As many observers had 
already noted, change was needed on the issue of costs if class proceedings legislation 
was to be useful; contingency fees were a key part of this. Until the late 1980s, and as can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 Brief of the Consumers’ Association of Canada on the LRP Report, at 32-33, in B501822 – Background 
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551 Letter from the Canadian Advertising Foundation on the LRP Report, at 3-4; Brief of the Canadian 
Federation of Independent Business on the LRP Report, at 13 [CFIB Brief]. Both briefs are in B501822 – 
Background Papers, ibid. 
552 Submission of the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association on the LRP Report, at 23 [CMA Brief]; brief of 
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553 CMA Brief, ibid, at 23; RCC Brief, ibid, at 10. 
554 RCC Brief, ibid, at 10. 
555 CMA Brief, supra note 552 at 23. 
556 CFIB Brief, supra note 551 at 15. 
557 Submission of the Board of Trade of Metropolitan Toronto (now the Toronto Region Board of Trade) on 
the LRP Report, at 13, in B501822 – Background Papers, supra note 527. 
558 Class Actions: Meeting with Business Interests (Preparation Note from Cochrane to Scott), March 23, 
1989, at 2, in Policy Development Division Counsel correspondence files, Class Actions – Briefing Note, 
1983-1990, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B501822, Archives of Ontario [B501822 – Briefing Note]. 
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be seen from the above-noted submissions to Roy McMurtry and the briefs on the 
Legislative Review Project, contingency fees were opposed by many (if not most) 
lawyers in Ontario as unethical and an encouragement of unnecessary litigation.559 Public 
opinion perceived the concept as an American import that would enable greedy lawyers 
to line their pockets at the expense of litigants.560  
However, in May 1988, after studying the issue for just over a year, the Law 
Society of Upper Canada’s Special Committee on Contingency Fees reported to 
Convocation.561 They recommended the adoption of contingency fees, primarily because 
they would increase access to justice for the middle class. The Special Committee found 
that contingency fees were permitted in every province except Ontario, with no instances 
of abuse reported to the provincial law societies, and with contingency fees being used 
very little in those provinces (with the exception of British Columbia and Alberta). The 
committee found no evidence that those provinces had seen an increase in unmeritorious 
lawsuits since the introduction of contingency fees. They further concluded that the 
system was already in de facto use in many instances in Ontario. The Special Committee 
recommended to Convocation that it approve in principle the introduction of contingency 
fees in Ontario, and the AG was asked to amend the Solicitors Act accordingly.562  
A major point of controversy on the costs issue was now much less controversial. 
With the recommendation from the Law Society, class action reformers could now 
support the idea of contingency fees without looking like they were trying to import yet 
another American concept.563 Yet numerous controversies, especially on the issue of 
costs, remained. Even as the LSUC considered the issue of contingency fees, Scott, 
Cochrane and the MAG were working behind the scenes on a plan to bring about 
consensus on those other issues.  	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560 The debate on contingency fees is covered in detail in Chapter 3. 
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Division Counsel correspondence files, LSUC Contingency Fees – Report of the Sub-Committee, 1988, 
CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B449218, Archives of Ontario. 
562 K Makin, “Ontario law society withdraws opposition to contingency fees”, Globe and Mail (June 22, 
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B. Preparing the Way for Reform 
 
The Ontario general election on September 10, 1987 saw the Liberals returned to power 
with their first majority government in half a century. With this resounding mandate, 
Scott and his Ministry could begin work on class action reform in earnest. Shortly before 
the election, Ewart wrote to Richard Chaloner, Deputy Attorney General, asking him to 
review Cochrane’s draft policy submission, in order to have it approved by the 
Ministerial Cabinet Committee, and then submit a draft to Scott for consideration for the 
fall legislative agenda.564 
Before any kind of consensus could even begin to build, however, the legal 
profession and the wider public had to be re-introduced to the concept of class actions. 
The OLRC Report had been released six years previously, but the sheer length of the 
Report meant that it had not been widely read or its specific recommendations 
commented upon.565 Any momentum that it had built had long since dissipated. Even the 
Naken decision was five years old. The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 
had released a report in June 1988 that recommended class action reform, including the 
unusual recommendation that there be no certification requirement whatsoever (it stated 
that frivolous suits would instead be discouraged through the maintenance of traditional 
costs rules).566 However, the report does not seem to have had much immediate impact on 
the debate in Canada.567 In the summer of 1988, the Ministry of the Attorney General 
therefore had to start preparing the ground for a debate on class actions. 
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Miscellaneous Material, supra note 305.  
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 There was still a wide variety of opinions and many misconceptions about class 
actions in the legal and business community.568 To suddenly announce an intention to 
introduce legislation, as Roy McMurtry had done following the release of the OLRC 
Report, would be to encounter the same inertia and outright resistance. Scott therefore 
broke the ground at an Access to Justice Conference in June 1988, held in Toronto and 
organized by the Attorney General. The conference took place over three days, with the 
workshop on “Group Claims/Collective Rights” being last on the agenda. 569 
Nevertheless, the workshop was a significant first step in the fight for reform.  
The Chair was Jacques Dufour of the Québec Fonds (an acknowledgement that 
costs was to be a central issue in the reform debate). The panelists were Basil Stapleton 
of the New Brunswick Law Reform Commission (who had already expressed his 
commitment to reform) and Kevin Doucette of the Consumers’ Association of Canada (a 
natural ally of the class action cause, as exhibited in his presentation at the workshop). 
The only panelist who represented the case against wide-ranging reform was Margaret 
McNee, a young lawyer from McMillan Binch.570 However, even McNee acknowledged 
that the possibilities of bringing a class action were severely constrained by the existing 
Rules of Civil Procedure and case law, and her presentation implied that some reform 
was needed.  
The discussion, which was largely about the funding of class actions, ended with 
the following conclusion: 
 
The workshop formed a consensus that class actions should be more readily 
available in appropriate cases. Similarly, public funding of class actions 
should be provided where meritorious claims might otherwise be 
commenced.571 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 Cochrane briefing note, September 9, 1987, in Policy Development Division Counsel correspondence 
files, Class Actions – Background Papers 2, 1981-1989, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B502275, Archives of 
Ontario.	  
569 Access to Justice Conference, supra note 25. 
570 Ibid; Access to Justice Workshop Report, Tuesday, June 21, 3:30pm: Group Claims/Collective Rights 
[Access to Justice Workshop Report], in Policy Development Division Counsel correspondence files, Class 
Actions – Access to Justice Conference, 1988, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B502275, Archives of Ontario. 
McMillan Binch had submitted a brief to Roy McMurtry, and subsequently Ian Scott, on the OLRC Report 
(McMillan Binch Report, supra note 419). 
571 Access to Justice Workshop Report, ibid, at 4. 
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The word “consensus” should be regarded with caution. Scott and Cochrane were to use 
the word throughout the class actions consultation process, even when little or no 
consensus actually existed.572 In addition, both men were later to report the conclusions 
of this workshop as being resoundingly in favour of wholesale reform, when such was 
not the case573 (even though the vast majority of attendees were from organizations that 
would have held a pro-class actions stance).574 Nevertheless, it is apparent that some 
common ground had begun to take shape on the subject.  
 The next step was to get the buy-in of the other provinces by way of the Uniform 
Law Conference of Canada, a process that Cochrane had begun the previous year 
(although in fact the ULCC had been discussing the subject of class action reform for 
many years before that). Cochrane was due to present at the conference in early August 
1988, and as the basis of this presentation he used his Policy Development Submission 
from August 6, 1986.575 Where Cochrane’s submission recommended that class action 
reform be undertaken, however, he changed the first draft of his ULCC paper to appear 
somewhat more neutral so that, for example, all language on “recommendations” was 
removed.576 Cochrane also inserted a disclosure that the views expressed were his own 
and not those of the Government of Ontario.577 Nevertheless, the paper still contained 
Cochrane’s conclusion that “the case for class action reform has been made.”578 
 This was not acceptable for Doug Ewart, Director of the Policy Development 
Division at the MAG. Putting forward the option of class actions reform at the ULCC 
was one thing; stating that reform was a foregone conclusion was quite another. The 
debate had only just begun again publicly, and it was too soon to risk any perception that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 See, for example, letter from the head of the Canadian Bar Association - Ontario to Scott, dated January 
21, 1989: “Michael Cochrane has indicated that there has been a consensus but as far as C.B.A.O. is 
concerned there is not” (in B248633 Correspondence, supra note 401).   
573 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 34th Parl, 2nd Sess (June 29, 
1989) (Ian Scott), online: <http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/34-2/l034.htm>; Cochrane 1993, 
supra note 27 at 2. It should be noted, however, that Cochrane was not actually in attendance at this 
conference.  
574 Access to Justice Conference, supra note 25, list of attendees at workshop on Group Claims/Collective 
Rights. 
575 AG Policy Development Submission, August 6, 1986, in B248501 – Draft Policy Submission file #1, 
supra note 542. 
576 MG Cochrane, “Class Actions: A Discussion Paper”, in B248501 – Draft Policy Submission file #1, 
ibid. 
577 “Class Actions: A Discussion Paper”, ibid, at cover page. 
578 Ibid at 86.  
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the MAG had already made up its mind. Ewart stated as much in his handwritten changes 
to the first draft of Cochrane’s ULCC paper:579 
 
Particularly near the beginning there are a number of conclusions and/or 
statements of opinion. I feel that these should be deleted before the paper 
goes out. Even with your disclosure the press could still [find] that a policy 
advisor to the AG had concluded that class action reform was essential etc. 
etc. The ULC is not worth the risk.  
 
As a result of Ewart’s comments, the final draft of the ULCC paper contained no pro-
reform conclusion. Nevertheless, the title of the paper (“A Path to Reform”) made 
Cochrane’s sympathies clear. Once the ULCC conference was over, Cochrane created a 
further version of his “Path to Reform” paper in January 1989,580 which was essentially 
identical to the first draft, and included the original conclusion that “the case for class 
action reform has been made.” This was clearly Cochrane’s own personal conviction, if 
not a wider conviction throughout the Ministry of the Attorney General.581 
 The case for reform was also articulated at the ULCC conference by Andrew 
Roman of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, who had acted as a consultant to the 
Australian Law Reform Commission in formulating its draft class actions bill. Roman’s 
key recommendations stemmed from the content of the ALRC draft bill; no certification 
requirement, and public funding of class actions. He argued that these represented a less 
radical departure from traditional litigation than the US or Québec model.582 
 As a result of Cochrane’s and Roman’s papers, the ULCC referred the matter 
back to the Ontario Commissioners for a further report and draft Act for discussion the 
next year.583 Again, however, this conclusion was much less resounding than Cochrane 
later reported it to be. In a Cabinet submission the following year, Cochrane stated that 
the 1988 ULCC had approved a detailed set of proposals for class action reform, and that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 Ibid at cover page.	  
580 January 30, 1989, in B248501 – Draft Policy Submission file #1, supra note 542. 
581 Scott’s sympathies were also for reform at this time. He stated to the ULCC that class action reform was 
a topic “close to my heart”: Notes for Remarks by the Honourable Ian Scott, Attorney General of Ontario, 
to the Closing Banquet, 1988 Uniform Law Conference Meeting, August 11, 1988, at 10 [Scott ULCC], in 
Policy Development Division Counsel correspondence files, Class Actions – Communications Plan, 1988-
1990, MGC, RG 4-40, Box No B501822, Archives of Ontario [B501822 – Communications Plan]. 
582 AJ Roman, “Class Actions in Canada: The Path to Reform?” for the ULCC 1988, supra note 26 at 103. 
583 ULCC 1988, ibid, at 28. 
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the proposed remedy would provide a model suitable for adoption by other Canadian 
provinces.584 Given that the Ontario Commissioners had not even produced a further 
report or draft Act yet, let alone had it approved by the ULCC, one wonders precisely 
what “proposed remedy” Cochrane had in mind. Certainly his own paper articulated 
numerous different proposals, and Roman’s paper sharply disagreed with Cochrane’s 
suggestion on certification. Even Ian Scott acknowledged the preliminary state of the 
ULCC’s discussions on class actions in his closing remarks to the conference.585 Once 
again, Cochrane painted a picture of consensus and certainty where little existed. 
 Nevertheless, the ULCC and Access to Justice conferences were important events 
that began building a momentum towards reform, or at least a discussion about reform. 
While Cochrane painted an over-optimistic picture of the conclusions reached at these 
conferences, they did serve as a signal to the Bar, business interests and the public that 
class actions were firmly on the Attorney General’s agenda.  
 
C. Initial Consultations (1988-1989) 
 
The Attorney General built on this momentum by conducting initial consultations with 
those who would be most affected by reform. These consultations began in earnest on 
December 2, 1988, when Ian Scott met with representatives of numerous organizations to 
brief them on the possibility of class action legislation.586 The documents circulated to 
these organizations show that the Attorney General had made up his mind on the need for 
reform, and that the only question now was what shape that reform would take. 
A second consultation took place on December 22, when Cochrane met with 
various stakeholders,587 including the Consumers’ Association of Canada (CAC), the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 Cabinet Submission, March 20, 1989 [March 20 1989 Cabinet Submission], in Policy Development 
Division Counsel correspondence files, Class Actions – Final Cabinet Submissions, 1989, CA226, RG 4-
40, Box No B248633, Archives of Ontario. 
585 Scott ULCC, supra note 581 at 10. 
586 Letter from Gang of Four to Scott, January 20, 1989, at 1, in B248633 Correspondence, supra note 401. 
Cochrane does not appear to have been at this meeting, because he did not meet Stewart (who was at the 
meeting) until December 22: letter from Stewart to Cochrane, December 7, 1988, in B502275 – 
Consultations, supra note 401.  
587 Meeting between Cochrane and stakeholders, December 22, 1988, handwritten minutes by Michael 
Cochrane [Meeting Dec 22 1988], in B502275 – Consultations, supra note 401. Additional groups were 
also consulted informally: Briefing note by Michael Cochrane, January 6, 1989, at 1, and attached list 
[Briefing Note January 6 1989] (in B502275 – Consultations, supra note 401), which lists the same groups 
to which the January 10, 1989 materials were circulated (see below). 
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Advocates’ Society, and the group known colloquially in Queen’s Park as the “Gang of 
Four”.588 The “Gang of Four” consisted of the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association 
(CMA), the Retail Council of Canada (RCC), the Ontario Chamber of Commerce (OCC) 
and the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB). The CMA was a policy, 
lobbying and public relations group for manufacturers across Canada. It was arguably the 
biggest of the Four, with seven regional divisions, 33 local branches and a full-time staff 
of more than 100. Its members represented approximately 75 per cent of Canada’s 
manufacturing output.589  
The RCC represented grocery and general merchandise retail stores in Canada. It 
existed to inform the government on the latter’s policy objectives, and played more of a 
technical advisory role than a lobbying role.590 Its spokesperson for the class actions 
consultations with the MAG was Peter Woolford, who was responsible for government 
relations and public policy at the RCC. Woolford had just joined the RCC, having been a 
senior public servant in economic and fiscal policy for the federal government, and knew 
very little about class actions.591 The third member, the OCC, lobbied on behalf of tens of 
thousands of business people throughout Ontario,592 and it was represented in the class 
actions consultations process by Robert Anderson. Anderson was General Counsel at 
Procter & Gamble Inc.,593 and worked with Stewart and Woolford on other consultations 
after the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee.594  
The fourth member of the Gang of Four was the CFIB, which represented small 
businesses across Canada595 and regularly polled its members in order to formulate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 The original Gang of Four was a political faction of four officials from the Chinese Communist party, 
which came to prominence during the Cultural Revolution and controlled the major organs of the 
Communist party during the last years of the Revolution. Clearly, the use of this epithet for the major 
business interests at Queen’s Park was not entirely respectful. Nevertheless, it will be used as a convenient 
shorthand for the group for the remainder of this thesis. 
589 CMA Letter 1983, supra note 401. 
590 Interview with Peter Woolford, September 27, 2016 [Woolford Interview 2]. 
591 Ibid. 
592 Website of the Ontario Chamber of Commerce, online: <http://www.occ.ca>. 
593 Letter from Anderson to Cochrane, January 18, 1990, in B248633 Correspondence, supra note 401 
[Anderson letter].  
594 J David, The Public Consultations of the Competition Bureau: Building Bridges to Consumers 
(Montréal: Option consommateurs, 2003), online: Option consommateurs < http://option-
consommateurs.org/documents/principal/fr/File/rapports/competition/concurr_eng_oc0603.pdf> at 8. 
595 The CFIB currently represents 109,000 small business owners across Canada, although there is little 
information in the archival record regarding its status at the time of the class actions consultations: website 
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positions on which to lobby the government.596 Its representative in the consultation 
process was Judith Andrew, Director of Provincial Affairs and later Director of 
Provincial Policy at the CFIB,597 who had previously pursued a management career in the 
banking industry.598 All of the Gang of Four representatives had worked together earlier 
that year, meeting weekly on government consultations involving revisions to the Ontario 
Consumer Protection Act.599 They therefore had a close working relationship and went 
into the class action consultations as a fairly tight-knit unit on behalf of the business 
community.600 
In advance of the December 22 meeting, Stewart forwarded to Cochrane a copy of 
the CMA brief that he had submitted to Roy McMurtry in 1983.601 According to this 
brief, the CMA favoured “opt-in” class actions;602 on the other hand, the CAC and the 
Advocates’ Society favoured the “opt-out” option.603 The Gang of Four appears to have 
been willing to consider the opt-out route, provided it remained within the court’s 
discretion, and provided that the court could narrow the class and concretize damage 
claims at an early stage.604 There was also agreement between the parties regarding post-
certification notice (in favour) and the role of the Attorney General (no special role).605  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, online: <http://www.cfib-fcei.ca/english/about-
us/canada/178-about-us.html>.	  	  
596  Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, Registration, CFIB, online: OCLC 
<https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/vwRg;jsessionid=IpiW6Gs41UQJ9McNjQ6Yme5W.app-
ocl-01?regId=500543&cno=4590>. In January 1989, the CFIB conducted a poll of its members, asking 
“[s]hould the justice system in Canada allow for “class action” law suits?” Of 142 respondents, 54 per cent 
said “yes”, while a further 18 per cent were “undecided”: CFIB Mandate, January 1989 [CFIB Poll], in 
Policy Development Division Counsel correspondence files, Class Actions – Cabinet Submission, 1987-
1990, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B501822, Archives of Ontario [B501822 – Cabinet Submission]. 
597 AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 3. 
598 Government of Canada, Canada Employment Insurance Commission (CEIC), Commissioner for 
Employers: Judith Andrew, online: CEIC <http://www.esdc.gc.ca/en/ei/commissioner_employers.page>.	  
599 Woolford Interview 2, supra note 590. The revised Act was eventually passed in 1990: Consumer 
Protection Act, RSO 1990, c C-31. 
600 Interestingly, however, Peter Woolford states that it was more of a “Gang of 3”, with Judith Andrew 
remaining something of an outsider due to the “political” nature of the CFIB and the personality dynamics 
of the group: Woolford Interview 2, ibid. 
601 Letter from Stewart to Cochrane, December 7, 1988, in B502275 – Consultations, supra note 401. 
602 Meeting Dec 22 1988, supra note 587 at 1, in B502275 – Consultations, ibid. For a definition of “opt-
in” and “opt-out” class actions, see Chapter 1, supra, at 14. 
603 Meeting Dec 22 1988, ibid, at 1. 
604 Ibid at 2.	  
605 Ibid at 3. Scott appears to have accepted this submission, despite the fact that he had personally 
intervened in numerous actions throughout his tenure as Attorney General: see the terms of reference for 
the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, infra, which state explicitly that there will be no special role 
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Various options for cy-près distribution and costs were also discussed, but no 
agreement was reached.606 Nevertheless, the simple act of sitting around a table and 
talking to each other, as well as the points of tentative agreement that were reached, led to 
further understanding between the various factions that was to come in useful during the 
meetings of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee that were to take place the 
following year: indeed, the same parties and, for the most part, the same people were 
involved in both. This was an encouragement to Scott and Cochrane, as were concurrent 
developments in other provinces607 and the rising tide of public opinion.608 
 True to form, however, Cochrane overestimated the goodwill that had been built 
up by these meetings. On January 4, 1989, he wrote to the various interest groups in order 
to confirm what was discussed at the December 1988 meeting, and stated that, if further 
consultations were not possible before the introduction of a Bill, he would welcome their 
comments on any proposed draft legislation.609 He observed shortly afterwards in a 
briefing note that the stakeholders were willing to talk about the shape of reform, instead 
of whether reform itself was desirable.610 Cochrane enthused that, “[t]his is the closest 
Ontario has ever come to having a concensus [sic] among major interest groups on what 
class action reform should look like,”611 although importantly he noted that the group had 
not come to a specific conclusion with respect to costs.612 This last issue was to prove a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for the AG in class actions. However, the Attorney General would still be able to apply for intervener status 
as in a normal action.  
606 Meeting Dec 22 1988, ibid, at 3-4. 
607 In January 1989, Alberta’s Committee on Fair Dealing in Consumer Savings and Investments released 
its report entitled, A Blueprint for Fairness (Edmonton: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Alberta, 1989), 
online: <https://archive.org/details/blueprintforfair00albe> [Blueprint]. This report was a response to the 
collapse of various financial institutions in Alberta throughout the 1980s. It recommended the creation of a 
Consumer Savings and Investment Information Act, which would include a civil right of action on a class 
basis for breaches of the Act, with government allowed to participate (at 55). The report’s 
recommendations were never implemented, although it did receive some coverage in the media: M Fisher, 
“Alberta urged to read the riot act to reeling financial services industry”, Globe and Mail (January 17, 
1989), B1 and B4, in B248501 – Draft Policy Submission file #1, supra note 542. Michael Cochrane also 
mentioned the Blueprint in his later Cabinet Submission, although this was simply to note that the Blueprint 
had recommended class action reform for consumers: March 20 1989 Cabinet Submission, supra note 584.  
608 CFIB Poll, supra note 596. 
609 Letter from Cochrane to Class Action Consultation Members, January 4, 1989 [Jan 4 1989 letter], in 
Policy Development Division Counsel correspondence files, Class Actions – Business Consultation, 1989, 
CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B501822, Archives of Ontario [B501822 – Business Consultation]. 
610 Briefing note January 6 1989, supra note 587 at 1. 
611 Ibid at 3.	  
612 Ibid at 2. 
	   101 
major sticking point, both in getting the groups to the table for further negotiations, and 
in coming to any kind of eventual consensus.  
 Cochrane’s over-optimism with regard to these consultations is in stark contrast to 
the stakeholders’ perception of them. Just the day before he wrote his briefing note, the 
Gang of Four met with the Premier in regard to the Legislative Review Project and told 
him that they did not want class action legislation introduced.613 Five days after that, 
Cochrane wrote to the “Class Action Consultation Members”, again asking them to 
confirm their “consensus” on the basic structure of a class action remedy.614 In response, 
the Gang of Four voiced their discontent directly to Ian Scott,615 stating that Cochrane 
was mistaken in assuming they were supportive of a new class action law.616 They 
criticized the consultative process as unfocused and incapable of leading to workable 
legislation,617 stating that it was premature because they saw no current need for class 
actions reform. 618  While they expressed willingness to take part in appropriate 
consultations, as well as the possibility and need for consensus, they listed several 
questions that had to be answered as a condition of their participation. These largely 
related to the need or demand for class actions legislation in Ontario given the 
alternatives available; whether the MAG was prepared to make it a priority relative to its 
numerous other initiatives; and the costs of the new law and by whom those costs would 
be borne. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Letter from Gang of Four to Ian Scott, March 15, 1989, at 1, in Policy Development Division Counsel 
correspondence files, Class Proceedings – Correspondence, 1990, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B248501, 
Archives of Ontario [B248501 – Correspondence]. 
614 Letter from Cochrane to Class Action Consultation Members, January 10, 1989, in B248633 
Correspondence, supra note 401. Cochrane’s ULCC 1988 paper was enclosed with this letter, as was a 
“Class Action Consultation Paper” that he had authored, setting out the various viewpoints on class actions 
as well as the experience of other jurisdictions. The consultation paper concluded that, “the case for reform 
has been made … The real question for consideration is which model is best suited to the needs of litigants 
in Ontario” (at 12). The letter was sent to all the members of the future Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee, as well as Robert Prichard (the Dean of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law), Jim 
O’Grady (of the Ontario Federation of Labour), Susan Ursel at Mary Cornish & Associates (for the 
Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF)), Jim Breithaupt (Chair of the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission), and Raj Anand (Chair of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, and previously a colleague 
of Ian Scott’s at the law firm of Cameron, Brewin & Scott).  
615 Letter from Gang of Four to Scott, January 20, 1989, at 2, in B248633 Correspondence, ibid. 
616 Ibid at 4. 
617 Ibid.	  
618 Ibid at 1. 
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The other stakeholders clearly shared the concerns of the Four. They wasted no 
time in writing to Cochrane to set the record straight, and their responses indicated that 
the consensus he sought was still a long way off. Janet Yale, General Counsel at the 
CAC,619 disagreed strongly that unsuccessful plaintiffs should pay the costs of notice (her 
recollection was that a public fund would pay the costs of notice up-front, and a review of 
Cochrane’s notes from the December 22 meeting shows her to be correct).620 She further 
wrote that she had not agreed on the return of unclaimed damages awards to the 
defendant621 (this issue was to be a major bone of contention which would almost prevent 
the formation of the Advisory Committee), and that, as Cochrane had previously 
observed, no-way costs were essential to encouraging meritorious class actions.622  
On the same date, Andrew Roman of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre (who had 
not been able to attend the December 1988 meetings) wrote to Cochrane and Scott to 
question why such “non-issues” as opting-in/opting-out had been put before the 
consultation members as the focus for discussion.623 Roman stated that there were only 
two issues to discuss: the economic barriers to class actions (ie costs) and the legal 
barriers (ie certification), both of which had to be removed to facilitate class actions.624 
He urged Cochrane not to tell Scott that there was a consensus on the basic structure of a 
class action remedy.625 
 Similarly, JD Grenkie, the President of the Canadian Bar Association – Ontario 
(CBA), wrote to Ian Scott on January 21, 1989, stating that his organization was pleased 
that class action reform was back on the Ministry’s agenda. The MAG saw the CBA as 
one of the natural representatives of the legal profession,626 and had been in touch with it 
regarding class actions since the late 1970s when the Competition Act was being debated. 
As the CBA had noted in its previous submissions to the Ontario government, it wanted 
to make its views known before that government became committed to a policy on class 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 Letter from J Yale to Cochrane, January 13, 1989, at 1 [Yale], in B502275 – Consultations, supra note 
401. 
620 Meeting Dec 22 1988, supra note 587 at 3. 
621 Yale, supra note 619 at 1; Jan 4 1989 letter, supra note 609 at 4. 
622 Yale, ibid, at 2. 
623 Letter from Roman to Cochrane, January 13, 1989, at 1-2, in B501822 – Business Consultation, supra 
note 609. 
624 Ibid at 2. 
625 Ibid. 
626 Interview with Michael Cochrane, September 26, 2016 [Cochrane Interview 3].	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actions, especially given the possibility that other provinces could follow Ontario’s lead 
on the issue.627 The CBA was therefore eager to take part in the resurrected consultations. 
However, it disagreed strongly with Cochrane’s indication that there was a consensus.628 
Grenkie also felt that further study and consultation was required before any Bill could be 
prepared.  
A couple of weeks later, and also in response to Cochrane’s January 10 letter, 
Rino Stradiotto of The Advocates’ Society (TAS) too expressed concern about the 
consultation process.629 He stated that the views he had expressed to date were solely his 
own, and that the view of TAS could only be obtained by having one of its committees 
review draft legislation and then report to the Board of Directors, who would then 
canvass the TAS membership before providing the MAG with input.630 Again, the MAG 
was keen to obtain the views of TAS, seeing it as another strong representative of the 
legal profession631 that had previously made submissions on the class actions issue.632 
TAS would eventually appoint a member to sit on the Advisory Committee on its behalf, 
in the form of its Vice-President Terrence O’Sullivan, who was also a partner at 
McMillan, Binch. 
 As far as there was any consensus, it was clearly that further consultations were 
required. There was certainly no general agreement that the case for reform had been 
made, as Cochrane seemed to imply. Nevertheless, Ian Scott decided that the time for 
debate on the reform question was over: he wanted stakeholders to move on and discuss 
the shape of a class actions remedy that was going to become law whether they liked it or 
not. He replied to Grenkie and the Gang of Four by stating that a powerful case for 
reform had already been made by the Supreme Court’s decision in Naken, the OLRC 
Report, and the recent experience in Québec and the US, as well as mass incidents such 
as the Mississauga train derailment.633 He re-iterated Cochrane’s position that there was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 CBA/PIAC Report, supra note 373 at 3. 
628 Letter from CBA President to Scott, January 21, 1989, in B248633 Correspondence, supra note 401.  
629 Letter from Rino Stradiotto to Cochrane, February 7, 1989, in B248633 Correspondence, ibid. Stradiotto 
was a well-known and widely-respected insurance defence litigator. 
630 Geoffrey Adair of the CBA wrote to Cochrane saying essentially the same thing: letter from Adair to 
Cochrane, January 18, 1989, in B501822 – Business Consultation, supra note 609. 
631 Cochrane Interview 3, supra note 626. 
632 Supra note 447. 
633 Letter from Scott to Grenkie, February 21, 1989; letter from Scott to Gang of Four, February 23, 1989; 
both letters are in B248633 Correspondence, supra note 401. 
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general consensus on the direction of reform, although further consultations were likely 
to take place. It was time to “seriously apply our minds to the shape of the reform.”  
The message from Scott was clear: you cannot stop reform from happening, but 
you can help determine its shape. This was even more alarming to the Gang of Four than 
Cochrane’s January 10 letter. They told Scott that his personal support for class action 
reform contradicted the Premier’s statement to them that he did not want any initiatives 
that would encourage litigation.634 They criticized Scott’s reliance on the OLRC Report, 
saying that a number of groups (including the CMA) had been critical of its conclusions, 
which at any rate were now seven years old. Finally, they demanded answers to their 
previous questions before they would be willing to take part in further consultations.635  
Scott and Cochrane faced an uphill battle in getting the various interest groups 
together to discuss the shape of reform, and there were issues that would prove 
contentious on all sides. It was the Gang of Four, however, who would be the most 
difficult to persuade. Simply to get them to the table, Scott and Cochrane made 
significant compromises that would have long-term effects for class actions in Ontario.  
 
D. Building the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee 
 
Following the initial round of consultations, Cochrane prepared a Cabinet Submission.636 
Although it was signed by Scott, it was based heavily upon Cochrane’s earlier policy 
development submission of June 1986. This later version was updated with developments 
such as the ULCC conference of 1988 and the Law Society’s approval of contingency 
fees, as well as the results of the initial consultations. Cochrane provided a 
characteristically over-optimistic description of these results, stating that there was 
widespread agreement that reform was needed,637 and that consensus was possible along 
the lines recommended in the submission.638 Of course, there was no agreement of the 
sort, and it was certainly not clear that a consensus was possible according to Cochrane’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 Letter from Gang of Four to Ian Scott, March 15, 1989, at 1, in B248501 – Correspondence, supra note 
613. 
635 Ibid at 1. 
636 March 20 1989 Cabinet Submission, supra note 584.  
637 Ibid at 1.	  	  
638 Ibid at 3. 
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proposals. 639  The feedback from the consultations demonstrated that the following 
recommendations were particularly controversial:640 
 
• Class actions should require court approval before they proceed (certification), 
with the certification test including a preliminary merits assessment; 
• The traditional costs rules should be amended to provide: 
o A no-way cost rule (because the role of normal costs rules in discouraging 
improperly brought actions would instead be performed by the threshold 
test at the certification stage);641 
o A modified, court-supervised contingency fee arrangement; and 
o Cost-sharing among successful class members, whereby fees and 
disbursements owed to class counsel would be deducted from any class 
recovery.642 
 
The aim of Cochrane’s submission was to secure Cabinet approval for consultation with 
the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, as well as the terms of reference for that 
consultation (as listed in the Proposal and Recommendation section).643 Given that major 
stakeholders such as the Gang of Four had not even agreed to further consultations yet, 
let alone the terms of that consultation, a Cabinet Submission was almost certainly 
premature. Indeed, the next three months would see a number of changes that would 
render the Proposal and Recommendation section (and therefore the terms of reference) 
inaccurate.644  
 These changes were made primarily to get the Gang of Four onto the Attorney 
General’s Advisory Committee. Scott and Cochrane met with the representatives of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 Ibid at 3. 
640 Ibid. 
641 Ibid at 17.	  
642 Interestingly, the Proposal and Recommendation section makes no mention of the Fund, even though it 
had been discussed during initial consultations. 
643 The idea of negotiating the content of the legislation by way of a committee of stakeholders with pre-
determined terms of reference was an idea that Cochrane had put to Scott: Cochrane Interview 2, supra 
note 4. 
644 Despite these changes, the Cabinet Minute of June 21, 1989 [Cabinet Minute], which approved 
consultation with the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, reproduced Cochrane’s Proposal and 
Recommendation section verbatim: in Minutes of Cabinet Meetings, 1989, 1/89 to 45/89, RG 75-14, Box 
No B834837, Archives of Ontario. 
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Four on March 23, 1989.645 At that meeting, Scott made it clear to the Four that class 
action reform was going to take place, in all likelihood according to five terms of 
reference that he presented to the group646 (these terms essentially mirrored the Proposal 
and Recommendation section of the March 20 Cabinet Submission, and included the 
provision on no-way costs).647 The draft terms of reference were left with the Gang of 
Four for their consideration.648 A few days later, however, they made their response quite 
clear when the President and General Manager of GM Canada, George Peapples, met 
with the Premier.649 He stated that the questions posed by the Gang of Four in its January 
20 letter to Scott had not been answered, and that he could not therefore support the 
introduction of class action legislation. He urged Peterson not to allow Scott to publicly 
announce his intention to introduce such legislation.650 
The Gang of Four was clearly not in favour of the terms proposed by Scott and 
Cochrane on March 23, or of the general idea of reform at all. Nevertheless, less than a 
week later, Scott was putting those very same terms before the Cabinet Committee on 
Justice, stating that all parties to the consultations had generally endorsed them.651 He 
further told the CCJ that he intended to announce, by the end of May, the introduction of 
class actions legislation based on those terms, with a committee to advise on the drafting. 
It is unclear quite what Scott and Cochrane were hoping to achieve in overstating 
the support for class actions in this way. They may well have been hoping that, by the 
end of May, the Gang of Four would be persuaded to come to the table, either because 
they genuinely wanted reform, or because events would otherwise move ahead without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645 Class Action Consultation Advisory Committee: Agenda and Draft Terms of Reference, March 23, 1989 
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Development Division Counsel Correspondence Files, Class Actions – Advisory Committee Minutes and 
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them (Scott’s indication that he wanted to make a public announcement652 may also have 
been intended to force the Four’s hand). It does seem apparent that Scott was prepared to 
move forward with class action reform no matter what the outcome of the consultations. 
 The Gang of Four, however, continued to show their reluctance on the issue of 
reform. They wrote to Scott on April 11, 1989, expressing a willingness to continue 
discussions focused upon a set of agreed upon principles, such as the five terms of 
reference that were discussed at the March 23 meeting. However, they insisted that 
further consultations were necessary so they could better understand the potential impact 
of reform,653 and that, before such consultations were completed, they were unable to   
publicly reject or support the introduction of a class action remedy.654 Cochrane still had 
a long way to go in achieving the consensus he was aiming for.  
 He acknowledged as such in a briefing note drafted in response to the Gang of 
Four’s April 11 letter.655 The note details the requests made in the April 11 letter (no 
rejection or support of a class action remedy; continuation of consultations with the 
MAG, with the five terms of reference as the possible focus; and suspension of other 
class action initiatives, such as those contained in the Environmental Bill of Rights and 
the ULCC model legislation), as well as what the MAG itself wanted (the Gang of Four’s 
endorsement of the five principles, or at least their neutrality; and their participation in 
the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee). 656 Cochrane then demonstrated the 
mediation skills that were to prove so useful in breaking the logjam on class action 
reform. He suggested a way out of the impasse: the MAG would announce class action 
reform along the lines of the five principles, with the Gang of Four joining the Advisory 
Committee; in return, the Four could remain neutral on the need for reform, and the 
ULCC draft legislation as well as the class action remedy in Bill 13 (the Environmental 
Bill of Rights) would be suspended pending further consultations.657 Cochrane drafted a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652 Peapples Letter March 31 1989, supra note 649 at 2. 
653 Letter from Gang of Four to Scott, April 11, 1989, in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
654 Ibid.	  
655 It is unclear whether the briefing note was directed to Ewart, Scott or both. Cochrane briefing note, 
April 1989 [April 1989 Briefing Note], in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
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press release incorporating this possible solution, 658  which is very close to what 
eventually happened – with one important exception. Later changes to the press release 
reflect changes to the five terms of reference, with the provision for no-way costs 
disappearing entirely.  
In the meantime, the Gang of Four was not the only group that needed to be 
brought on side. Around the middle of April 1989, the environmental and consumer 
groups began expressing their frustration at the compromises that appeared to have been 
made. In particular, they wanted the content of the certification test and the issue of 
unallocated damage awards to be open for discussion (while the business groups wanted 
these issues to be determined in advance of any further consultations, and indeed felt they 
had a specific commitment from the Attorney General in this regard).659 This had created 
an impasse that prevented the announcement on reform and the beginning of 
consultations.660  
Cochrane suggested a number of options to break this new impasse, including 
maintaining the commitment to the business interests and beginning consultations 
without the environmental groups, or conducting the consultations without any private 
groups at all (their views would instead be represented by the relevant ministries, such as 
the Ministry of the Environment). The preference was clearly to maintain the 
commitment to the business groups, while giving a concession to the environmental 
groups. Cochrane recommended that Scott make one final offer to all the groups on a 
“take it or leave it” basis, stating that there would be a presumption that unclaimed 
damage awards would be returned to defendants, with the consultation group to discuss 
any exceptions to this rule (for example, in environmental cases). Consultations would 
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659 “Class Actions Consultation – Options”, by MG Cochrane [Options], in B502275 AGAC Minutes, ibid. 
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begin immediately.661 This is the option that the MAG ultimately pursued, and Cochrane 
communicated it to the consultation group on April 18, 1989.662 Clearly there was some 
urgency to the matter, because the Gang of Four informed Cochrane immediately that 
they would have a response to him by April 21.663  
 Once again, however, Scott and Cochrane overplayed their hand. Before any of 
the consultation groups had a chance to respond the April 18 letter, the Attorney General 
(with Cochrane) appeared before the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy (CCEP) to 
discuss the Cabinet Submission of March 20, 1989.664 Scott announced before the 
Cabinet Committee that the Gang of Four would cooperate with a public announcement 
on new class actions legislation.665 On the basis of Scott’s representations, the CCEP 
agreed to recommend to Cabinet (concurrently with the CCJ Report of April 6, 1989)666 
that class actions should be brought about in Ontario, in the manner outlined in the 
Cabinet Submission of March 20 and the five principles put to the Gang of Four on 
March 23 (including the provision for no-way costs).667  
Of course, the Gang of Four had never indicated that they would cooperate with 
an announcement on class actions reform. The Four heard about Scott’s announcement 
before the CCEP and immediately wrote to Premier Peterson, copying all other Cabinet 
Ministers (presumably to draw their attention to the inaccuracy of Scott’s representations 
to them). They expressed their “dismay” at this recent development,668 and tersely stated 
that Scott should have waited for their response to Cochrane’s April 18 letter.669 
Frustrated with Scott’s attempts to force them into his consultation process, they 
reiterated their previous reservations about class action reform. They flatly denied that 
they supported the establishment of a process to develop class action legislation, that their 	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negotiations with Scott had been concluded, or that they were prepared to publicly 
support the introduction of legislation.670 
The Four further objected to Scott’s actions and his proposed consultation process 
as a whole, stating that it was highly unusual. Technically, there was no formalized 
consultation process for legislation in Ontario; the process was, and still is today, within 
the discretion of the Minister and subject to Cabinet approval.671 Nevertheless, the Four 
were accustomed to pre-legislative consultation processes such as the one they were 
involved in with the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, regarding the 
Legislative Review Project (LRP), 672  whereby groups would meet and discuss, 
sometimes around pre-agreed terms of reference. The Four pointed out that there was no 
precedent for Scott’s proposed consultation process,673 which involved the following:674  
 
• An up-front public announcement that reform would be taking place;  
• The public announcement would name a group of organizations which would be 
discussing the shape of reform; and  
• The announcement would include the key terms of reference, not up for 
negotiation, around which discussions would focus.   
 
Such a process would not allow the Four to negotiate on the subject of reform itself, and 
would leave them limited flexibility on the shape of that reform, having made a public 
commitment that would imply their support for a number of highly contentious issues 
that had not yet been resolved. They would be unable to publicly criticize a bill that 
would result from any process of which they had been a part. In other words, they would 
be backed into a corner. The Four described this approach as “totally unreasonable.”675 
Nevertheless, as the Gang of Four had previously stated, they were willing to 
continue discussions with various interested groups (just as they were doing with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 Ibid at 1. 
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LRP) and senior MAG staff, on the need for class action reform in Ontario, provided 
there would be no public announcement. 676  Following those discussions, if the 
participants agreed, then further consultations would take place around key terms of 
reference. The Gang of Four stated that some of the terms of reference put forward by 
Scott and Cochrane at their meeting on March 23 (other than the certification requirement 
and no special role for the AG) “would require some amendment in order for us to agree 
to begin a consultative process”.677  
 The Four and the MAG were still quite far apart. However, on April 25, 1989, the 
two parties met. While there are no minutes of this meeting, the correspondence 
exchanged by the parties afterwards shows that significant concessions were made on 
both sides.678 Scott and Cochrane got their public announcement that consultations would 
take place around certain key terms of reference. However, those key terms changed from 
those contained in the Cabinet Submission of March 20 and the five principles put to the 
Gang of Four on March 23. The major concession made by Scott and Cochrane to the 
business interests was on the issue of costs.  
The five terms of reference previously put to the Four, and approved by the CCEP 
and CCJ, stated that the ordinary rules with respect to costs would be replaced with a no-
way costs rule.679 However, in its letter of May 11, 1989, the Gang of Four refused to 
allow the issue of costs to be included in the terms of reference, stating that the Attorney 
General’s public announcements on class actions should be silent on the issue.680 The 
Four strongly reiterated their position that existing cost rules should be retained for class 
actions, as no-way costs rules would encourage frivolous suits.681 Dropping the issue of 
costs from the terms of reference was a significant concession by the MAG. Without a 	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public acknowledgement that any class action remedy would include a no-way costs rule, 
the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee was free to come to any conclusion it 
wished. This would be an issue on which the business interests would eventually win, and 
having it removed from the terms of reference was a crucial first step.  
 The Four also made an important suggestion as to what the consultation process 
would look like. Having protested in their April 21 letter that there was no precedent for 
Ian Scott’s consulting mechanism, the Four made a suggestion of their own that was also 
very unusual. They proposed that if the participants reached a consensus, then they 
should take part in the drafting of the legislation.682 It was unusual for participants in pre-
legislative consultations to be actively involved in the drafting of any eventual Bill. 
Normally, legislative counsel would draft the Bill, using the Advisory Committee report 
as only one of many guidance documents.683 The Four were asking for a level of control 
over the drafting process that was unprecedented. They used Scott’s desire for consensus 
to secure that level of control – if they gave Scott his consensus, they wanted to make 
sure that it would be reflected in the legislation.  
 While the Gang of Four was meeting with the Ministry to discuss its terms for 
consultation, Cochrane was also trying to keep the consumer and environmental groups 
happy. On May 1, 1989, Cochrane wrote to Rollie Thompson, Chair of the Regulated 
Industries Program at the Consumers’ Association of Canada, to finalize the terms of 
reference with him.684 These terms contained no mention of costs – presumably the result 
of Scott and Cochrane’s meeting with the Gang of Four a few days prior. This proved 
less of a concern for the CAC than the issues of a high bar at certification and the return 
of undistributed damage awards to defendants. While Thompson eventually signed off on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682 Ibid at 3. 
683 Memo from D Revell, Chief Legislative Counsel, to Ewart, February 27, 1990 [Revell Memo], in Policy 
Development Division Counsel Correspondence Files, Class Actions – Drafting Instructions, 1989-1990, 
MGC, RG 4-40, Box No B248633, Archives of Ontario [B248633 – Drafting Instructions]. 
684 Letter from Cochrane to Thompson, May 1, 1989 [Thompson May 1 1989], in B502275 AGAC 
Minutes, supra note 645. In the end result, Thompson was unable to sit on the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee due to cuts to CAC funding. In July 1989, a few days before the first meeting of the Committee, 
the Consumers’ Association of Canada asked Edward Belobaba to represent them. Belobaba had worked 
with Ian Scott when he was in private practice at Cameron, Brewin & Scott (which in 1983 merged into 
Gowling, Strathy & Henderson), the firm to which Scott returned after retiring from the legislature in 1992. 
The two appeared on several cases together, including Bhinder v CN, [1985] 2 SCR 561; and Giouroukos v 
Cadillac Fairview Corp, [1986] 2 SCR 707, leave information: <http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/counsel-procureurs-eng.aspx?cas=18182&pedisable=true>.  
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the finalized press release and terms of reference,685 he implied that the CAC’s “serious 
misgivings” about those issues could lead it to leave the Committee altogether.686  
 The Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) and Energy Probe, both 
represented by Toronto lawyer David Poch, had similar concerns. While CELA accepted 
Scott’s invitation to take part in the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, it did so 
only on certain conditions – including that certification must be discussed in the most 
general terms possible, and that the issue of unallocated funds was to be left open for 
discussion. CELA also expressed concern about costs and funding, saying that both 
issues should be open for discussion by the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee.687 
 However, it was the issue of the return of undistributed damage awards to the 
defendants that was the dealbreaker for the environmental groups, because they did not 
want to see unclaimed damage awards (a fairly likely scenario in the environmental 
context, where damages were often widespread but difficult to document, or awards too 
small to bother claiming) revert to the defendants, thereby unjustly enriching them after 
they had already been found liable.688 The dispute on this point had been threatening the 
entire idea of the AG Advisory Committee since at least early April 1989.689 On May 5, 
1989, Michael Cochrane met with CELA and Energy Probe representatives, again to try 
to break the impasse.690 He confirmed that the only real sticking point for them was the 
return of undistributed damage awards.691 Cochrane reiterated that the business groups 
felt they had a commitment from the Attorney General on this point and were unlikely to 
back down.692 Even Cochrane, however, could not persuade the environmental groups to 
change their position. On May 8, Poch wrote to Cochrane to inform him that they had 
already conceded that certification would be part of any class actions remedy; they were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 Letter from Scott to Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, May 12, 1989, in B502275 AGAC 
Minutes, supra note 645. 
686 Letter from Thompson to Scott, May 17, 1989, in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645.	  
687 Memo from John Moffet (Executive Assistant to Ian Scott) to Doug Ewart, May 2, 1989; motion of the 
CELA Board of Directors, May 2, 1989. Both documents are in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
688 Letter from Poch to Cochrane, May 8, 1989 [Poch May 8 1989], in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra 
note 645. 
689 Options, supra note 659. 
690 This meeting is documented in a letter from Cochrane to the CELA/Energy Probe representatives, dated 
May 8, 1989, in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
691 Ibid at 1. 
692 Ibid at 1-2.	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unwilling to back down on the issue of unclaimed damages.693 At some point, Cochrane 
must have taken this issue back to the Gang of Four to see if they were willing to 
compromise in any way. Fortunately, they were willing to consider, for environmental 
cases, an exception to the principle of returning unclaimed damage awards to the 
defendants.694 The consultation process was back on track.  
On May 12, 1989, Ian Scott wrote to the members of what was to become the 
Attorney General’s Advisory Committee: the Canadian Federation of Independent 
Business, the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association, the Retail Council of Canada, the 
Ontario Chamber of Commerce,695 the Consumers’ Association of Canada, the Canadian 
Environmental Law Association, the Advocates’ Society, the Canadian Bar Association, 
Energy Probe, and the Insurance Bureau of Canada. It is unclear why women’s groups 
such as the Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) were not invited to sit on the 
Committee. Cochrane had written to numerous women’s groups in March 1989, asking 
them for their opinions on the use of a potential class action remedy for advancing the 
rights of women.696 A member of the Committee later reported that he or she had been 
receiving calls from women’s groups who felt their interests were not represented. In 
response, Cochrane noted that he had offered to meet with members of LEAF “but 
nothing had come of it.”697 Whether it was inertia on the part of women’s groups, or an 
unwillingness to include them as full members of the Committee, is unknown. It may be 
that women’s groups were not invited because the business interests had asked Scott in 
their May 11, 1989 letter that the Committee be restricted to the 10 organizations listed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 Poch May 8 1989, supra note 688. 
694 Scott May 11 1989, supra note 678 at 2. 
695 As noted previously, these four organizations were colloquially referred to at Queen’s Park as the “Gang 
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696 Letters from Cochrane to Sherene Razack (Professor at University of Toronto), Mary Lou Fassell 
(Counsel for the Barbra Schlifer Clinic, a women’s legal clinic), and Joan Bercovitch (Legal Policy Analyst 
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March 29, 1989, in B501822 – Cabinet Submission, supra note 596. 
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[AGAC Minutes Nov 23 1989], in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
	   115 
above, “particularly as [the Committee] already represents a diversity of interests.”698 It 
seems that many women later disagreed that the Committee was truly that diverse.  
In writing to the members of the Committee, Ian Scott confirmed that, “a 
consensus has been reached concerning the basic parameters of the consultation” and that 
Michael Cochrane was to chair the group.699 The terms of reference listed in Scott’s 
letter, and the enclosed draft press release, both reflected the outcome of months of 
negotiation between the Ministry and the various groups:700 
 
(i) The remedy was to have a structured certification procedure, although the 
precise content of that procedure (such as a preliminary consideration of the 
merits of the case) was open for discussion; 
 
(ii) The remedy would be an “opt-out” model whereby class members who did 
not opt out of the action would be automatically bound by it; 
 
(iii) Notice would be given after certification, unless the court otherwise ordered; 
 
(iv) There would be a controlled contingency fee arrangement; 
 
(v) There would be no special role for the Attorney General; 
 
(vi) Undistributed damage awards would be returned to defendants, with the 
possible exception of environmental cases; 
 
(vii) The remedy should treat plaintiffs and defendants in a fair and equitable 
manner, and impose no unnecessary burdens on the courts. 
 
While this list contained some important concessions from the business groups (such as 
the use of contingency fees and the opt-out model), those groups also prevailed on 
important issues such as a certification test, no special role for the Attorney General and 
the return of undistributed damage awards. In the ensuing discussions of the Attorney 
General’s Advisory Committee and the subsequent hammering out of the legislation, it 
was the voice of the Gang of Four that was to prevail over that of the consumer and 
environmental groups. 
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 The Attorney General’s May 12 letter stated that any participant was free to leave 
the consultation if dissatisfied with the process.701 However, at some point it was made 
clear to the members of the Committee that their conclusions had to be unanimous in 
order for their recommendations to be carried forward into legislation.702 As if to 
emphasize the requirement for consensus, Scott asked the prospective members of his 
Advisory Committee for their sign-off to indicate their acceptance of the terms of 
reference and the draft press release.703 Most of the Committee members signed off 
without substantive comment.704 However, as noted above, the Consumers’ Association 
of Canada signed off on the terms of reference and press release, while indicating its 
“serious misgivings” on the issues of a high bar at certification and the return of 
undistributed damage awards to defendants in non-environmental cases.705 Even after 
agreement on the terms of reference, unanimity between the Committee members seemed 
a long way off.  
 None of these issues were reflected, however, in the Cabinet Minute of June 21, 
1989, that authorized the Attorney General to continue consultations on the subject of 
class actions reform.706 That Minute contained exactly the same terms of reference that 
had been listed in Cochrane’s March 20 Cabinet Submission. It had not been amended to 
reflect the agreements that had since been reached between the parties – there was no 
mention in the Cabinet Minute of the return of undistributed damage awards. The Cabinet 
Minute was specific on the elements of the certification test (including a preliminary 
merits assessment), while the agreement between the parties was clearly to keep the 
elements of certification open for discussion.707 There was no indication in the Cabinet 
Minute that other class action initiatives, such as that contained in the ULCC model 
legislation, would be suspended.708 Finally, on the issue of costs, the parties had agreed to 
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publicly remain silent on that issue.709 In the Minute, however, Cabinet explicitly stated 
that the ordinary rules with respect to costs should be replaced with a no-way costs 
rule.710 The instructions from Cabinet were directly at odds with the agreements the 
Attorney General had made with the various interest groups with whom he had consulted. 
In announcing the establishment of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on June 
29, 1989, along with its terms of reference, Ian Scott was therefore acting outside the 
bounds of his Cabinet mandate. 
 The Cabinet Minute was also much more equivocal on the manner in which the 
new remedy would be implemented. Whereas Cochrane’s March 20 Submission stated 
that the new class action remedy should be provided by statute,711 Cabinet simply agreed 
that, once the consultations were concluded, the report should be brought forward for 
approval and further consideration as to how to incorporate it in statutory form.712 The 
Cabinet Minute contained no agreement that legislation would be introduced following 
the completion of the report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee. 
 Scott’s Statement to the Legislature and in the Press on June 29 that a consultation 
process was about to take place, and that the government would introduce legislation at 
the end of that process,713 was, therefore, another step too far.714 The Secretary of the 
Cabinet, Robert Carman, pointed out this inconsistency to Richard Chaloner, the Deputy 
Attorney General. Carman stated that the Cabinet Minute deliberately did not include the 
recommendation of the CCJ that a new comprehensive class action remedy be 
implemented by statute, as the Minute “reflects the different views held respecting the 
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introduction of class action legislation.”715 Scott’s announcement that legislation would 
be introduced therefore went beyond the bounds of the Cabinet Minute.716  
Carman urged Chaloner to ensure that, once the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee had completed its work, its report should be discussed in the CCJ and Cabinet 
for approval before proceeding to the Cabinet Committee on Legislation.717 In other 
words, any report produced by the Advisory Committee could not immediately go to 
Legislative Counsel for drafting a Bill and then the Cabinet Committee on Legislation for 
approval. It would have to go through a second round of Cabinet approval in order to 
ensure that the report complied with Cabinet’s instructions (as reflected in the Minute of 
June 21, 1989), and to determine whether, and in what form, the provincial government 
wanted to introduce a draft Bill.  
This is what eventually happened718 but, thanks to the work of Scott and Cochrane 
who wanted to see the Advisory Committee’s Report changed as little as possible prior to 
introduction as a draft Bill, the process was largely a formality. In the meantime, 
Chaloner defended Scott’s actions by stating that the only way the MAG could secure the 
support of the business groups was by promising that class actions would only be 
available through one comprehensive statute – so that in that regard, there would be 
nothing to fear from potential consumer or environmental legislation.719 This was clearly 
not anticipated by the Cabinet Minute. However, Chaloner assured Carman that any draft 
legislation would be put to the appropriate Cabinet committees and Cabinet for review. 
While this is not quite what Carman was looking for, he seems to have been 
placated by Chaloner’s assurances because the two men do not appear to have 
corresponded further on the subject. It is likely that the matter was not taken further 
because of Scott’s relationship with Premier Peterson; any breach of Cabinet confidence 
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such as this would be for Cabinet to sanction,720 and no sanctions would have occurred 
without the Premier’s say-so. It was almost certainly Scott’s influence, therefore, that 
enabled him to bypass the democratic process and surreptitiously change the Advisory 
Committee’s terms of reference. 
The work of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform 
therefore proceeded as planned, with Michael Cochrane as Chair. Informally at least, the 
mandate of the Committee was to come up with a unanimous report regarding the shape 
of a class actions remedy for Ontario.721 In order to secure this unanimity, significant 
concessions would be made that would affect class actions in Ontario for decades to 
come. 
 
E. The Report of The Attorney General’s Advisory Committee 
 
The Committee met for the first time on July 18, 1989. It met approximately every two to 
three weeks up to December 1989, when it began finalizing its report, and then on 
numerous occasions thereafter. The Committee members spent much of their time 
together hammering out the relatively non-controversial parts of an Act that had been 
drafted by Michael Cochrane and MAG staff.722 The discussions did not revolve around 
whether class action reform was desirable – the terms of reference made clear that such 
reform would definitely take place – but its shape. As a result, there was little if any 
discussion of developments that had swayed government and public opinion towards the 
enactment of reform over the past decade, such as the Mississauga train derailment and 
other events that gave rise to mass claims.723 The focus instead was on precedents in 	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other jurisdictions (particularly Québec), the briefs submitted to the government by 
various Committee members, and how much the Ontario bill should borrow from those 
sources. 
There were several points of sharp disagreement between the Committee members, 
largely on the issues of costs and certification.724 With regard to both issues, CBA 
representative Andrew Roman725 had certain materials circulated a few days after the 
initial meeting. These included his draft Bill prepared for Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs Canada (which did not include a certification requirement), and the joint 
CBA/PIAC brief (which argued for a departure from the traditional costs rules).726 On the 
other side of the debate, the law firm of McMillan, Binch submitted a memo to the 
Committee articulating the business community’s negative perception of the current 
government and its pursuit of “social advance”.727 The memo also argued against any 
departure from traditional costs rules.728 As in the US, the philosophical divide was 
between those who saw class actions as advancing social goods (such as consumer and 
environmental rights), and those who saw class actions as merely a procedural device that 
should not depart from established rules of court.729 Clearly the two sides were still 
sharply divided on crucial issues, particularly costs and certification. 
The initial meeting appears to have consisted of a general discussion of the terms of 
reference, as well as setting an agenda for the remainder of the Committee’s work.730 
However, this work had barely begun when an article in the Financial Post threatened to 
derail the participation of the business groups. The August 28 article implied that the 
business interests were in support of a class action remedy, an impression that the Gang 	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of Four had tried very hard to avoid giving.731 Norm Stewart, on behalf of the CMA and 
the Gang of Four, clearly believed that Michael Cochrane had something to do with the 
article, because he wrote to Cochrane later that week to express his discontent at what he 
perceived as “posturing” in the media.732 He was disturbed to see that Cochrane himself, 
on behalf of the Minister, believed that, “the goal is to write legislation that is less 
restrictive than that of Quebec”.733 He stated that the article made it very difficult to 
approach the consultations with an open mind, and that it could cause business interests 
to “unnecessarily fear that we are about to create a litigation monster.”734 Stewart 
therefore asked that Committee participants restrict their contact with the media.735 This 
was to be the first in a long series of letters from Stewart to Cochrane, in which the 
former (as the voice of the Gang of Four) persistently attempted to control the outcome of 
the Committee’s deliberations. 
 These attempts were largely successful, with Cochrane paying more heed to 
Stewart’s input than perhaps any other member of the Committee. This is demonstrated 
in the fact that, just a few weeks after Stewart’s letter, the Attorney General personally 
addressed the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association regarding class actions. This is the 
only member organization of the Advisory Committee that Scott appears to have 
personally addressed. Scott attempted to put CMA members’ minds at ease, not about 
class action reform as a whole or even certain elements of it, but about the consultation 
process itself.736 Not only did he attempt to persuade the CMA that the consultation 
process was beneficial to them because it ensured their interests were accommodated, but 
that, in taking part, they were helping to design a remedy that in reality they had not yet 
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Media 1990, 1989-1990, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B248501, Archives of Ontario [B248501 – Media]. 
The article identified Cochrane as “Scott’s policy director”. Although Doug Ewart was actually the 
Director of the Policy Development Division, this epithet may actually have been a more accurate 
reflection of Cochrane’s role with regard to class actions. 
732 Letter from Stewart to Cochrane, September 1, 1989, at 1 [Stewart Sept 1 1989], in B502275 AGAC 
Minutes, supra note 645. 
733 Ibid. See also Financial Post article, supra note 731. 
734 Stewart Sept 1 1989, ibid, at 1-2. 
735 Ibid at 2. Stewart’s reference to the non-public nature of the LRP discussions with the Ministry of 
Consumer and Commercial Relations implied that he wished the same for the Committee.	  
736 CMA Speech, supra note 37. 
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even agreed to, at least publicly.737 It was the persuasive genius of Scott to thank the 
CMA for support it had not yet given. The speech, as an attempt to keep the CMA in the 
consultation process and reassure other business interests, appears to have been 
successful as the business groups remained on the Advisory Committee. 
 Those groups continued to be influential in the Committee’s deliberations. For 
example, at the Committee’s second meeting on September 7, Stewart’s concerns with 
the media were the first issue to be raised by Cochrane, with the latter concluding that all 
future Committee meetings would be confidential.738 This point was later taken even 
further, when the Committee decided that Minutes would no longer be attributable to 
individual members.739 
However, one of the most controversial issues amongst the Committee members 
was costs, on which the Committee was more divided than any other issue.740 It was a 
consumer advocate who first articulated a possible compromise on this point. At their 
second meeting the Committee discussed certification, with business interests advocating 
a stringent test and members such as Andrew Roman (for the CBA) wanting a simpler 
and less onerous test.741 In the middle of this discussion, Edward Belobaba, for the 
Consumers’ Association of Canada, stated that he too would prefer less onerous 
certification requirements.742 He then articulated the link between certification and costs: 
 
E.B. added that if Committee wished to constrain class actions it should be 
accomplished up front with costs and symmetrical appeal rules … E.B. 
suggested that if we need a structured criteria [for certification] it would do 
to eliminate … anything to do with merits (and to instead use cost rules)743 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 Ibid at 8-9. Even as late as November 1989, members of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee 
were asking Cochrane whether they were discussing wholesale reform by way of legislation, or simply 
through an amendment to the Rules. Cochrane said he would get back to them on that point, but his 
response is not noted in the remaining minutes: AGAC Minutes of November 8, 1989, at 1-2 [AGAC 
Minutes Nov 8 1989], in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645.  
738 AGAC Minutes Sept 7 1989, supra note 722 at 1-2. In a follow-up letter to the AGAC dated September 
14, 1989 (in B502275 AGAC Minutes, ibid), Cochrane referred to a recent submission from the Chartered 
Accountants’ Institute, which does not appear to be in the archival record. 
739 AGAC Minutes of September 21, 1989, at 9, in B502275 AGAC Minutes, ibid. From the meeting of 
September 21 onwards, minutes were no longer attributable to individual members. 
740 AGAC Minutes Nov 8 1989, supra note 737 at 10. This observation was made by Cochrane himself. 
741 AGAC Minutes Sept 7 1989, supra note 722 at 5-6. 
742 Ibid at 6. 
743 Ibid. 
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This was one of the first articulations of the connected functions of costs and 
certification.744 Both were a way of weeding out unmeritorious actions. Up until this 
point, the business interests had been pressing for traditional costs rules and a stringent 
test at certification. The consumer and environmental groups had been advocating for no-
way costs and limited or no certification requirements. Belobaba’s suggested compromise 
meant that both groups could get something of what they wanted, while balancing the 
goals of consumer/environmental groups (access to justice) and those of business 
(traditional rules of fairness).745 In addition, it meant that class actions adhered as closely 
as possible to the traditional model of litigation, another goal of the business groups.746 It 
was a brilliant solution at the time, and one that was ultimately to become part of the 
Class Proceedings Act. Unfortunately, it would not work so well in practice, and Edward 
Belobaba would come to regret his suggestion.747 
 The issue of costs dominated the later meetings of the Committee. On November 
8, the members once again discussed the link between certification and costs, with most 
of the Committee discerning this link to be fairly strong. The business community in 
particular felt that if the certification standard was lowered, the normal cost rules should 
not be changed,748 as current cost rules were essential in deterring frivolous litigation.749 
On the other side, the consumer and environmental representatives felt that contingency 
fees were a major step towards removing the financial obstacles to class actions. 
However, more needed to be done to help plaintiffs with costs, or “the integrity of the 
Attorney General and the government’s commitment to class actions would be put in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744 This point had not been articulated in the discussion paper on certification provided to the Advisory 
Committee: Class Action Reform Discussion Paper Re: Certification Procedure, Undated, in B501822 – 
Background Papers, supra note 527. 
745 AGAC Minutes Sept 7 1989, supra note 722 at 5. 
746 Ibid.	  
747 Now a sitting class actions judge, Justice Belobaba wrote the following in his decision in Rosen v BMO 
Nesbitt Burns Inc, 2013 ONSC 6356, at para 2: 
 
Most members of the class action bar, whether acting for plaintiffs or defendants, agree that 
a “no costs” rule would be much more sensible. Like them, I also wish that the 
recommendations on costs as set out in the Ontario Law Reform Commission’s Report on 
Class Actions had been accepted. Instead, the provincial legislature decided to adopt the 
views of the Attorney-General’s Advisory Committee and continue the “costs follow the 
event” convention for the very different world of class actions as well. I was a member of 
that Advisory Committee. I now realize that I was wrong and that the OLRC was right. 	  
748 AGAC Minutes Nov 8, 1989, supra note 737 at 9, 12. 
749 Ibid at 10. 
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doubt.”750 The discussion became so heated that Cochrane “noted that the Committee was 
more divisive on this point than any other issue.”751 
 With little movement from the business interests on traditional cost rules, and the 
consumer and environmental groups insisting that more needed to be done for plaintiffs 
than just a simpler certification test and contingency fees, a middle way was needed to 
break the deadlock. Various alternatives were suggested, such as no-way costs until 
certification and traditional cost rules thereafter.752  
However, public funding, along the lines of the Fonds in Québec, was the most 
promising middle way. The issue had been raised previously,753 but the Committee now 
began discussing it in earnest in order to find a consensus on the costs issue. There was 
some pushback on the establishment of a Fund for disbursements and to pay legal costs. 
However, many members stated that such a Fund would remove the barrier to class 
actions faced by a representative plaintiff, who would otherwise be faced with carrying 
the costs and disbursements of an entire class (with very little ultimate financial benefit, 
because she could only pursue damages for her own individual claim).754 While a no-way 
costs rule would perform essentially the same function, it was acknowledged that, 
“defendants would object to this idea”.755 The choice therefore seemed to be between a 
Fund with traditional costs rules, or no Fund with a no-way costs rule.756 However, the 
Committee noted that such a Fund could be politically controversial and could jeopardize 
the entire Act.757 The decision was therefore made to ask the Attorney General if the idea 
of a Fund was acceptable to the government.758 This was the only question that was 
formally put to the Attorney General throughout the Committee’s deliberations, and the 
fact that the Committee did so showed the importance of the funding question to breaking 
the stalemate on costs.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
750 Ibid at 9-10. 
751 Ibid; Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7. 
752 AGAC Minutes Nov 8, 1989, ibid, at 13-14. 
753 AGAC Minutes of October 26, 1989, at 6, in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
754 AGAC Minutes Nov 8 1989, supra note 737 at 3. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Ibid. This was the same choice that faced the CBA/PIAC in formulating its report, with the original 
majority report calling for traditional costs and a Fund, and the final CBA/PIAC Report (incorporating the 
view of the minority), calling for no-way costs and no Fund: supra notes 373 and 442. 
757 AGAC Minutes Nov 8 1989, ibid, at 4. 
758 Ibid at 14. 
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Subsequent meetings saw discussions on costs that were just as heated. In the 
November 23 meeting, certain members noted that they felt uncomfortable with bending 
the costs rules for class actions, which “was removing the original fairness of the British 
justice system.”759 Others stated that if the Committee members did their job right, “the 
incremental costs of a class action to the point of certification should be minimal”.760 At 
this point, the subject of a Fund came up again, because it would prevent the financial 
disincentive to class actions caused by traditional costs rules.761 
In the alternative, if the government was not willing to establish such a Fund, the 
Committee suggested that traditional costs rules could instead apply only at certain 
stages, such as after certification or after the common issues trial.762 This option was 
discussed on November 30, where the Committee agreed that normal costs rules should 
apply at the individual issues stage, and considered the CBA proposal that there be no 
costs up to and including certification.763 The CBA also proposed that trial judges also 
have discretion to refrain from awarding costs, based on as yet unspecified factors.764 
 The Committee outlined other options, several of them heavily contingent on the 
existence of a class actions Fund:765 
 
• Having traditional costs rules apply;  
• Settling on the issue of a Fund, because that would remove or reduce the 
problems with traditional costs rules;  
• Present a “take it or leave it” option to the government: retain a traditional costs 
regime premised on the existence of a Fund, because otherwise there would be no 
consensus on the entire issue of class actions; or 
• Present two options to the government: the CBA proposal, or traditional costs 
rules with a Fund. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
759 AGAC Minutes Nov 23 1989, supra note 697 at 4. 
760 Ibid. Anyone familiar with the current state of class actions in Ontario, where certification costs easily 
run to hundreds of thousands of dollars, will know that this hope was in vain. 
761 Ibid.	  
762 AGAC Minutes Nov 8 1989, supra note 737 at 13-14. 
763 AGAC Minutes of November 30, 1989, at 6 [AGAC Minutes Nov 30 1989], in B502275 AGAC 
Minutes, supra note 645. The “CBA proposal” refers to the CBA/PIAC Report, supra note 373, although 
there was also a CBA meeting on costs shortly before the AGAC meeting of November 30, 1989. The 
minutes of the CBA meeting are not in the archival record.  
764 AGAC Minutes Nov 30 1989, ibid, at 7. 
765 Ibid. 
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The Committee was eventually to settle on the third option. It was clear that business 
groups wanted traditional costs rules to apply, but consumer and environmental groups 
would not agree to a class actions remedy that would rarely be used because of the 
financial barriers that plaintiffs would face. The Fund was the key to the consensus 
between the two camps.766 
 The Attorney General was initially pessimistic on this subject. In answer to the 
question posed to him on November 8, Scott stated that he could not guarantee a 
government-financed or even a government-seeded fund.767 He could not answer the 
Committee’s question, but did say that, “[t]he Treasury will not cough-up a lot of money 
to make this sort of litigation available.”768 In that same message, however, Scott made it 
clear that he required a consensus report.769 The Committee knew that one of the only 
ways that consensus could be secured was through the provision of a Fund. It therefore 
decided to ask the government to put its money where its mouth was – in other words, if 
it wanted a consensus, it would have to pay for it. This is made clear in the final Report, 
in which, “[t]he Committee concluded that if the Government is committed to reform in 
this area and committed to increasing access to justice it will provide whatever assistance 
it can to establish the fund, adequately endowed, to assist class litigants.”770  
 The Committee would also have been aware of Scott’s personal sympathies 
towards government funding of public interest litigation. Scott himself had granted $1 
million of funding to LEAF in 1988,771 was a firm supporter of legal clinic funding,772 
and had overseen the introduction of the Intervenor Funding Project Act773 that provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766 As the Committee stated in its Advisory Report, “[t]he Committee’s retention of the existing costs 
regime for class actions was based in part on a number of considerations, including … that the Government 
… should establish a fund to assist parties to class proceedings”: AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 57. See 
also Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7. 
767 “Government-financed” meant that the government would supply the money to be distributed by the 
Fund. “Government-seeded” meant that the government would provide “seed money” to start the Fund, 
which would eventually become self-financing and thereafter pay back the seed money. 
768 AGAC Minutes Nov 30 1989, supra note 763 at 8. 
769 Ibid. 
770 AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 59-60. 
771 Scott, supra note 56 at 134-135. 
772 Ibid at 175. 
773 Supra note 279. 
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qualified interveners with advanced funding.774 These projects were in fact used as 
examples of government funding in the final report of the Advisory Committee.775 
At the next meeting on December 15, 1989, the Committee discussed the various 
models for financing the Fund. It was unanimously decided that a Fund should be part of 
any class action remedy,776 and that it should consist of a self-funding assistance 
program, with seed money from a variety of sources including the government.777 While 
the CBA option was discussed as a possible alternative, 778  Michael Cochrane’s 
handwritten notes on the issue of the Fund state, “[n]o alternative.”779 
 The Committee was getting close to unanimity on the controversial issue of costs. 
By the December 15 meeting, a consensus has already been reached on the availability of 
contingency fees, that such fees should be court supervised,780 and that traditional costs 
rules should apply to individual proceedings, to certification and to common issues trials 
(provided a Fund was put in place).781 The court would also have discretion not to award 
costs against unsuccessful plaintiffs, if the proceeding was a test case, raised a novel 
point of law or was otherwise in the public interest.782  
 Consensus was close, but it had not yet been reached. Business groups continued 
to be reticent, as evidenced by a Canadian Business article in which several of the 
Committee members were quoted.783 Nevertheless, on January 2, 1990, Cochrane wrote 
to Ewart to tell him that the Committee had completed its work and was finalizing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
774 Benidickson, supra note 248 at 652.  
775 AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 63-65; memorandum from Doug Ewart to Scott, February 1, 1990, in 
B703283 – Bill 28 and 29, supra note 564. 
776 Cochrane’s handwritten minutes of AGAC meeting of December 15, 1989, at 3 [AGAC Minutes Dec 15 
1989], in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
777 Ibid at 3; handwritten notes by Daniel Jazvac, law student, of December 15, 1989 meeting, at 4 [Jazvac 
handwritten notes], in B502275 AGAC Minutes, ibid. 
778 AGAC Minutes Dec 15 1989, ibid. 
779 Ibid at 4. See also AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 72, where the Committee declined to make alternative 
recommendations to its funding proposals. 
780 Jazvac handwritten notes, supra note 777 at 1-2. 
781 Ibid at 3-4. 
782 Ibid at 3. These criteria were based on class actions practice in California and New York (ibid at 3), and 
the point was first raised at the AGAC meeting of November 8, 1989, supra note 737 at 12.  
783 C Allard, “Issues: Class War”, Canadian Business (December, 1989), p 123, in Policy Development 
Division Counsel correspondence files, Class Actions – Media, 1988-1990, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No 
B248633, Archives of Ontario [B248633 – Media]. The article referred to the Mississauga train derailment, 
an event that had occurred a decade previously, showing the influence such mass disasters had on the 
public debate about class actions.  
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report, which was “unanimous”.784 Once again, Cochrane was trumpeting consensus 
when it had not yet come about. The Gang of Four had further comments on the draft 
Report, and would contact Cochrane with numerous other substantive changes while the 
legislation was being drafted. For example, just days after Cochrane’s letter to Ewart, 
Norm Stewart suggested changes to section 33 of the draft Act, regarding the use of a 
multiplier to determine lawyer’s fees (Stewart stated that the “risk” the multiplier was 
intended to reflect was the risk incurred at various stages throughout the proceeding, not 
simply as assessed at the outset), and to the “Related Matters and Recommendations” 
section, regarding the percentage contribution to the Fund to be levied against damage 
awards (Stewart wanted to make it clear that the levy would be taken out of the damage 
award, not a separate cost the defendant would have to pay).785 Apart from these changes, 
however, Stewart approved of the draft Report.786 
 Other Committee members also had concerns about funding. In January 1990, 
Cochrane asked the Committee to make recommendations on how the Fund should be 
created and maintained. 787  Several members responded with consternation. Robert 
Anderson, for the Ontario Chamber of Commerce, said that, although a Fund was crucial 
to the Report, it would actually weaken the whole proposal unless experts considered its 
implementation.788 Terry O’Sullivan, for The Advocates’ Society, was concerned that Ian 
Scott’s enthusiasm for the Fund would override the Committee’s recommendation that a 
separate committee look at the best way to set it up.789 Norm Stewart also stated that the 
specifics should be left to a task force of actuaries and funding experts.790  Both 
O’Sullivan and Stewart disliked the fact that the draft Report did not mention that 
defendants would also be able to use the Fund.791 In O’Sullivan’s opinion, this left that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
784 Memorandum from Cochrane to Ewart, January 2, 1990, in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
785 Letter from Stewart to Cochrane, January 8, 1990 [Stewart January 8 1990], in B248633 
Correspondence, supra note 401.  
786 Stewart January 8 1990, ibid. 
787 This letter does not appear to be in the archival record, but is mentioned in the subsequent letters of 
Anderson (January 18) and O’Sullivan (January 25) [O’Sullivan January 25 1990], both of which can be 
found in B248633 Correspondence, supra note 401.	  
788 Anderson letter, supra note 593. 
789 O’Sullivan January 25 1990, supra note 787 at 3; letter from O’Sullivan to Cochrane, January 16, 1990, 
in B248633 Correspondence, ibid. 
790 Letter from Stewart to Cochrane, January 19, 1990, in B703283 – Bill 28 and 29, supra note 564.	  
791 Ibid at 2. 
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section with a distinctly “pro-plaintiff” flavour.792 Edward Belobaba, for the Consumers’ 
Association of Canada, was more concerned with the representation on the board that 
would make funding decisions. He asked that there be representation from a diversity of 
community groups, which should make decisions according to publicly accountable 
guidelines.793 
 The Committee met with Michael Cochrane again on January 26, 1990.794 Norm 
Stewart seems to have put forward further concerns about the Fund at this point, stating 
that the Attorney General should provide different options for funding from which the 
Committee could choose. He was opposed to a specific level of financing for the Fund, 
and agreed with the other members that actuarial assistance was needed in setting it up.795 
Cochrane was able to accommodate most of Stewart’s concerns, but felt that certain of 
them were beyond the scope of the consensus (specifically, changes to the modified 
contingency fee which would explicitly forbid lawyers from seeking a percentage of 
recovery).796  
Cochrane wrote to the Committee on February 14, 1990, mediating between them 
and Stewart in an effort to maintain the fragile consensus that was essential for the draft 
Act to see the light of day. He stated that Scott was working to make the group’s 
recommendations work at a political level, but that he needed a final unanimous report. In 
order to bring Stewart on side, he offered the Committee’s support in “selling the 
consensus to his members”, noting that the consensus was a compromise in which no one 
group had its way completely.797 Cochrane’s message was clear: Stewart had to pull his 
weight by supporting the fragile consensus, or the Committee’s work would be for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792 O’Sullivan January 25 1990, supra note 787 at 3.	  
793 Letter from Belobaba to Cochrane, January 25, 1990, at 1, in B248633 Correspondence, supra note 401.	  
794 While the minutes for this meeting do not appear to be in the archival record, Cochrane made 
handwritten notes of the Committee members’ concerns about the Fund [AGAC Minutes Jan 26 1990], in 
B248633 Correspondence, ibid. 
795 AGAC Minutes Jan 26 1990, ibid, at 1; letter from Stewart to Cochrane, February 19, 1990 [Stewart Feb 
19 1990], at 2, in B248633 Correspondence, ibid. 
796 Letter from Cochrane to AGAC, February 14, 1990 [Cochrane Feb 14 1990], in Policy Development 
Division Counsel Correspondence Files, Class Actions – Class Proceedings Fund, 1988-1990, MGC, RG 4-
40, Box No B501822, Archives of Ontario [B501822 – CPF]. 
797 Cochrane Feb 14 1990, ibid, at 1. 
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nothing. At the same time, there was public awareness of the Report and mounting 
pressure to release it, both from business interests and the pro-consumer camp.798 
Nevertheless, Stewart was willing to gamble on the consensus in order to have 
further changes made. He wrote to Cochrane again a few weeks later with more detailed 
concerns regarding the section on the Costs Assistance Fund.799 He was concerned about 
the presumptions the draft Report was making regarding the shape of the Fund.800 Stewart 
ended his letter by reassuring Cochrane that all of his suggestions were made to ensure 
that the Report was consistent with the group’s consensus.801 Stewart knew that Scott and 
Cochrane wanted a consensus, and even at this late stage, he was willing to try and make 
further tweaks to the draft Report by appealing to that desire. This pattern was to continue 
even after the Report was finalized, and well into the legislative drafting stage.  
Stewart was willing not only to put pressure on Cochrane, but also to try and 
influence other members of the Committee. Two days after Stewart wrote to Cochrane, 
Terry O’Sullivan also did so, with comments that were essentially identical to Stewart’s 
(including the changes to the modified contingency fee, that Cochrane had already stated 
went beyond the scope of the consensus).802 Stewart’s actions were not lost on Cochrane 
and other MAG officials. Upon receiving O’Sullivan’s letter, Shawn Scromeda, an 
articling student with the Ministry, forwarded the letter to Cochrane with a note saying 
that O’Sullivan’s comments were “very similar to those ‘suggested’ by Norm Stewart.”803 
Stewart was to make many more “suggestions” before the draft legislation was finalized. 
 While there appears to be no further correspondence between Stewart or 
O’Sullivan and Cochrane in February 1990, Cochrane must have spoken to the two men 
to assuage their concerns, because by late February 1990, all the Committee members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
798 A Hutchinson and K Roach, “Legislation needed to increase access to class-action suits”, Financial Post 
(February 24, 1990), p 15; W Macdonald and W Rowley, “Reforming Ontario class action procedures”, 
Financial Post (January 20-22, 1990), p 21; A Hutchinson, “Should the Province Expand Class Action 
Suits? Yes”, Law Times (March 12, 1990), p 7; W Macdonald and W Rowley, “Should the Province 
Expand Class Action Suits? No”, Law Times (March 12, 1990), p 8. All these articles can be found in 
B248501 – Media, supra note 731.  
799 AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 56. 
800 Stewart Feb 19 1990, supra note 795 at 1-2. 
801 Ibid at 3. 
802 Letter from O’Sullivan to Scromeda, February 21, 1990, in B248633 Correspondence, supra note 401.	  
803 Note from Shawn Scromeda to Cochrane, February 21, 1990, in B248633 Correspondence, ibid. 
	   131 
had signed off on the Report and it was presented to Ian Scott.804 Obtaining something of 
a consensus amongst such diverse interests was a huge achievement. However, the 
Committee’s recommendations still had to find their way onto the statute books. 
 
F. Drafting the Legislation 
 
Scott and Cochrane had worked hard to get the members of the Committee to agree on 
the shape of reform.805 A fragile consensus had been reached that complied with the 
Attorney General’s terms of reference. Specifically, the Fund was the glue that held the 
positions of the various parties together, and the Committee’s Report made it clear that 
the class actions remedy was contingent on the Fund. In fact, it refused to make 
alternative recommendations on a class actions remedy should the government refuse to 
implement a Fund, stating that to do so “would jeopardize the unanimity of the 
Committee and undercut the value of the recommendations.” 806 The certification test, 
costs regime and Fund were therefore interdependent. 
Having worked so hard to secure unanimity, Scott and Cochrane were not about 
to let the consensus be jeopardized by the tinkering of the Cabinet committees and the 
drafting process. They were certainly not about to subject the Report and draft Bill to a 
public consultation process, which would delay the Bill’s introduction and possibly 
change the Advisory Committee’s model.807 The Class Proceedings Act that eventually 
became law therefore looks remarkably like the draft Act put forward by the Committee, 
except for a few minor changes. There is little doubt that this was the result of Scott’s 
iron hand over the process, as well as Cochrane’s ability to negotiate with the various 
parties to ensure that the consensus held together while the draft Act was given life.  
In fact, the draft Bill passed through inter-Ministerial consultation and the various 
Cabinet committees remarkably smoothly, largely due to the emphasis, in Cochrane’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804 Letter from AGAC to Scott, February 1990, in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
805 Cochrane was well aware of his achievement: on February 28, 1990, he wrote to Ralph Nader, champion 
of the US consumer and a person whom Cochrane clearly admired, to tell him about the Committee’s 
unanimous report. Letter from Cochrane to Nader, February 28, 1990, in B501822 – Communications Plan, 
supra note 581.  
806 AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 72. See also memorandum from Cochrane to Scott, May 28, 1990, at 2 
[Cochrane May 28 1990], in B248633 – Drafting Instructions, supra note 683. 
807 “Briefing Note: Class Action Reform”, drafted by Cochrane at the end of October 1989, at 2, in 
B501822 – Communications Plan, supra note 581. This was a departure from Scott’s usual style, which 
was to conduct public consultations before making major policy decisions: Scott, supra note 56 at 144. 
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Cabinet Submission808 and consultations with the various Ministries,809 on the unanimous 
nature of the Committee’s recommendations. While certain Ministers had concerns about 
the Fund (primarily whether it would divert resources away from Legal Aid)810 and 
others had concerns that enabling class actions would mean more lawsuits against the 
government,811 all had their concerns assuaged812 and all eventually indicated their assent 
to the draft Bill.813 Neither the Cabinet Committee on Justice nor the Cabinet Committee 
on Economic and Environmental Policy seems to have noticed that the draft Bill departed 
from the Cabinet Minute of June 21, 1989 (which authorized the establishment of the 
Advisory Committee) in one significant respect: costs. In fact, both committees 
recommended to Cabinet that the CPA be adopted along the lines laid out in the draft 
Bill, and explicitly approved the principle that “normal costs rules apply and continue to 
be in the court’s discretion.”814 Even if the departure was noted (there is no indication 
that it was), it would have been fairly difficult and politically inexpedient to contest a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
808 Cabinet Submission, March 20, 1990; an earlier draft version, dated March 8, 1990, has much less 
emphasis on the consensus of the Committee. It is not clear who made the changes to the draft, but it was 
clearly felt that emphasizing the consensus would assist with the draft Bill’s passage through the committee 
stages. Both documents can be found in B248501 – Cabinet Minutes, supra note 715. 
809 Memorandum from Chaloner (Deputy Attorney General) to All Deputy Ministers, March 27, 1990; 
report of the Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Economic and Environmental Policy (E&E 4/90), April 12, 
1990, at 2. Both documents can be found in Policy Development Division Counsel Correspondence Files, 
Class Actions – Inter-Ministry Consultation, 1989, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B248501, Archives of 
Ontario [B248501 – Inter-Ministry Consultation]. 
810 Report of the Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Justice (DCJ 4/90), April 12, 1990. The Ministry of 
Industry, Trade and Technology raised the same concerns noted by some Committee members, that the 
Fund needed to be set up and monitored with the help of actuarial experts: letter from Deputy Minister to 
Chaloner, April 9, 1990. These documents, as well as other correspondence from the various Deputy 
Ministers raising concerns about funding, can be found in B248501 – Inter-Ministry Consultation, ibid.  
811 Internal electronic message from Ewart to Cochrane, April 8, 1990, re: questions from Graham Stoodley 
of Legal Services, Human Resources Secretariat. Ewart stated that, “the government could occasionally be 
exposed to an embarrassing lawsuit … but it would probably be more embarrassing to put a provision in 
the legislation to exempt the Crown from class actions.” This document, as well as other correspondence 
from the various Deputy Ministers raising concerns about increased litigation against the government, can 
be found in B248501 – Inter-Ministry Consultation, ibid.  
812 Letter from Chaloner to various Deputy Ministers, April 12, 1990, addressing their concerns about the 
Fund, in B501822 – Cabinet Submission, supra note 596.  
813 Cabinet approval of CPA and Law Society Amendment Act for introduction, signed by Secretary of the 
Cabinet Peter Barnes, May 30, 1990, in Cabinet Submissions, CS6990/90 to CS7047/90, 1986-1996, 
CA61, RG 75-18-1, Box No B861458, Archives of Ontario. 
814 Report of the Cabinet Committee on Economic and Environmental Policy (E&E 4/90), April 19, 1990, 
at 4; report of the Cabinet Committee on Justice (J 5/90), April 19, 1990, at 8. Cabinet did adopt the CPA 
along those lines: Cabinet Minute (13-13/90), May 2, 1990. All these documents can be found in B248501 
– Cabinet Minutes, supra note 715. 	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costs mechanism that had received the unanimous support of a diversity of stakeholders, 
and upon which the entire class actions remedy hinged.815 
 In the meantime, Cochrane attempted to control the legislative drafting process 
itself. Days after the Committee submitted its Report, Cochrane asked Legislative 
Counsel Cornelia Schuh to draft a Bill for introduction in May 1990. He agreed with 
Doug Ewart that Schuh had the most talent for drafting the Bill and stated that, “[t]he 
only delicate issue is the Committee’s touchiness about their own drafting.”816 Of course, 
it was not Cochrane’s job to decide which counsel had “the most talent” to draft the 
legislation.817  
It was also highly unusual for consultation groups to have detailed input into the 
drafting process, let alone a veto as Cochrane was implying. Normally, a report or draft 
Bill would be prepared and given to the Minister, who would then take the report to the 
Cabinet Committee on Justice and thereafter the Cabinet, which would develop 
parameters for the legislation by way of a Cabinet Minute. Legislative counsel would 
then draft the legislation, using the report or draft Bill as only one of many guidance 
documents, and would also consult with the relevant Ministry officials. The draft would 
then be examined by the Legislation and Regulations Committee to see if it was in 
accordance with the Cabinet Minute and, if it was, the legislation would then be approved 
for introduction.818 This is very similar to the process that was followed when the 
regulations under the Law Society Amendment Act were drafted, dealing with the Class 
Proceedings Fund.819 By contrast, Cochrane’s approach, in surrendering the drafting 
process to the Advisory Committee, was completely unprecedented and profoundly un-
democratic. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815 In fact, some Deputy Ministers congratulated Cochrane on his success in bringing together so many 
disparate viewpoints: letter from Deputy Minister of Financial Institutions to J Johnson, Acting Deputy 
Attorney General, April 17, 1990, in B501822 – CPF, supra. 
816 Handwritten note from Cochrane to Cornelia Schuh (Legislative Counsel) and Craig Perkins (Director 
of the Court Reform Task Force and the Rules Committee at the MAG), February 26, 1990, in B248633 – 
Drafting Instructions, supra note 683. 
817 Ibid. 
818 Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7; Revell Memo, supra note 683.  
819 Letter from Laura Hopkins, Legislative Counsel, to Carmen Rogers, MAG Counsel, re: Regulations 
under the Law Society Act, December 3, 1992 [Hopkins Letter], in Policy Development Division Counsel 
Correspondence Files, CPA – Regulations, 1992-1993, CR, RG 4-40, Box No B703283, Archives of 
Ontario [B703283 – CPA Regulations]. By this time, Cochrane had left the MAG for private practice. 
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Chief Legislative Counsel Donald Revell quickly attempted to put Cochrane in his 
place, writing a disgruntled memorandum the next day to Cochrane’s superior, Doug 
Ewart: 
 
First, I do not think that it is your role or the role of Mike Cochrane to run 
my office by deciding who has “the most talent” to work on your projects 
… If Mr. Cochrane understood the policy then I am sure that, given proper 
instruction, any of my counsel could do an appropriate job.  
… 
Secondly, I am surprised that an advisory committee chaired by a member 
of your office would get into a drafting exercise on some understanding that 
the committee and not the Legislative Counsel would draft the bill. This is 
the first time that I can recall that a member of your staff has been involved 
in such an action … In the past, when committee’s [sic] have been involved 
in drafting, it was always on the understanding that the committee’s draft 
would be only one more document to be considered by us in drafting the 
bill. To say that we have a “delicate issue” because of “the Committee’s 
touchiness about their own drafting” is like a threat to this Office to leave 
the draft as it appears in the report.820 
 
While it was a little over-zealous to characterize Cochrane’s note as a “threat”, in fact it 
was precisely his intention (and that of Scott) that the final legislation resemble the 
Committee’s draft Act as closely as possible. Revell stated that he did “not intend to 
compromise the standards of the Office because of the ‘touchiness’ of a committee”,821 
and finished his letter by stating that he would not assign counsel to the project until his 
concerns were addressed.  
 There is no other correspondence between Revell and Ewart (or Cochrane) in the 
archival record. Nevertheless, it appears that Revell’s concerns were addressed, because 
counsel was at some point assigned to the project. Just over two months later, Cochrane 
received a complete first draft of the CPA from legislative counsel Marilyn Leitman.822 
Even though Leitman was formally appointed by Revell,823 it appears that she was 
subsequently co-opted into going along with the Committee’s wishes. According to 
Cochrane, he met with Leitman informally and explained to her that the Committee 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
820 Hopkins Letter, ibid. 
821 Ibid at 2. 
822 Letter from Leitman to Cochrane, enclosing first draft of the Class Proceedings Act, May 18, 1990, in 
B248633 – Drafting Instructions, supra note 683.  
823 Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7.	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members wanted to be directly involved in the drafting of the legislation. She was 
reportedly very reluctant to go along with this, but agreed to meet with the Committee 
anyway, and subsequently drafted the legislation in direct and repeated consultation with 
them.824  
Cochrane has confirmed that this process was completely unprecedented, and that, 
when the Committee asked to be involved in this manner, he told them as much. Leitman 
reportedly assured the Committee that she would consider their opinions when drafting, 
but the members insisted on having control over the actual wording of the statute. Each 
provision of the draft CPA, therefore, was drafted after consultation with the Committee, 
and then run past them again to make sure each provision reflected their consensus.825 
This is reflected in the letters from Leitman to Cochrane of May 9 and 18, 1990, with 
which she enclosed the preliminary and complete first drafts of the CPA.826 Leitman 
referred repeatedly to sections and subsections of the “AC”, meaning the provisions of 
the Advisory Committee draft Act.827 She justified why certain sections of the AC draft 
Act had not been included (because they had been covered elsewhere, either in the draft 
statute or in other legislation),828 and asked for clarification on other sections (for 
example, on contingency fee agreements). 829  Clearly, her aim was to reflect the 
provisions of the AC draft Act as faithfully as possible, within the confines of coherence, 
consistency and the current law. 
In turn, Cochrane immediately forwarded Leitman’s draft Act to the Committee 
for their review. The Act was annotated with Cochrane’s handwritten notes in red pen, 
showing exactly how the provisions of Leitman’s draft Act corresponded with the 
provisions of the AC draft Act.830 Where sections of the latter had been changed or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
824 Ibid. 
825 Ibid; Woolford Interview, supra note 514.	  
826 Letter from Leitman to Cochrane, May 9, 1990 (enclosing preliminary first draft of CPA), in B703283 – 
Bill 28 and 29, supra note 564; letter from Leitman to Cochrane, May 18, 1990 (enclosing complete first 
draft of CPA) [Leitman May 18 1990], in B248633 – Drafting Instructions, supra note 683. 
827 Leitman May 18 1990, ibid. An annotated copy of the draft Act, forwarded on the same day to the 
Committee on Cochrane’s behalf, clarifies that “AC = Advisory Committee”. 
828 Ibid, notes section, at 1-2 (regarding section 38 of the Report), 3 (regarding appeal rights) and 4 
(regarding costs of notice, offers to settle, and the rules of court). 
829 Ibid, notes section, at 3 and 4. 
830 Cochrane handwritten annotations to draft Act, faxed by his assistant to Committee members on May 
18, 1990 [Cochrane notes draft CPA], in B248633 – Drafting Instructions, supra note 683. Cochrane was in 
Washington at the time, on secondment to the National Association of Attorneys General. 
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deleted, Cochrane justified those changes or deletions. For example, on page 4 of the 
annotated Act, Cochrane wrote that section 6(5) was “[n]ew but needed”, and on the top 
of that page he wrote, “[n]ote AC 4(6) onus eliminated as unnecessary”.831 In doing this, 
Cochrane was mediating once more – this time between Legislative Counsel, who was 
improving the legislation while keeping it faithful to the AC draft Act, and the 
Committee members, who wanted the drafting as far as possible to be in their own words. 
 On May 25, 1990, the Committee met to discuss the first draft of the Bill.832 At 
that meeting, Cochrane produced a second version of the draft Bill833 incorporating some 
prior suggestions from the group,834 all of which were acceptable to the Committee.835 
They also made further changes, including the re-insertion of section 28(1), which 
suspended the running of applicable limitation periods upon the commencement of a 
class action.836 The majority of the changes to the draft Bill appear to have been made by 
Norm Stewart. He had significant concerns about sections 24 (aggregate damages), 25 
(individual issues) and 26 (judgment distribution). His changes meant, in part, that a court 
had to consider whether individual damage awards were impractical prior to awarding an 
aggregate damages award; and that unclaimed amounts under both aggregate awards and 
individual assessments would be returned to the defendants after a certain amount of 
time.837 Interestingly, there is no mention in any draft of the Act (including the AC draft 
Act) of an exception for environmental cases, as was originally suggested (but not 
required) by the Attorney General’s terms of reference. The environmental groups appear 
to have conceded on this point, in exchange for a provision on cy-près distribution of 
awards, which are dealt with in the same section of the CPA.838  
 Stewart brought up his concerns at the May 25 meeting. He was clearly the 
dominant force in the Committee’s review of the draft Bill. Despite the fact that the other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
831 Cochrane notes draft CPA, ibid, at 4. 
832 The minutes of this meeting do not appear to be in the archival record, but the meeting is referred to in 
Cochrane May 28 1990, supra note 806. 
833 Leitman had sent this to Cochrane the previous day: letter from Leitman to Cochrane, May 24, 1990, in 
B703283 – Bill 28 and 29, supra note 564. 
834 Letter from Stewart to O’Sullivan, May 29, 1990, at 2 [Stewart May 29 1990], in B248633 – Drafting 
Instructions, supra note 683. 
835 Ibid. 
836 Ibid. 
837 Ibid at 1-2.	  
838 CPA, supra note 10, subsections 26(4)-(6). 
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members of the Committee, including Michael Cochrane, had not identified any issues 
with sections 24-26 during their review, they agreed with Stewart.839 In addition, Stewart 
objected strongly to a provision inserted into the second draft, that would allow 
agreements that contingency fees be paid based on percentage of recovery. While he 
insisted that the provision be replaced by section 33(3) of the AC draft Act that expressly 
prohibited such agreements, the most he could get was the group’s agreement to delete 
the objectionable provision.840 Stewart’s attempt to impose his will on the Committee 
was successful only to a certain extent. 
 However, it is clear that Stewart was able to coerce Cochrane into agreeing to 
most of his changes, because a few days after the meeting Cochrane reported to the 
Attorney General that, “several of the changes incorporated into the most recent version 
of the Bill were necessary to obtain some of the above signatures” (which included 
Stewart’s and the signatures of two other representatives of the Gang of Four).841 Many 
of the changes made reflected Stewart’s comments.842 The other Committee members 
who had not yet signed were unable to attend the May 25 meeting, one of them being 
Terry O’Sullivan, representing The Advocates’ Society. 843Stewart continued to be 
successful in influencing O’Sullivan. He filled him in on the discussions that had taken 
place on May 25, and also offered to advise him on the timing of the Bill’s introduction 
in the Legislature.844 The two continued to meet after Cochrane sent out the third draft of 
the Bill on May 31.845 O’Sullivan thereafter wrote to Cochrane to advise him that he was 
in agreement with all the changes suggested by Stewart846 and that he particularly agreed 
with Stewart’s objections on the contingency fee issue.847 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
839 Stewart May 29 1990, supra note 834 at 1. 
840 Ibid at 3. 
841 Leitman had sent the most recent version of the draft Bill to Ewart earlier that day: memorandum from 
Leitman to Ewart, May 28, 1990, in B703283 – Bill 28 and 29, supra note 564; Cochrane May 28 1990, 
supra note 806 at 1. 
842 Memorandum from Cochrane to Legislation Committee, May 28, 1990, in B703283 – Bill 28 and 29, 
ibid. 
843 Cochrane May 28 1990, supra note 806. 
844 Ibid. 
845 Letter from O’Sullivan to Cochrane, June 1, 1990 [O’Sullivan June 1 1990], in B248633 – Drafting 
Instructions, supra note 683. Leitman had sent the third draft of the Bill to Cochrane on May 31, 1990: 
memorandum from Leitman to Cochrane, May 31, 1990, in B703283 – Bill 28 and 29, supra note 564. 
846 O’Sullivan June 1 1990, ibid. 
847 Ibid at 2.	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Stewart, with O’Sullivan’s help, continued to pressure Cochrane regarding the 
changes he had requested. In the first week of June, he wrote to Cochrane twice to remind 
him that one of the changes he had mentioned at the May 25 meeting, on aggregate 
damages, had not been incorporated into the third draft of the Bill.848 In doing so, he 
appealed once again to both Cochrane and Scott’s desire for consensus and the 
Committee’s desire to remain true to the Committee’s draft Act. Stewart informed 
Cochrane that O’Sullivan shared his concerns and demanded that Cochrane fax, to both 
him and O’Sullivan, copies of the final Bill incorporating the amendments they had 
requested by noon the next day.849  
Cochrane responded quickly, making handwritten annotations to Stewart’s letter 
in order to communicate the changes to others on the Committee. The annotations are 
addressed to “David”850 – likely David Poch of the Canadian Environmental Law 
Association, whose constituents would be especially affected by changes meaning that 
unclaimed damage awards would be returned to defendants, and whose sign-off would be 
essential. The first reading of the CPA was just days away, and Cochrane was working to 
hold the consensus together.  
In the final event, however, there was not enough time to make the changes; they 
would instead have to be addressed after First Reading.851 By June 5, 1990, all the 
Committee members had signed off on the draft Bill as consistent with their Report 
(some of them, like Stewart and O’Sullivan, on the condition that their changes would be 
made).852 Cochrane wrote to the Committee to inform them that the Class Proceedings 
Act would receive its first reading on June 7, 1990, along with the Law Society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
848 Letter from Stewart to Cochrane, June 1, 1990; letter from Stewart to Cochrane, June 4, 1990 (copying 
O’Sullivan) [Stewart June 4 1990]. By this time, Stewart had moved from GM Canada to become General 
Counsel and Secretary of Ford Motor Company of Canada, Ltd. Both documents can be found in B248633 
– Drafting Instructions, supra note 683. 
849 Stewart June 4 1990, ibid. O’Sullivan followed up with a letter to Cochrane on June 5, signing off on the 
draft Bill on the condition that Stewart’s changes would be made: letter from O’Sullivan to Cochrane, June 
5, 1990, in B248501 – Correspondence, supra note 613. 
850 Stewart June 4 1990, supra note 848 at 2. 
851 Letter from Cochrane to AGAC, June 5, 1990 [Cochrane June 5 1990], in B248501 – Correspondence, 
supra note 613. 
852 Memorandum from AGAC to Ian Scott, in B248501 – Correspondence, ibid. Although this memo is 
dated May 22, 1990, it is clear from subsequent correspondence that sign-off was not actually obtained 
from all parties until late May or early June 1990: Cochrane May 28 1990, supra note 806. It is therefore 
likely that the final memorandum, signed by all parties, indicated sign off on the final draft Bill prior to first 
reading (which took place on June 7, 1990). The version of the memorandum signed by all parties does not 
appear to be in the archival record. 
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Amendment Act creating the Class Proceedings Fund.853 He further confirmed Scott’s 
commitment to get the legislation through committee without substantive changes, stating 
that, “[t]he Attorney General is committed to our Bill and we can continue to polish it 
without jeopardizing the consensus.”854 
 On June 12, 1990, the Class Proceedings Act and the Law Society Amendment Act 
received their First Reading in the Ontario legislature.855 In speaking to the House, Scott 
referred to the unanimous recommendations of the Committee members, many of whom 
were sitting in the gallery.856 While Scott stated that traditional costs rules would apply to 
class actions, he also pointed to contingency fee arrangements and the Fund as a 
counterbalance to this.857 The goal was to get the legislation passed as soon as possible.858  
 To this end, Cochrane proposed to the Advisory Committee that the Bill go to a 
Committee of the Whole House and be passed without amendment by June 28; the 
Attorney General would then give a written undertaking that the changes requested by 
Stewart and O’Sullivan would be contained in an amending bill in the fall of 1990, prior 
to Royal Proclamation of the CPA.859 However, Stewart and O’Sullivan both felt that 
they could not accept this approach, as too many intervening events could take place that 
would be beyond Scott’s control.860 They insisted instead that their amendments be made 
prior to Second Reading.861 In addition, Stewart reminded Cochrane of the Attorney 
General’s promise that the CPA would be the only class actions mechanism available in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
853 Cochrane June 5 1990, supra note 851. 
854 Ibid.	  
855 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 34th Parl, 2nd Sess (June 12, 
1990) (Ian Scott), online: <http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardespeaker/34-2/l045_90-22.html> 
[Hansard June 12]. The CPA and the LSAA were companion Bills, and from this point onwards, reference 
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856 Ibid. 
857 Ibid. 
858 Ibid. See also memorandum from Ewart to Communications Branch, May 31, 1990, making changes to 
Scott’s draft Statement to the Legislature because “[i]t’s important that we signal a desire for early 
passage” (emphasis in original), in B501822 – Communications Plan, supra note 581. 
859 Letter from Stewart to Cochrane (copied to O’Sullivan), June 25, 1990, in B248633 – Drafting 
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860 Ibid at 2. 
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Ontario; the Environmental Bill of Rights was still before the legislature, and it still 
contained a class actions remedy.862 
 Scott would never get the chance to implement the changes requested by his 
Committee. The Attorney General wrote to the Committee on July 16, 1990,863 saying 
there was a high degree of consensus in the House regarding the CPA, and he did not 
anticipate any problems with its passage. However, it had not been possible to pass the 
legislation before the House rose at the end of June, and it would therefore have to be 
reintroduced in the Fall. Before that could happen, the “intervening events” anticipated 
by Stewart came to pass, in a way that very few could have predicted. On October 1, 
1990, the Ontario provincial election saw David Peterson’s Liberal government voted out 
of power. Ian Scott did not lose his seat, but he lost his job as Attorney General and was 
replaced by Howard Hampton. The NDP assumed the mantle of government, and the 
CPA was left in legislative limbo. 
 
G. Re-Introduction of the CPA 
 
The members of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee had seen what happened 
when a draft Act got stuck in no man’s land.864 The OLRC draft Act was never even 
introduced as a Bill, and had gathered dust for about six years before consultations on the 
subject of reform began again. Cochrane and the Committee had worked hard to bring 
about a consensus and see legislation drafted, and they were not about to let the 
momentum slow down. They had to act quickly to get the CPA re-introduced. 
 The Consumers’ Association of Canada was the first to write to Hampton, just 
days after his appointment as Attorney General, to express support for re-introduction of 
the Bill.865 Early in November, the Committee met in order to discuss a strategy for re-
introduction of the CPA (now Bill 213), and also to discuss the amendments on aggregate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
862 Letter from Stewart to Cochrane, June 29, 1990, in B248633 – Drafting Instructions, supra note 683. 
Stewart had also reminded Cochrane of this provision in the Environmental Bill of Rights in the fall of 
1989: letter from Stewart to Cochrane, October 26, 1989, in B502275 AGAC Minutes, supra note 645. 
863 Letter from Scott to the AGAC, July 16, 1990, in B248501 – Correspondence, supra note 613. 
864 Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7. 
865 Letter from Joan Huzar, President, Consumers’ Association of Canada, to Hampton, October 12, 1990, 
in B248501 – Correspondence, supra note 613. 
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damages requested by Stewart and O’Sullivan on June 4 and 25, 1990.866 Fortunately for 
the Committee, Cochrane indicated that the new Attorney General was in favour of re-
introduction, as well as any agreed technical amendments.”867 Indeed, it would have been 
strange if Hampton wasn’t supportive: the previous year, he had criticized the Liberal 
government for not including class actions in the Courts of Justice Amendment Act, 
arguing passionately that aggrieved consumers needed access to justice.868  
 The Committee agreed to make almost all of Stewart and O’Sullivan’s changes, 
and also agreed that they should send a joint letter to the Attorney General in support of 
an early re-introduction of Bill 213.869 The Committee knew that unanimity was crucial 
to the Bill’s passage, and that any doubt regarding the consensus would cause delay. 
Their best strategy would be to present a united front. As a result, Cochrane was careful 
to note the unanimous nature of the Committee’s recommendations in his 
communications with his superiors.870 In November 1990, Cochrane sent Ewart a copy of 
the finished Bills,871 stating that they were ready for consideration by the Policy & 
Planning and Legislation Committees, 872  and enclosing a note in support of 
reintroduction, which stated that the Advisory Committee continued to unanimously urge 
reintroduction of the Bills.873 
 True to his word, Hampton put the Bills on the Fall Legislative Program, to be 
considered for early re-introduction.874 As the MAG tried to get the Bills through 
Committee, Cochrane’s note in support of re-introduction made the rounds. At the end of 
November, Hampton submitted Cochrane’s note to the Cabinet Committee on Justice in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
866 Fax from Norm Stewart to the AGAC, November 12, 1990, detailing the Committee’s discussions when 
it met on November 8, 1990 [Stewart Nov 12 1990], in B248501 – Correspondence, ibid. 
867 Stewart Nov 12 1990, ibid, at 1.	  
868 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 34th Parl, 2nd Sess (June 14, 
1989) (Howard Hampton), online: <http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/34-2/l025.htm>. 
869 Stewart Nov 12 1990, supra note 866 at 1-2. 
870 Memorandum from Cochrane to Ewart, November 14, 1990, in B703283 – Bill 28 and 29, supra note 
564.	  
871 That is, the CPA and the LSAA, at this time known as Bills 213 and 214, respectively. 
872 Memorandum from Cochrane to Ewart, November 22, 1990 [Cochrane Nov 22 1990], in B248633 – 
Drafting Instructions, supra note 683. As previously, the Committee members reviewed and signed off on 
these updated Bills. See, for example, letter from Stewart to Cochrane, December 3, 1990, in B248633 – 
Miscellaneous Material, supra note 305. 
873 Cochrane Nov 22 1990, ibid. 	  
874 Memo from Ewart to Hampton, November 23, 1990, in Policy Development Division Counsel 
Correspondence Files, Legislation 1990-91, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B807794, Archives of Ontario 
[B807794 – Legislation 1990-91]. 
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his efforts to have the Bills reintroduced.875 Around the same time, the Deputy Attorney 
General wrote to the Deputy Ministers also enclosing Cochrane’s note and emphasizing 
the unanimous and non-controversial nature of the Committee’s recommendations.876 The 
MAG’s ability to claim that the CPA was “non-controversial”, when just two years 
previously it had provoked bitter debate amongst the various interest groups, shows how 
valuable the Committee’s consensus really was. As one of the Committee members has 
stated, “Scott was nobody’s fool. He knew that to get this through the house, he would 
have to come in waving a report and say, “we’ve talked to everybody, they’ve signed off, 
why are you complaining?” Otherwise there would be no legislation for another 10 
years.”877 This was essentially the position put forward by Cochrane when he briefed all 
the Ministries about the re-introduction on December 4, 1990.878 
  This is almost certainly why the Bills passed through the Committee stage so 
easily. It would have been difficult to take issue with legislation that was not only based 
on a unanimous report by many of the major players, but that had also been drafted and 
signed off on by those same players. As one Committee member put it, “it was pre-
ordained to be acceptable.”879 This point can clearly be seen in the correspondence from 
the Ministries regarding the re-introduced Bills. Some of them had concerns regarding 
the potential for increased litigation against the government that could affect their 
Ministries. However, they nevertheless indicated their assent for the consultation record, 
because of the Advisory Committee’s unanimous support for the legislation. This struck 
them as “unusual”880 and was powerful enough to overcome their hesitation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
875 Memo from Hampton to Cabinet Committee on Justice, November 30, 1990, in Cabinet Submissions, 
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Cabinet Submissions]. 
876 Letter from Chaloner to Deputy Ministers, November 29, 1990, in Ministry of the A-G acts & regs files, 
Proposed Legislation 1990, 1100, RG 4-143, Box No B827937, Archives of Ontario [B827937 – Acts & 
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877 AC Member Interview, supra note 12. 
878 Memo from Suzanne Harrington, Counsel, to Rita Burak, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food, 
December 5, 1990 [Harrington Memo], in B827937 – Acts & Regs, supra note 876.  
879 AC Member Interview, supra note 12. 
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 The MAG’s goal was to have the legislation re-introduced as quickly as possible, 
with first reading before December 19 and second reading in January 1991,881 and 
initially this plan was on track.882 On December 17, Bills 213 and 214 were re-introduced 
in the legislature.883 The MAG press release put out the same day once again emphasized 
the consensus reached by the Advisory Committee.884 It also downplayed the innovative 
nature of the Bills by stating that they would support the government’s work on 
environmental rights and the law of standing.885 A few days previously, Minister of the 
Environment Ruth Grier had announced in the legislature that the government intended to 
introduce an Environmental Bill of Rights, that an advisory committee had been 
established for this purpose, and that the MAG was working on the questions of legal 
standing and class actions that would complement the Bill.886 While previous drafts of the 
Bill of Rights had included a class actions remedy, this had been removed at the request 
of the business members of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee.887 The passage 
of the Bill of Rights was therefore dependent on the passage of the CPA, because only the 
latter provided a remedy for breach of the rights enshrined in the former. 
 The Bill of Rights and the CPA were also connected in other ways. The advisory 
committee mentioned by Grier was eventually modeled on the Attorney General’s 
Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform. Michael Cochrane recalls that, following 
his success with the CPA, Grier asked him for his assistance when the consultation 	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Planning Committee on December 12, and by the Legislation & Regulations Committee on December 13: 
Memo to Hampton from Ewart, December 14, 1990, re: Fall Legislative Program, in B807794 – 
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process for her bill went off the rails. “She had an unholy war on her hands about the 
Environmental Bill of Rights – I was told that the [consultation] process was out of 
control. People were standing on tables yelling at each other”.888 A similar process was 
therefore set up for the Bill of Rights, with many of the same players. Cochrane was 
appointed co-chair of the Task Force on the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights.889 This 
Task Force operated according to terms of reference that were agreed in advance, and the 
understanding was the same as for the Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform: if 
the Task Force produced a unanimous report, the government would have to run with it 
and enact legislation accordingly. When the legislation was ready to be drafted, Leitman 
was once more brought in to do the drafting according to the Task Force’s instructions.890 
 This legislation could not be passed, however, until the CPA was passed. While 
the original plan was to pass the CPA as quickly as possible, there was a delay of almost 
a year between first reading (on December 17, 1990) and second reading (November 18, 
1991). There is little to explain this delay,891 although the Rae government may well have 
been distracted by the severe difficulties it faced in its first year and thereafter, as well as 
the deepening recession in Ontario. At the end of October 1991, Cochrane grew tired of 
waiting and wrote to the Leader of the House to ask him that the CPA receive second 
reading before the end of the session, highlighting again the unanimous nature of the 
Advisory Committee’s recommendations.892 In doing so, he referred to the Task Force on 
the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights, stating that its terms of reference were formed 
on the assumption that redress for breaches of that Bill would be available through the 
CPA. If the CPA was not passed, the work of the Task Force would be jeopardized.893 
It is unclear why Cochrane was alone in urging swift passage of the CPA. There 
appear to be no follow-up letters from the Advisory Committee, either to Cochrane or to 	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891 This same question was asked when the CPA received its second reading: Ontario, Legislative 
Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl, 1st Sess (November 18, 1991) (Robert 
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any other government representative. It is curious that a group that was so keen on having 
the legislation passed just one year before subsequently lost interest. Given the reaction 
of business groups to the Rae government, the Gang of Four may have been happy to let 
the possibility of class action reform lie dormant. As Cochrane recalls, “[t]he business 
community was horrified that there was an NDP government. The Gang of Four was on 
high alert for all policy development.”894 
 Nevertheless, Cochrane’s letter appears to have worked. Just a few weeks later, 
the CPA received second reading in the legislature. MPPs noted the consensus that the 
Advisory Committee had reached,895 as well as the unusual nature of the consultation 
process, which they felt should be used more widely: 
 
Of interest about this bill is [that it] was based not just on consultation but 
collaboration, something this government should learn … their definition of 
consulting is to make a decision and tell people about it afterwards but not 
ask for their input or opinion. This bill should teach this government a 
lesson … that if it wants to get a good piece of legislation before this 
Legislature, it should not just consult after the fact but make people the real 
players … part of a collaboration process.896 
 
The CPA received widespread support in the House, with the only criticisms being that 
the government took almost a year to get the legislation to second reading,897 and that 
some of its provisions were not more widely available (for example, intervener 
funding).898 It passed second reading and went to the Standing Committee stage.899 
It was at this point that the fears of the Gang of Four were almost realized. The 
submissions of two groups to the Standing Committee threatened to upset the consensus 
that had been reached. The Advisory Committee members had made it clear that if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
894 Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7.	  
895 Hansard November 18, supra note 891 (David Winninger on behalf of Howard Hampton). 
896 Ibid (Charles Harnick). 
897 Ibid (Robert Chiarelli). 
898 Ibid (Robert Chiarelli and Charles Harnick).	  
899 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl, 1st Sess (December 2, 
1991), Standing Committee on Administration of Justice, Class Proceedings Act, 1990, Law Society 
Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), 1990 [Standing Committee on Administration of Justice], in 
B703283 – Bill 28 and 29, supra note 564. Michael Cochrane was in attendance. 
	   146 
substantive changes were made to the legislation as it passed through the readings, then 
they might no longer be able to support it.900  
Parkdale Community Legal Services was the first to make submissions to the 
Standing Committee.901 Their main request was that the CPA be amended so that tenants 
could bring class actions (the CPA did not apply to them pursuant to section 37, because 
they could bring representative actions under the Landlord and Tenant Act). The Tenant 
Advocacy Group (TAG) had made similar submissions to the MAG earlier that year and 
had even met with the Attorney General to discuss their concerns.902 Cochrane had 
drafted a briefing note for the Attorney General regarding possible responses.903 He 
recommended that Hampton tell the groups that a delicate consensus existed on class 
proceedings that the Ministry was reluctant to jeopardize. To allow the “traditional power 
struggle between landlords and tenants to spill over into class actions” would be to 
endanger access to justice for all other litigants in the province.904 Hampton’s responses 
to the tenants’ rights groups had clearly not been as effective as had been hoped, as 
demonstrated by the opposition that the legislation faced at Standing Committee.  
Another group that voiced its opposition consisted of labour lawyers who 
represented trade unions. Speaking on their behalf to the Standing Committee was 
Toronto lawyer Mark Zigler.905 Their main concern was that the CPA should be amended 
to allow for injunctions, and also to allow unions and other unincorporated associations to 
sue.906 This terrified the Gang of Four and triggered their “high alert”. Cochrane had told 
the Advisory Committee that he would take responsibility for making sure the CPA was 
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passed without any substantive changes,907 and now it looked like the fragile consensus 
was in jeopardy. He recalls that precarious time: 
 
[A] rumour went around that the government was going to move for an 
amendment to allow the CPA to be used by unions. That was a pretty tough 
moment – I told the Attorney General at the time that, “you’re going to lose 
the whole thing.” He said, “okay, I’ll get back to you.” Next thing we knew 
they didn’t propose the amendment and the CPA was passed intact.908 
 
Presumably the Attorney General took the same action with regard to the tenants’ rights 
groups, because their requested amendments were not made either. The Standing 
Committee reported the CPA and the LSAA (now known as Bills 28 and 29, 
respectively) without amendment, and they were ordered for third reading.909 
 Another five months passed before the Bills received third reading in the 
legislature, despite the request of the opposition that third reading and royal assent take 
place in December 1991.910 During that time, the legal profession was busy preparing for 
the CPA911 and further objections to the Bills rolled in. These objections were dealt with 
fairly summarily: with the Bills based on unanimous recommendations from the major 
stakeholders, and having passed the Standing Committee stage without amendment, there 
was very little stopping them now. The first objection was from Courts Administration, 
stating that little thought or discussion had been directed towards the Bills’ impact on the 
court system.912 That objection appears to have been dealt with by a simple phone call.913 
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The second was directed to the Premier himself. Bernard Wilson, a chartered accountant 
at Price Waterhouse, told Bob Rae that class actions legislation would have an adverse 
impact on Ontario’s economic competitiveness and would open the Pandora’s Box of 
frivolous litigation.914 Given that the Gang of Four had signed off on the legislation long 
ago, however, this was too little, too late. It is also strange that Wilson objected on behalf 
of an OCC committee, given the fact that the OCC was part of the Gang of Four. Rae did 
not even respond to Wilson’s letter until after the Bills had received Royal Assent, and 
even then he got his Attorney General to write back.915 
 The Bills received third reading on April 27, 1992.916 Again, they received 
widespread support and there was very little debate about the substantive details of the 
Bills or the concept of reform. The major controversy regarded the significant delay in 
the passage of the Bills, with Hampton announcing for the first time that his government 
needed six months from Royal Assent to take the several steps necessary for the Bills to 
come into force. Several MPPs asked, justifiably, why none of these steps had been taken 
when the government was fairly confident that the legislation would be passed.917 In the 
end result, the Bills passed third reading and received Royal Assent on June 25, 1992.918 
 As Hampton had noted, numerous tasks needed to be completed before the CPA 
and the LSAA were proclaimed into force.919 First, the Class Proceedings Fund had to be 
designed and funds put in place so the CPF would be ready to receive applications. 	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competitiveness had to be balanced with the government’s commitment to access to justice (at 5).	  
916 Hansard April 27, supra note 910 (Howard Hampton). The debate was adjourned until May 4, 1992 
(David Winninger, on behalf of Howard Hampton), online: 
<http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/35-2/l016.htm> [Hansard May 4].  
917 Hansard April 27, ibid (Robert Chiarelli; Steven Offer; Chris Stockwell; Charles Harnick); Hansard 
May 4, ibid (Robert Chiarelli; Elinor Caplan). 
918 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl, 2nd Sess (June 25, 
1992) (Deborah Deller), online: <http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/35-2/l043b.htm>.	  
919 Hansard April 27, supra note 910 (Howard Hampton); Larry Fox, PDD Counsel, Briefing Note Re: 
Implementation of Bills 28 and 29 (April 9, 1992), in Policy Development Division Counsel 
Correspondence Files, Class Proceedings – Briefing Notes, 1992, CR, RG 4-40, Box No B703283, 
Archives of Ontario [B703283 – Briefing Notes]. 
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Second, the rules of civil procedure needed to be adapted to accommodate class actions. 
Third, the Law Society of Upper Canada needed to be consulted on whether changes to 
the Rules of Professional Conduct were necessary to take into account various ethical 
concerns. Fourth, the judiciary, lawyers and the public needed to be educated on the 
impact of the new legislation. In addition, Courts Administration had to be prepared for 
the tracking and registry of class proceedings.920 
All these tasks had to be completed following considerable turnover at the Policy 
Development Division. Michael Cochrane left the MAG in mid-March 1992. With his 
work on class action reform (and other projects such as the Environmental Bill of Rights) 
largely completed, Cochrane decided to leave government for private practice.921 Carmen 
Rogers and Larry Fox would continue his work in the Policy Development Division. Fox 
had been a Legal Research Officer at the Ontario Law Reform Commission and had done 
considerable work on its Report on Class Actions, particularly with regard to costs. 
Another former OLRC Legal Research Officer, Ann Merritt, became Deputy Director of 
the PDD. While there was a changing of the guard at the PDD, therefore, the new faces 
were in fact very experienced in class actions policy and reform. 
 The major task facing the MAG was the issue of funding. A deal had been struck 
whereby the Law Foundation of Ontario would contribute $500,000 as seed money for 
the Class Proceedings Fund and would also administer it.922 However, an advisory 
committee still had to be set up to develop the structure, administration and procedures 
for the Fund; regulations had to be written and enacted; and a Class Proceedings 
Committee had to be established that would process applications for funding.923  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
920 This was taken care of fairly easily, with the preparation of a supplement to the Court Procedures 
Manual which was finalized in December 1992. The manual also addressed the collection of statistical data 
on class proceedings: Briefing Note prepared by Carmen Rogers and Larry Fox, November 17, 1992, at 1, 
in B703283 – Briefing Notes, ibid. 
921 Bell Letter, supra note 912. Although he went to Scott & Aylen, Ian Scott’s family firm, Cochrane’s 
decision to do so was nothing to do with Scott (the firm was at that time run by David Scott, Ian’s brother): 
email correspondence with Michael Cochrane, July 6, 2016. Ian Scott returned to his previous firm of 
Gowling, Strathy & Henderson upon his retirement from the legislature, and also began teaching at 
Osgoode Hall Law School: Scott, supra note 56 at 207.  
922 Hansard June 12, supra note 855 (Ian Scott). 
923 Hansard April 27, supra note 910 (Howard Hampton). 
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This process was complex and extensive. 924  What is particularly notable, 
however, is that the advisory committee process was deliberately different from that used 
with the CPA. The Policy Development Division acknowledged that it would be useful to 
have some of the representatives of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on the 
Fund Advisory Committee;925 however, they did not want to simply “use the old 
group,”926 because that would increase the risk that the AGAC would expect the same 
consultation process to be used for the Fund.927 This time, there would be no promise of a 
public report; the Fund Advisory Committee “was structured as an advisory committee 
only”,928 simply providing advice to the Attorney General.929 Members were not asked to 
reach consensus on issues, and no “sign off” was requested.930  
As the PDD explicitly stated in its final report to the Attorney General on the 
Class Proceedings Fund, the report was not a “Committee” report as the AGAC Report 
had been, but was prepared by the PDD and simply drew on the advice of the committee 
members.931 In this second process, the PDD therefore gave much less power to the 
parties with whom it consulted. The CPA had by this time received its third reading,932 
and the PDD was only too familiar with the control that had been exerted over that 
legislation, particularly by the business interests. Consultations on the Fund – a 
mechanism constructed specifically for plaintiffs – were different.  
In addition to the Fund, changes also had to be made to the rules of civil 
procedure in order to reflect the new legislation. Fortunately, relatively little work was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924 Full details on the administration of the Fund and applications for financial assistance are provided in 
the Report to the Attorney General re: Implementation of Bill 29 (the LSAA), November 29, 1992 [Fund 
Report], in B703283 – CPA Regulations, supra note 819. The Fund covered plaintiffs’ disbursements and 
indemnified them against an adverse costs award, but did not cover the fees of plaintiffs’ counsel. 
925 Larry Fox, Briefing Note on Class Proceedings Fund, April 27, 1992 [Fund Briefing Note], in B703283 
– Briefing Notes, supra note 919. Two of the AGAC members (Terry O’Sullivan for the Advocates’ 
Society and Edward Belobaba for the Consumers’ Association of Canada) sat on the Fund Advisory 
Committee: Fund Report, ibid. 
926 Annotation by Doug Ewart on letter to him from Chris Happel, Legislative Assistant to the Attorney 
General, re: Advisory Committee for Fund, March 31, 1992, in Policy Development Division Counsel 
Correspondence Files, Class Proceedings Committee, 1992-1993, CR, RG 4-40, Box No B703283, 
Archives of Ontario. 
927 Fund Briefing Note, supra note 925. 
928 Fund Report, supra note 924. 
929 Fund Briefing Note, supra note 925. 
930 Fund Report, supra note 924; Fund Briefing Note, ibid. 
931 Fund Report, ibid; Fund Briefing Note, ibid. 
932 Hansard April 27, supra note 910.	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needed on this front.933 Rule 12 needed to be revoked, and replaced with a rule that took 
into account class proceedings: to allow for court staff to identify and register class 
proceedings; with regard to discovery of class members other than the representative 
plaintiffs; to allow the Law Foundation to make submissions to the court on the issue of 
costs in funded cases; to remove the costs consequences of offers to settle where the case 
was funded; and to require that any judgment or settlement approval order of a funded 
case deal with how the Law Foundation’s levy would be paid.934 The Rules Committee 
reviewed these recommended changes on November 24, 1992,935 and six weeks later the 
new Rule 12 came into force.936 
 The ethical issues arising from class actions also had to be considered. On August 
18, 1992, Larry Fox wrote to the Senior Counsel for Professional Conduct at the Law 
Society of Upper Canada, on the subject of whether the Professional Conduct Handbook 
should be amended to accommodate the ethical issues arising from class proceedings.937 
These included the duty of class counsel to represent the interests of both the 
representative plaintiff and class members, and where conflicts of interests could arise; 
sharing information among class members and whether that would breach the duty of 
confidentiality; whether special written retainers were required in order to clarify the 
duties of class counsel; the use of contingency fees; advertising to class members and 
making public statements. The LSUC decided not to amend the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, but instead issued a set of guidelines entitled, “The Challenges of Class 
Proceedings for Civil Litigators”.938 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
933 Letter from Larry Fox to the Honourable Mr. Justice RS Montgomery, Ontario Court (General 
Division), Civil Rules Committee, October 22, 1992, in Policy Development Division Counsel 
Correspondence Files, Class Proceedings – Rules of Court, 1992-1993, CA226, RG 4-40, Box No 
B703283, Archives of Ontario [B703283 – Rules]. 
934 Memorandum of the Civil Rules Secretariat, re: Rules to fit with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, 
October 22, 1992 (enclosure to letter from Fox to Montgomery, ibid), in B703283 – Rules, ibid. 
935 Letter from Fox to Montgomery, ibid. 
936 Ontario Gazette, Vol 126-1, Reg 770/92, January 2, 1993 at 20-21 [CPA into force], in B703283 – 
Rules, supra note 933. 
937 Fox to Stephen Traviss, Senior Counsel, Professional Conduct, LSUC, August 18, 1992, in Policy 
Development Division Counsel Correspondence Files, Class Proceedings – Ethics, 1992, CA226, RG 4-40, 
Box No B703283, Archives of Ontario [B703283 – Ethics]. 
938 Law Society of Upper Canada, The Challenges of Class Proceedings for Civil Litigators (Toronto: 
LSUC, 1992). These guidelines were mentioned in an LSUC circular (Vol 2, No 2; November 1992), 
which in turn were attached to a letter from Traviss to Rogers, November 18, 1992, in B703283 – Ethics, 
ibid. Traviss stated in this letter that Michael Cochrane was drafting the guidelines, which indicates that 
Cochrane continued to be involved in the work of finalizing the CPA even after leaving government. A 
	   152 
 That left the issue of education. Numerous conferences had been held in order to 
educate lawyers and the judiciary,939 and the MAG had also corresponded with other 
Ministries and provinces on the subject.940 However, the public also needed to be 
informed about the effects of the new legislation. The MAG had already released a 
backgrounder with the details of the CPA and the LSAA,941 and in November 1992 it also 
developed a communications plan.942 This plan noted that, despite the unanimous nature 
of the Advisory Committee’s recommendations, the CPA was still controversial amongst 
some groups (particularly business interests). 943  However, other sections of the 
population, particularly consumer groups, had greeted the legislation with enthusiasm,944 
and some even praised the collaborative nature of the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee and its unanimous consensus.945 The MAG through its communications plan 
also took pains to emphasize this consensus, as well as the access to justice dimensions of 
the new statutes.946 Overall, the news articles published around the time of third reading 
and proclamation reveal a high level of awareness about the legislation. The release of 
the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee Report, as well as high-profile cases such as 
Naken, appear to have made an impression on the public consciousness.947 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
change to the Rules of Professional Conduct would have been preferable to guidelines, given the numerous 
ethical challenges that have since arisen in the context of class actions in Ontario. 
939 B248501 – LSUC and B248501 – CI, supra note 911. 
940 See, for example, memorandum to Larry Fox from Christopher Ferguson, Policy Analyst, Ministry of 
Consumer and Commercial Relations, re: Class Proceedings in Ontario, October 26, 1992, in Policy 
Development Division Counsel correspondence files, Class Proceedings – Miscellaneous, 1989-1992, CR, 
RG 4-40, Box No B703283, Archives of Ontario. Ferguson wanted information for use by his Deputy 
Minister at a federal-provincial Deputy Ministers’ conference on class actions, which took place in 
Victoria, BC, on November 12-13, 1992. Ferguson particularly wanted to know why the legislation had not 
yet been proclaimed into force. 
941 MG Cochrane, Class Proceedings in Ontario: Backgrounder (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 1990), in B248633 – Miscellaneous Material, supra note 305. 
942 Class Proceedings Communication Plan, MAG Communications Division [MAG Communications 
Plan], in B248633 – Miscellaneous Material, ibid. This document is undated but appears to have been 
prepared in November 1992. 
943 MAG Communications Plan, ibid, at 3. See also D Best, “Coming soon: legal excess, US-style”, 
Financial Times of Canada (March 9, 1992) [Best], referred to in MAG Communications Plan, ibid, at 3. 
Best’s article states that class actions and contingency fees will lead to a major change in the way Canadian 
courts do business, towards the more litigious US model. 
944 Ibid at 2-3. See also T Williams, “Class action suits: laws are welcome news for consumers”, Toronto 
Sun (November 7, 1992), p 77, in PDD Media, supra note 154. 
945 C Bernstein, “Proposed new class action law shows how rules should be made”, Toronto Star (May 5, 
1991), F6, in PDD Media, ibid. 
946 MAG Communications Plan, supra note 942 at 4. 
947 See, for example, Lemon Car Legacy, supra note 154. This article outlines the events leading up to the 
Naken decision, and the effect that decision had on the movement for class action reform. 
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 On January 1, 1993, the CPA and LSAA came into force.948 A MAG news release 
put out shortly thereafter explained the basics of the CPA and the Fund, and provided 
information to the public on how to start a class action lawsuit.949 It did not take long for 
the public to do so, with the first lawsuit under the CPA being issued less than two weeks 
later.950 Canadian Tire credit card holders alleged that their agreements with Canadian 
Tire were in violation of section 4 of the federal Interest Act, and sought $800 million in 
interest plus damages.951 The lawsuit garnered fairly extensive news coverage,952 which 
provided further awareness of the new legislation and the manner in which it could be 
used by consumers and others. 
However, the first class action under the CPA also served as a warning to the 
others that would follow. It was dismissed on a Rule 20 motion, with Justice Winkler for 
the Ontario Divisional Court finding that the credit card agreements were not in violation 
of the Interest Act on a plain reading of that statute.953 A subsequent judgment on the 
issue of costs found that there had been serious improprieties akin to champerty or 
maintenance, with a non-party conducting and basically profiting from the proceedings, 
and promising a reward that was not available under the CPA.954 The non-party, Larry 
Whaley, had set up a corporation called the Borrowers Action Society to solicit 
contributions from credit card holders towards the costs of this and other class 
proceedings against credit card companies.955 The “investors” were promised between 10 
and 30 per cent of any settlement or judgment in favour of the Society. While a different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
948 CPA into force, supra note 936.	  
949 MAG News Release, “Class Proceedings Legislation Expands Access to Justice”, January 7, 1993, with 
backgrounder, in Policy Development Division Counsel Correspondence Files, Legislation 1992-1993, 
CA226, RG 4-40, Box No B807794, Archives of Ontario. 
950 Press Release, “Credit Card Class Action Seeks $800 Million Plus Interest”, January 18, 1993 (Toronto, 
ON) [Canadian Tire Class Action], PDD Media, supra note 154. 
951 Canadian Tire Class Action, ibid.	  
952 See, for example, J Heinzl, “Canadian Tire faces lawsuit: borrowers dispute interest charges”, Globe & 
Mail (January 9, 1993), B3; and L Ainsworth, “Ontario’s class action laws face first test”, Toronto Star 
(January 16, 1993), PA14. Both articles can be found in PDD Media, supra note 154. 
953 Smith v Canadian Tire Acceptance Ltd, 1994 CanLII 7298 (ON SC), dismissed on appeal: 1995 CanLII 
3152 (ON CA). 
954 Smith v Canadian Tire Acceptance Ltd, 1995 CanLII 7163 (ON SC) [Smith 1995].	  
955 D Carlson, “Ontario’s Class-Action Law to Get its First Test”, Law Times (January-February 1993); L 
Ainsworth, “Class action suit filed against Canadian Tire”, Toronto Star (March 16, 1993), PC1. Both of 
these articles can be found in PDD Media, supra note 154. Both reported that Whaley was soliciting 
contributions from class members, and the Star article reports that class members had to pay a fee to 
register their credit cards with the Borrowers Action Society. 
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representative plaintiff was put forward in order to shield Whaley from an adverse costs 
award, he personally gained from the lawsuit by paying himself a salary from the 
Society. 956  Justice Winkler awarded costs on a solicitor-client basis 957  against Mr. 
Whaley and the Society, holding that they were the “real” plaintiffs who had instigated 
the action. The financial consequences would have been devastating, given that the 
plaintiffs subsequently appealed the costs judgment and sought leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada (which was denied with costs).958 
This case had a chilling effect on entrepreneurial lawyers who might have been 
tempted to use the costs provisions of the CPA to generate a profit.959 Class actions were 
not as easy to bring as many in the business community had previously thought, and, 
while the CPA aimed to level the playing field for plaintiffs in terms of costs, it was not a 
boon to avaricious lawyers nor a tool for promoting litigation.960 It was to be many years, 
and indeed the turn of the millennium, before the CPA began to be used on anything like 
a widespread basis. The fears that it would open the floodgates of litigation have never 
been realized, and in fact the certification requirement has become burdensome for 
plaintiffs far beyond that envisaged by the members of the Attorney General’s Advisory 
Committee. 961  Nearly 25 years later, the CPA is now under review by the Law 
Commission of Ontario due to various issues that have arisen – including those related to 
costs – that were never foreseen by its authors.  
 
H. Conclusion 
 
Many of the issues that have arisen since the inception of the CPA are a result of the 
influence of various private interest groups that held sway over the debate and passage of 
the legislation. The public interest theory of regulation has been the dominant paradigm 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
956 Smith 1995, supra note 954. See also “Caught In a Trap - Ethical Considerations for the Plaintiff’s 
Lawyer in Class Proceedings”, speech by The Honourable Chief Justice Warren K Winkler, online: 
<http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/caught.htm> [Winkler Speech].  
957 Known today as substantial indemnity costs. 
958 Smith v Canadian Tire Acceptance Ltd, 1995 CanLII 2281 (ON CA); application for leave to appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed with costs October 3, 1996 (La Forest, Cory and Major JJ), SCC 
File no 25080, SCC Bulletin, 1996, p 1559. It is unlikely that the Fund would have paid these costs, given 
that its role was to indemnify plaintiffs for adverse cost awards, not lawyers personally. 
959 Winkler Speech, supra note 956. 
960 Smith 1995, supra note 954. 
961 AC Member Interview, supra note 12. 
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in the literature on the history of class proceedings. As stated in Chapter 1, scholars such 
as Bill Bogart and Shaun Finn have focused on consumers and the environment, seeing 
class actions legislation as a counterbalance to the exploitation of both.962 
Public interest theory posits that legislation is enacted to correct market 
failures.963 These market failures arise in a number of circumstances. For example, 
natural monopolies arise due to the infrastructure cost of providing a service, such as 
electricity, thereby driving up the price for consumers. Externalities such as air pollution 
affect consumers, but because those externalities are not fully incorporated into the price 
of a product, there is little incentive for manufacturers to change their behaviour.964  
The non-economic perspective on public interest theory sees the issue in terms of 
the protection of vulnerable groups or the fair distribution of resources.965 In the context 
of class actions, for example, regulation seeks to protect the interests of consumers. If 
such consumers were overcharged $10 for a product, for example, they would not sue the 
corporation individually as it would not be economically worthwhile. A class action 
would aggregate the individual claims, preventing the unjust enrichment of the 
corporation at the cost of the consumer, ensuring the fair distribution of resources and 
protecting the vulnerable consumer’s interests. 
However, the genesis of class actions in Ontario reveals that private interests were 
just as important, if not more, in the creation of the legislation.966 The historical record 
demonstrates that, while Scott and Cochrane intended class actions legislation to serve a 
public interest purpose, in fact the legislative process was co-opted or “captured” by 
private interests, notably the Gang of Four and other business groups.967 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
962 Finn 2005, supra note 20; Finn 2011, supra note 20; Bogart 2007, supra note 20. 
963 Ogus, supra note 19 at 55. 
964 Ibid at 29-46. Backhaus, supra note 21 at 71-72. 
965 Ogus, ibid, at 46-54. 
966 This reflects a general trend whereby neoliberalism erodes the regulatory capacity and public 
accountability of states (which empower citizen stakeholders) in favour of unaccountable private interest 
networks (which empower entrenched corporate interests): A Sisson Runyan and V Spike Peterson, Global 
Gender Issues in the New Millennium, 4th ed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014) at 199. 
967 Interestingly, this “capture” theory also includes legislators’ private interests, which can include a desire 
to make an imprint on history (Ogus, supra note 19 at 67). This could well have been one of Scott’s 
primary motives. Scott stated in his memoirs that, “the legislation allowing class actions may be the most 
important legacy of my time as attorney general” (Scott, supra note 56 at 182). Ogus also applies this 
analysis to bureaucrats (Ogus, supra note 19 at 68), and Cochrane very likely had similar motives. As Peter 
Woolford of the Retail Council of Canada put it, “[t]hey were trying to get legislation for the ages” 
(Woolford Interview, supra note 514). 
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Anthony Ogus and other scholars of law and economics968 have articulated this 
“capture” theory. Essentially, regulatory agencies are stymied in meeting their public 
interest goals because they have been subverted by pressure and influence to protect the 
interests of those who were the subjects of the regulation.969 This is particularly so in 
circumstances when such agencies conduct their work away from the public gaze; when 
certain information required by the agency is only obtainable from the regulated 
industries; when the agency must rely on the expertise of officials from those industries; 
and when those industries have the power to exercise some kind of veto or ability to 
obstruct the agency’s work.970 The historical record shows that these circumstances were 
in play when class proceedings legislation was being considered in Ontario: 
 
i) The Attorney General’s Advisory Committee conducted its work away from 
the public gaze. Its terms of reference and its Report were public, but the 
deliberations of its members were confidential, leaving room for influence by 
corporate representatives such as Norm Stewart;  
ii) Scott and Cochrane needed the Gang of Four, not only for the information 
they could provide as to how class actions would affect corporate interests (a 
perspective that had been sorely lacking from the OLRC Report), but also for 
their ability to represent the views of their constituents. The membership 
network of the CMA alone, for example, accounted for approximately 75 per 
cent of all Canadian manufacturing production;971 and 
iii) The Gang of Four had the power to stop the work of the Attorney General’s 
Advisory Committee. Without their sign-off, there would have been no 
consensus and therefore no CPA. Cochrane explicitly stated that the business 
groups had a veto over class action reform,972 and this enabled them to 
disproportionately influence the work of the Advisory Committee.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
968 See, for example, G Stigler, “Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971) 2:1 Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science 3 [Stigler]. 
969 Ogus, supra note 19 at 57. 
970 Ibid at 57-58. 
971 CMA Letter 1983, supra note 401. 
972 Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7. 
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The circumstances articulated above, however, applied equally to both the corporate and 
the consumer/environmental groups. What would enable the former to exercise more 
sway than the latter? And why did the latter not advance their position on class actions in 
Ontario as forcefully as they might have done? According to public choice theory that has 
expanded on the above analysis, there are two types of interest groups: those representing 
particular sectional interests (such as manufacturers or retailers), and those representing 
causes or ideologies (such as environmentalists or consumers).973  
Each group is subject to the “free rider” problem, in that their members will 
benefit from the activities of the group even if they have not participated in those 
activities. The group will be less subject to this problem, however, if it is well-organized 
and able to exercise control over its members, which in turn will be made easier if the 
members’ interests are homogenous. Effectiveness will be maximized where the group 
has a strong leadership that can require financial contributions and has the power to speak 
for the members. Sectional interests (such as the CMA and the Retail Council of Canada) 
fit this description; consumer and environmental groups (such as the Consumers’ 
Association of Canada and Energy Probe), whose memberships tend to be much more 
diffuse, numerous and disparate in interest, and who rarely require financial 
contributions, do not. The pressure for a particular measure will be greater from a 
homogenous group whose members are heavily invested in and will derive direct benefits 
from the measure, than from a diffuse group whose members may or may not experience 
benefits and have little invested in the result. 
As Ogus points out, therefore, this theory predicts that groups representing 
producers are likely to exert a greater influence on legislation than those representing 
consumers and other ‘public’ interests, such as the environment.974 This also explains the 
central thesis of the work of Richard Posner and George Stigler, that “as a rule, regulation 
is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”975 
The irony of this scenario will not be lost on anyone familiar with the economics 
of class actions. Class actions are needed, ostensibly, because the interests of consumers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
973 Ogus, supra note 19 at 70. 
974 Ibid at 71; S Harnay and A Marciano, “Collective litigation versus legislation: a rent-seeking approach 
to class actions”, in Backhaus, supra note 21 at 221.	  
975 Stigler, supra, note 968 at 3; Posner, supra note 19. 
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and other citizens are diffuse, and the impact of corporate misbehaviour on each 
individual is relatively light. As a result, it is not financially viable to bring an individual 
action, and neither is it possible to join together those diffuse interests in one lawsuit 
without incurring huge transaction costs.976 The same factors that necessitate class actions 
legislation, however, also ensure that consumers and other citizens have less influence on 
the shape of that legislation.  
Ontario was no exception to this theory. Business interests with well-organized 
and well-resourced constituencies were successful, first in delaying class action reform 
and, when reform appeared inevitable, shaping that reform to be as conservative as 
possible, particularly with regard to costs. The disproportionate nature of this influence 
was made possible by the informal and non-public nature of the Advisory Committee’s 
deliberations. The results changed the shape of the CPA and continue to be felt by class 
actions lawyers to this day. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
976 TS Ulen, “The economics of class action litigation”, in Backhaus, supra note 21 at 79-81. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
 
The history of the Class Proceedings Act provides significant insights into the ways in 
which law reform can be brought about effectively. In this regard, the contrast between 
the OLRC Report and the AGAC Report are striking. A number of factors, both internal 
to the legislative process and external as part of the wider culture, ensured that the AGAC 
Report was successful in bringing about reform where its predecessor failed. 
 
A. Wider Social and Cultural Context 
 
A number of changes had taken place in the wider culture by the time the OLRC Report 
was tabled in the legislature in June 1982. For example, consumer and environmental 
rights had come to the forefront of the public consciousness, with reports being released 
throughout the 1970s promoting consumer rights in general and class actions in 
particular, as well as a number of environmental disasters raising awareness of the fragile 
state of the planet. The closely-related issue of standing was the subject of several court 
decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, which gave public interest litigants standing in certain 
circumstances. In the same vein, the Charter became part of Canadian law in 1982, 
giving citizens certain rights against the power of the State. The Charter would also see 
an increasing amount of power taken out of the hands of the legislature and given to 
judges, who would play more of an activist role in public interest litigation. These 
developments, which challenged the traditional two-party model of litigation and allowed 
judges a more active role in the cases before them, were to prove positive for the advent 
of class actions.977 
 In addition, by the time the OLRC Report was released, Ontario had the examples 
of the US and Québec on which to rely. The two jurisdictions were referred to 
extensively in both the OLRC and the AGAC Reports,978 with reformers using various 
statistics to combat the argument that class actions would open the floodgates of litigation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
977 Interview with WA Bogart, April 1, 2016 [Bogart Interview]. 
978 OLRC Report, supra note 2 at 50-69, 70-75, 214-278; AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 56-73 and Part II. 
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in the province. The findings of the Williston Report, which concluded that, “the present 
procedure concerning class actions is in a very serious state of disarray”, were also a 
boost to proponents of class actions. The Supreme Court’s judgment in Naken, that 
legislation was needed in order to enable class actions in Ontario, also seemed to be a 
victory for those pushing for reform. 
 However, the opponents of class actions remained intransigent in the face of the 
Naken decision, as evidenced by the submissions of business groups and the bar to the 
Ministry of the Attorney General. The OLRC Report and Naken brought the divisions on 
the subject of class action reform to the fore, but did nothing to heal them. This was 
likely the primary reason why McMurtry did not subsequently introduce class actions 
legislation, because the issue was simply too contentious – it is not surprising that a 
government on the eve of an election would not want to touch it.  
 By contrast, by the time Ian Scott was setting up consultations on class action 
reform in the late 1980s, the Liberal government was in a very strong position. It had 
been in power for two years with the help of the NDP (a party that was also sympathetic 
to the case for reform), and ostensibly had years ahead of it. In addition, the factors that 
had been favourable to the movement for reform in the early 1980s were now more 
mature and arguably more favourable: the example of Québec (and, to a lesser extent, of 
the US), and the influence of the Charter, which had undergone several years of litigation 
and which had made lawyers and the public more comfortable with the concept of 
judicial activism, collective rights and public interest standing. The absence of 
contingency fees was another major obstacle in the way of class actions (because few 
representative plaintiffs would choose to bear the financial burden of the class while 
having no greater an entitlement to any eventual damage award), and these were a 
particularly contentious part of the OLRC Report. By the time the Attorney General’s 
Advisory Committee was discussing reform, however, contingency fees had been 
approved by the Law Society of Upper Canada and were receiving cautious acceptance 
amongst members of the bar. It was therefore easier for the Committee to recommend a 
court-supervised contingency fee. 
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 Nevertheless, conditions were not entirely favourable for the Advisory 
Committee. There were still fears of US-style excesses,979 and business groups continued 
in their opposition to various aspects of reform, a fact noted by Michael Cochrane.980 
These obstacles were faced by the authors of both the ORLC and the AGAC Reports. 
However, there were other key differences between the Reports that explained the 
success of the latter where the former had failed. Ian Scott and Michael Cochrane ensured 
that interest groups were prepared for the prospect of reform by organizing the Access to 
Justice Conference and attending the ULCC Conference, both in the summer of 1988. 
The OLRC, by contrast, conducted virtually no consultations before releasing its report in 
1982, long after the Attorney General had referred the question of class actions to them. 
Scott and Cochrane, for their part, oversaw a unique consultation process that mediated 
between the various interest groups and drew together their positions, so that compromise 
on the subject of reform was possible. 
 
B. The Consultation Process 
 
More than anything else, it was Scott and Cochrane’s unique consultation process that led 
to class actions reform in Ontario. While the initial consultations in December 1988 and 
the following months may seem cursory, in comparison to the usual lengthy and formal 
consultation processes engaged in by governments, they were still more substantial than 
the OLRC’s almost non-existent process. It was not until after the OLRC Report was 
released, to heavy criticism from many quarters, that the Attorney General formally 
invited submissions from interested groups.   
 By contrast, Scott and Cochrane began their consultation process almost a year 
and a half before the AGAC Report was released. Better yet, the parties with whom the 
government was consulting were also the authors of the Report. Scott was well aware of 
the fate of the OLRC Report and the hackles it had raised in the business community; that 
was why he didn’t simply introduce the OLRC’s draft Act in the legislature upon 
becoming Attorney General. Instead, he was willing to drop the controversial OLRC draft 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
979 MAG Communications Plan, supra note 942; Best, supra note 943. 
980 Cochrane handwritten notes, supra note 525 at 18. 
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Act, start from scratch and have a new Act drafted by the interest groups themselves.981 
In negotiating with these groups, Scott and Cochrane often overreached and concluded 
that consensus had been reached or aspects of reform had been agreed to when in fact 
they hadn’t, and Scott even stepped outside the bounds of his Cabinet mandate. 
Nevertheless, this “pushing” was never quite enough to drive away the interest groups 
(although at times it came fairly close), and it arguably speeded up the consultation 
process and made the groups realize that reform was going to happen, whether they liked 
it or not. 
 The “pushiness” of Scott and Cochrane was combined with a willingness to 
mediate and compromise, in order to reach agreement on the terms of reference of the 
Attorney General’s Advisory Committee. These terms of reference were key to the 
success of the Report.982 The Ministry of the Attorney General’s initial consultations 
were aimed at securing the interest groups’ commitment to reform around the terms of 
reference, so that a public announcement could be made stating that: (a) reform would be 
taking place, (b) certain widely representative groups would be discussing the shape of 
that reform, and (c) the discussions would revolve around fixed terms of reference which 
were not up for negotiation. To a certain extent, the shape of reform had been decided 
even before the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee had its first meeting. The terms 
of reference meant the interest groups were publicly committed to reform983 and could 
not leave the negotiating table without appearing to go back on their word. In exchange 
for agreeing to these terms of reference, Scott promised the members of the Committee 
that he would carry forward their recommendations to Cabinet. This was important to the 
Committee, who knew that their efforts would not be wasted.984  
 The process by which the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee deliberated 
was also unique. It reflected a method that Michael Cochrane has dubbed the “Principled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
981 Michael Cochrane encouraged Environment Minister Ruth Grier to do the same with the Environmental 
Bill of Rights – in other words, to drop the draft Act as detailed in her Private Member’s Bill, and bring the 
various interest groups to the negotiating table with entirely new terms of reference: Cochrane Interview 1, 
supra note 7. 
982 Cochrane Principled Negotiation, supra note 5 at 6. 
983 Ibid. 
984 Ibid, at 2 and 6. 
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Negotiation of Public Policy.”985 The discussions of the Committee were interest-based, 
rather than positional: for example, business groups did not approach the negotiating 
table simply stating that, “class actions are bad for business”, but they instead negotiated 
the various aspects of reform in ways that would benefit business.986 Because consumer 
and environmental groups did the same, the final product was a compromise that would 
benefit all the groups to some degree. In addition, abandoning a positional approach 
meant that each of the groups at the table were more likely to listen to each other on the 
various aspects of reform, so that, for example, consumer groups could see why business 
groups would want to retain the traditional costs rules.987 The unique nature of this 
process was noted, and appreciated, by several members of the Committee. This included 
Norm Stewart who, when making submissions to a Standing Committee nearly a decade 
later with regard to changes to competition legislation, stated that the process was ideal 
for framework legislation such as the CPA: 
 
They also work well when you have a contentious issue, where there is or 
has been some opposing views by various groups in society, and there’s a 
need to legislate. Where you can bring those groups together in a strong 
framework, strong terms of reference, and with a careful chairperson to 
guide the process, you can reach a consensus you wouldn’t ordinarily reach 
… It’s worked well in Ontario with their Class Proceedings Act and their 
Environmental Bill of Rights Act…988 
 
David Poch, for the Canadian Environmental Law Association and Energy Probe, also 
stated that, because of the opportunity to educate and be educated and to share goodwill 
with one’s opponents, the process “was quite different from the usual multi-stakeholder 
consultation in which opposing viewpoints are presented to government with no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
985 Cochrane’s process is unique in that it has rarely been attempted outside of a certain number of contexts: 
namely, the Class Proceedings Act, the Hamilton-Wentworth Mediation Pilot Project (in family law), and 
the Environmental Bill of Rights. Cochrane spoke to Bob Rae about using the process for labour legislation, 
but this never materialized: Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7. There is evidence that a similar process 
was used for amendments to the Competition Act, which came into force in March 1999: Bill C-20, An Act 
to amend the Competition Act and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, May 6, 1998 
(Norman Stewart and Peter Woolford), online: Parliament of Canada 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1038689&Language=E&Mode=1&Par
l=36&Ses=1> [Competition Act Amendment oral hearing]. 
986 Cochrane Principled Negotiation, supra note 5 at 3-4, 6-7. 
987 Ibid, at 6-7; Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7. 
988 Competition Act Amendment oral hearing, supra note 985. 
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resolution to the debate except by fiat.”989 Several other members of the Committee have 
praised the Principled Negotiation concept in similar terms.990 
Through this mediation-style process, the groups were able to reach a consensus 
and come up with unanimous recommendations for reform. According to the Principled 
Negotiation model, such unanimity eliminates the political risk for the Minister 
concerned because it demonstrates a broad base of support. In exchange, the Minister 
agrees to use her authority to promote the recommended reforms.991 This is exactly what 
happened with the Class Proceedings Act: the Advisory Committee reached consensus on 
their recommendations, and Scott and Cochrane ensured they were enacted, unchanged, 
into legislation. 
 The Principled Negotiation approach is a combination of a strong point of 
American politics (the very active involvement of interest groups and stakeholders in 
policy development) and a strength of Canadian politics (powerful Cabinet Ministers who 
can single-handedly make reform happen in certain circumstances).992 In the case of class 
action reform, the members of the Advisory Committee were motivated to reach a 
consensus because they knew that it would result in legislation that would be pushed 
through by Ian Scott. Scott was not just any Cabinet Minister; he had the force of 
personality and the political adroitness to push through class reform, and the unanimity of 
the AGAC Report enabled him to do just that.  
 The consensus of the Advisory Committee stands in stark contrast to the divided 
nature of the OLRC Report. However reasonable it was, the dissent of OLRC Chairman 
Derek Mendes da Costa substantially undermined the strength of the Report. He 
dissented not only on the crucial issue of costs, but also on five other major issues.993 
Even supporters of class action reform observed that, “[t]he proposals appear to be the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
989 Letter from Poch to Cochrane, January 10, 1990, Policy Development Division Counsel correspondence 
files, RG 4-40, Box No B248633, Archives of Ontario, at 1-2 [Poch Jan 10]. Poch added a few cautions, 
noting first that not every constituency was represented at the table, and that less well-financed groups 
would benefit from government funding to remedy this; second, that the government should avoid 
viewpoints that were too polarized, but at the same time should not paper over differences in opinion; and 
finally, that the success of any such consultation depended upon knowledgeable support from within the 
Ministry (as happened here) and the political will to follow through with any recommendations. 
990 Woolford Interview, supra note 514; Woolford Interview 2, supra note 590; AC Member Interview, 
supra note 12. 
991 Cochrane Principled Negotiation, supra note 5 at 5. 
992 Ibid at 4. 
993 Chairman’s Reservations, supra note 438. 
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product of different minds and sets of values.”994 The divisions and philosophical 
inconsistencies apparent in the OLRC Report are undoubtedly one of the reasons why 
McMurtry never introduced the draft Act as legislation. If the OLRC itself could not 
come to agreement, what hope was there for the massively divided stakeholders?  
By contrast, Scott’s insistence that the Advisory Committee reach a consensus 
meant that he was able to present the legislature and any opponents with a united front – 
it would be very difficult to oppose a Report on which most of the key stakeholders had 
signed off.995 In this way, Scott was able to pull together the many divergent interests and 
break the logjam on class action reform. Scott’s strength of personality and his skills as a 
Minister, combined with the Principled Negotiation approach, are the main reasons why 
the AGAC Report succeeded where the OLRC Report did not. 
 
C. The Recommendations 
 
It was not only the unanimous nature of the Advisory Committee’s recommendations that 
made its Report so influential; it was also the nature and timing of its recommendations. 
The AGAC Report departed as little as possible from the established rules of civil 
procedure, because each step away from the established rules would lead to more 
opposition.996 That is one of the reasons why the Report did not depart from the 
traditional costs rules; not only did the business interests strongly oppose such a change, 
but Cochrane as well as the consumer and environmental representatives knew that this 
departure would undermine the unanimity of the draft Act and make it much more 
difficult to “sell”. The AGAC Report had to chart a course between the desire of 
consumer and environmental groups to use class actions to enforce and advance their 
rights, and the desire of the business groups to adhere to the traditional rules of court and 
not change the substantive law.997 
 The OLRC Report, on the other hand, departed quite drastically from the 
established rules. Not only did it recommend that traditional costs rules not apply to class 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
994 Roman article 1988, supra note 406 at 1. 
995 AC Member Interview, supra note 12. 
996 Bogart Interview, supra note 977. 
997 Faced with the same situation in the US, Marcus writes that “decision-makers [have] muddle[d] through 
without picking sides”, enabling the two desires to coexist by maintaining an ambiguity in the 
interpretation of class action doctrine: supra note 44 at 10. 
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actions; it recommended that the Attorney General have a right to intervene in private 
civil litigation; it would allow courts to enquire as to the competence of plaintiffs’ 
counsel; and it would make class members take part in litigation unless the court gave 
them leave to opt out. Such recommendations indeed gave the OLRC Report an 
unrealistic air; a sense that these proposals would put an unacceptable burden on the civil 
litigation system.  
This may have been a product of the authors of the Report, very few of whom 
were actively involved in litigation at the time of writing. The OLRC did have an 
Advisory Committee on which several practicing lawyers sat; however, this Committee 
never met, and it does not appear as if any of its members were ever consulted with 
regards to the OLRC Report.998 This factor left the Report open to accusations of 
“academic perfectionism” and a failure to “correct real world problems”.999 It might also 
explain the length of the Report, which, at nearly 900 pages, was read by very few people 
with more pressing things to do. The OLRC Report was repetitive, meandering, and read 
like a series of largely unedited essays by a number of different people; indeed, that is 
exactly what it was. This, in turn, would explain the length of time the Report took to 
write. The timing of the OLRC Report was very poor. The fact that it took six years to 
write meant that any momentum the movement for reform might have had in 1976, when 
McMurtry wrote his reference, had long since dissipated by 1982. If it had not been for 
the Naken decision and the fact that Scott picked up the cause of class action reform later 
in the decade, the OLRC Report might have disappeared into obscurity entirely. 
The Attorney General’s Advisory Committee was very different in composition to 
the group that authored the OLRC Report. More than half of the Committee were 
practicing lawyers; where they were not lawyers, they were representatives with 
significant experience in their area of industry.1000 They were not only knowledgeable, 
they also represented a fairly wide cross-section of the groups that would be affected by 
the CPA.1001 They knew from everyday experience how class actions would interact with 
the courts, the legal profession and business. Furthermore, their recommendations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
998 Letters from Derek Mendes da Costa to members of the OLRC Advisory Committee on Class Actions, 
March 1982, in B380543, supra note 160. 
999 CMA Submission 1983, supra note 425. 
1000 Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7. 
1001 Cochrane Principled Negotiation, supra note 5 at 6. 
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depended for their strength not on their length (the AGAC Report can be comfortably 
read in an hour), but on their simplicity and their unanimity. As one of the members of 
the Committee has put it, “[t]he unanimity of the product was essential. You don’t even 
have to read the Report. It was unanimous.”1002 
The timing of the AGAC Report was also the result of political mastery. The 
Advisory Committee met over the course of at least six months, which enabled them to 
become educated about the other interests at the table and bring them closer to a 
compromise. It also enabled them to consult with their various constituencies to ensure 
that the consensus that was eventually reached was truly representative of those 
constituencies.1003 However, the process did not last much longer than that. The Attorney 
General made his statement to the legislature regarding the consultation process at the 
end of June 1989, and the CPA received its first reading less than a year later. This meant 
that the Attorney General could capitalize on the momentum that he had successfully 
built up with the various conferences on class actions as well as the consultation 
process.1004 He introduced legislation based on a unanimous report to a house that was 
well-informed and very supportive of reform. In light of this, it is no surprise that the 
only real controversy in the legislature, when the Bill was debated, was why it had taken 
so long to progress through its various readings. 
 
D. Political Will 
 
Another secret to the success of the AGAC Report was the political will behind it. The 
Principled Negotiation method advocated by Michael Cochrane dictates that the 
unanimity of a committee’s recommendations must be matched with the political will to 
implement them.1005 This was certainly true for the AGAC Report, which Ian Scott had 
the will and the ability to carry through into legislation. Both Ian Scott and Michael 
Cochrane made commitments to the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee to get their 
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draft legislation enacted without substantive changes, 1006  and this is indeed what 
happened, despite the submissions of unions and tenants’ groups that the CPA be 
amended to include them. 
 Of course, Scott was part of a reformist government that had been largely 
sympathetic to his other changes, such as court reform and no-fault auto insurance. The 
NDP government that succeeded the Liberals in September 1990 was also sympathetic to 
the cause of class action reform. Politically, therefore, circumstances were in Scott’s 
favour. It was his use of those circumstances, however, that led to the passage of the 
CPA. He knew that he needed to get the right people to the table and get them to agree on 
the shape of reform. Michael Cochrane’s negotiating skills and training as a mediator 
were also crucial in bringing the Advisory Committee to agreement. Once agreement was 
reached, Scott (and Cochrane) also had the determination and the ability to manoeuvre 
the unanimous report through the legislature without substantive change.  
 The members of the Advisory Committee, as well as Cochrane himself and his 
superior, Doug Ewart, agree that Scott’s personality was crucial to the successful 
enactment of class action reform.1007 Peter Woolford, who attended the Committee 
meetings on behalf of the Retail Council of Canada (which was part of the Gang of Four), 
put it this way:1008 
 
I don’t think the CPA would have happened without Mr. Scott. He was the 
driver, he was determined and had a brilliant legal mind. Everyone was 
deeply respectful of him and his skill and knowledge. Another Minister 
would not have had the credibility to get [the CPA] through. He was a very 
powerful Minister who clearly had the confidence of the Premier, and there 
was also the force of his personality. No Ian, no Act. 
 
Members of the Advisory Committee praise Ian Scott as a masterful tactician1009 who 
provided the leadership that class action reform needed, and that few other Attorneys 
General could have provided.1010 He was not an average Attorney General; he not only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1006 Cochrane June 5 1990, supra note 851; Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7; AC Member Interview, 
supra note 12. 
1007 AC Member Interview, supra note 12. 
1008 Woolford Interview, supra note 514; Bogart Interview, supra note 977.   
1009 AC Member Interview, supra note 12. 
1010 Cochrane Interview 1, supra note 7. 
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ran his own Ministry without interference, but was very influential and had a significant 
role in the work of other Ministries.1011 Doug Ewart recalls that Scott was, “rhetorically 
adept. He never really lost that cross-examination style. He had the power of persuasion 
to get things through Cabinet. He was a lovely man but you didn’t want to get into an 
argument with him.” The political determination of Ian Scott, combined with the 
unanimous support of the major stakeholders and the work of Michael Cochrane, meant 
that the CPA saw the light of day after decades of debate on class action reform,1012 
thereby leading the way for class actions legislation throughout the rest of Canada.1013 
The political will behind the OLRC Report, by contrast, was clearly lukewarm at 
best. This was not due to any antipathy on McMurtry’s part towards law reform in 
general: in fact, McMurtry was a very active Attorney General for whom reform was a 
major priority. During his tenure, he introduced 59 statutes that were passed by the 
Ontario Legislature. 1014  However, this enthusiasm did not extend to class actions. 
Following the release of the OLRC Report, the Attorney General did not introduce class 
actions legislation, despite the fact that the Naken court implicitly asked him to do so. It 
is not surprising that a certain amount of “criticism and cynicism set in as government 
used [the consultation process] to delay, rather than develop, reform”,1015 because the 
OLRC had not reported for six years and, even after that, there was no government 
commitment to implement its recommendations.1016 If Ian Scott had not broken the 
logjam,1017 class actions in Ontario could have stagnated for another decade,1018 as 
happened in New Brunswick and British Columbia. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1011 Ewart Interview, supra note 512. 
1012 AC Member Interview, supra note 12. 
1013 The only province that remains without class actions legislation is Prince Edward Island. Even here, a 
class action can be brought pursuant to the common law following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc v Dutton, 2001 SCC 46, which distinguished and effectively 
overturned Naken. 
1014 McMurtry, supra note 56 at 198. 
1015 Cochrane Principled Negotiation, supra note 5 at 1. 
1016 Ibid. 
1017 Bogart 2007, supra note 20 at 3. 
1018 AC Member Interview, supra note 12. 
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E. Flaws in the Advisory Committee process 
 
The Principled Negotiation method by which Scott and Cochrane successfully brought 
about class action reform was well received by almost all who observed it. It was praised 
in the legislature as “a collaboration process [that] make[s] people the real players.”1019 
Members of the Advisory Committee also said that the method “was quite different from 
the usual multi-stakeholder consultation ... Here it seemed possible to obtain a result that 
satisfied everyone. One reason is the opportunity to educate one’s enemy and be educated 
in turn. Another is due to the good will shared by all the participants.”1020 The process 
engendered a great deal of good will and was ultimately successful in bringing about 
class action reform. However, it was not without its flaws. 
 The main charge against the Principled Negotiation process is that it is anti-
democratic. The process worked in the case of the CPA because the members of the 
Advisory Committee reached a consensus, in exchange for Scott’s promise to get the 
legislation through the House unamended. In Cochrane’s words, “[i]t is essentially an 
almost contractual relationship between the political forces in Cabinet and the public as 
represented by these key stakeholders.”1021 But who is party to that contract? This 
question raises two problems from the perspective of democracy.  
The first is that there is no guarantee that the “key stakeholders” are truly 
representative of the public. The Attorney General’s Advisory Committee was selected 
by Ian Scott, based on organizations with whom he had worked on other 
consultations.1022 The assumption was that these organizations had the power to “veto” 
class action reform if they were not consulted.1023 Once the Committee had been selected, 
the powerful business interests ensured that no further groups were invited to the table on 
the basis that the process would otherwise be unworkable.1024 The fact that one man, or a 
small group of men, could decide who would sit at the negotiating table, does not seem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1019 Hansard November 18, supra note 891 (Charles Harnick). 
1020 Poch Jan 10, supra note 989. 
1021 Cochrane Principled Negotiation, supra note 5 at 5. 
1022 Woolford Interview, supra note 514. 
1023 Cochrane Principled Negotiation, supra note 5 at 6. 
1024 Scott May 11 1989, supra note 678 at 9. See also Cochrane Principled Negotiation, ibid, at 6: “[t]he 
negotiating table can only accommodate so many voices.” 
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especially democratic.1025 Women’s groups, especially, felt that they were not sufficiently 
represented in the debate on class actions reform.1026 If the basis of the Principled 
Negotiation process is that the key stakeholders represent the public, the Attorney 
General’s Advisory Committee arguably failed in this respect.1027   
The representative nature of the Committee may also have been compromised by 
the fact that lobbying the government is expensive. Briefs need to be researched and 
written, meetings attended, vast amounts of material read. This all takes time and money. 
Groups with more resources are therefore more likely to lobby the government on certain 
issues and, when it comes to selecting an Advisory Committee, are more likely to be 
chosen because the Minister involved knows who they are. They can also afford to send a 
representative for monthly or weekly meetings. Once on the Committee, groups with 
more resources will have the time and money to be better prepared and better informed. 
As a result, financially less advantaged groups will be drowned out. This was arguably 
the case with the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee. For example, Rollie 
Thompson, representative of the Consumers’ Association of Canada, was unable to sit on 
the Committee due to cuts to CAC funding.1028 The Retail Council of Canada, on the 
other hand, had numerous lawyers and marketing experts at its disposal.1029 As David 
Poch, representative of the Canadian Environmental Law Association, pointed out: 
 
[T]he wealthier interests will always be able to pay for good representation 
in the consultation process. The situation is analogous to that of class 
actions – improved access is only valuable if you can also afford to get 
involved. Environmental groups, minority groups and other special interests 
that do not have a direct pecuniary interest or who are relatively poorer need 
both access and funding.1030 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1025 This is ironic, given Scott’s self-avowed commitment to broad-based consultations on major policy 
decisions: Scott, supra note 56 at 144. 
1026 AGAC Minutes Nov 23 1989, supra note 697 at 16. 
1027 Poch Jan 10, supra note 989: “not every constituency was represented at the table.” Poch did not refer 
to any constituencies specifically. 
1028 Thompson May 1 1989, supra note 684. The CAC was eventually able to retain Edward Belobaba to 
represent it.  
1029 Woolford Interview 2, supra note 590.	  
1030 Poch Jan 10, supra note 989 at 1. See also Cochrane Interview 2, supra note 4. 
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Cochrane also admitted that funding would be required in order to make the Principled 
Negotiation process truly representative.1031 The ability of better-resourced groups to 
make stronger and more frequent submissions was not unique to the Advisory 
Committee; this was also the case with the submissions on the Legislative Review 
Project, the OLRC Report and, before that, the debate on the Competition Act.  
The second problem with the Principled Negotiation process is the implied 
promise by the Ministers involved that they will carry through the draft Act into 
legislation. In the case of class action reform, this effectively meant that the unanimous 
recommendations of the Committee were enacted into legislation without any meaningful 
democratic oversight by the legislature. As noted in Chapter 4, the Committee agreed 
upon a draft Act, and then undertook a clause-by-clause review of the Legislative 
Counsel’s work to ensure that it complied with their draft and their consensus. Once this 
Bill was drafted, Scott and Cochrane ensured that it passed through the legislature 
without substantive amendment, over and above the submissions of unions and tenant 
groups, as well as some expressions of concern by various Ministers. 
The lack of democratic oversight also meant that there was nothing stopping the 
more powerful representatives (ie the business groups) exerting an undue amount of 
influence on the creation of the CPA. These private interests used their influence to make 
the CPA as conservative as possible, especially with regard to costs. This began even 
before the Advisory Committee’s first meeting. Due to the Gang of Four’s influence, Ian 
Scott exceeded the terms of the Cabinet Minute authorizing consultations by dropping the 
no-way costs requirement from the terms of reference.  
This was a politicization of the process that Ian Scott was virtually powerless to 
stop if he wanted a consensus. The Gang of Four held a veto power over class actions 
reform1032 – Scott needed their support in order to obtain his unanimous Report, but if 
they did not support reform, it was very likely that it simply would not happen (which 
would be just fine from the business groups’ standpoint). He had much more to lose from 
a failure to bring about reform (having announced publicly that it would happen) than the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1031 Cochrane Principled Negotiation, supra note 5 at 7. On the funding of public participation in 
consultations, Ian Scott was of the same view: Scott and Anand, supra note 276. 
1032 In fact, both Scott and Premier David Peterson were of the view that the business groups had a veto 
over class actions reform – if they did not agree to it, it simply wouldn’t happen: Cochrane Interview 1, 
supra note 7. 
	   173 
business groups. They were therefore able to blackmail Scott, playing to his desire for 
consensus. The group as a whole also did this with regard to the Fund, telling Scott that if 
he wanted class actions reform, his government would have to pay for it. Scott’s need for 
unanimity meant that he was willing to make compromises, even against the terms of his 
government mandate. 
 
F. Compromises made in the Advisory Committee process 
 
The fact that there was little accountability to the consultation process also meant that 
compromises were made against the wishes of the legislature. As noted in Chapter 4, Ian 
Scott stepped outside the bounds of his Cabinet mandate by agreeing to terms of 
reference that were not reflected in the Cabinet Minute of June 21, 1989. This included 
dropping the term of reference that specifically mandated no-way costs. While the 
Secretary of the Cabinet picked up on the fact that Scott’s public commitment to a new 
statute was beyond the bounds of his mandate, the other transgressions seem to have 
slipped by unnoticed. The government’s public commitment to no-way costs, therefore, 
was simply dropped. Having been dropped as a public commitment, it was much easier to 
drop as part of the discussions of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee. 
The consumer and environmental advocates were willing to back down on no-
way costs in exchange for a no-merits certification test. In addition, plaintiffs would also 
be able to make use of contingency fee agreements, and could also apply to a Fund for 
financial assistance. The intent of the Advisory Committee was that plaintiffs would not 
have to pay up-front fees (their lawyers would assume these under a contingency fee 
agreement), and would be protected from any adverse cost awards by the Fund.1033 In 
certain circumstances (for example, public interest cases), the court could also exercise its 
discretion not to award costs against the plaintiffs. The end result would be essentially the 
same as no-way costs, without departing too far from traditional costs rules.1034 The 
expectation was also that a no-merits certification process would be fairly straightforward 
and consume relatively little time and resources.1035  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1033 AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 49-51, 58-61. 
1034 Ibid, at 56-61. 
1035 AGAC Minutes Nov 23 1989, supra note 697 at 4; AGAC Report, ibid, at 31. 
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Unfortunately, however, the practice of class actions has not reflected the hopes 
of the Advisory Committee. The Class Proceedings Committee (which administers the 
Fund) has proven quite conservative in its willingness to fund cases, and has only 
approved about two-thirds of applications to date.1036 There is a general perception that it 
will only fund cases that are “sure bets”. The application process for funding is quite 
labour intensive, and this, combined with the Committee’s risk-averse approach which 
assesses the merits of the case and its chances of being certified,1037 means that the vast 
majority of plaintiff lawyers simply choose not to apply for funding.1038 Many instead 
have chosen to apply for third party litigation funding, which generally offers a better 
deal than the Fund’s 10 per cent levy on any amount recovered. While the courts have 
held that such funding is not inherently champertous, it can become so in certain 
circumstances,1039 and can certainly lead to self-dealing as the interests of plaintiffs’ 
counsel are more closely aligned with the funder than with the class or even their 
client.1040  
With regard to the courts’ discretion not to award costs against unsuccessful 
plaintiffs, pursuant to section 31 of the CPA, this discretion has been exercised quite 
sparingly. Decisions such as Kerr v Danier Leather Inc1041 have demonstrated that the 
courts interpret this section permissively, and are not necessarily obligated to discount 
costs simply because the litigation involves the public interest.1042 These decisions have 
placed something of a chill on such cases, with a fair amount of unpredictability that 
plaintiffs’ counsel will be absolved from paying costs.1043 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1036 Law Foundation of Ontario, Class Proceedings Fund: 20 Years in Review, online: 
<http://www.lawfoundation.on.ca/wp-­‐‑content/uploads/CPF-­‐‑Brochure-­‐‑2013.pdf> at 7, 14 [CPF Review]. 
1037 Fund Report, supra note 924. 
1038 CPF Review, supra note 1036 at 1 (only 10% of all class actions in Ontario to date have received 
funding). This was predicted by Kent Roach in his review of Michael Cochrane’s book (Cochrane 1993, 
supra note 27), in “Book Reviews” (1994) 23 Canadian Business Law Journal 156 at 159. 
1039 Metzler Investment GMBH v Gildan Activewear Inc (2009), 81 CPC (6th) 384 (ON SC). 
1040 LCO 2013, supra note 9 at 8. 
1041 2007 SCC 44. See also McCracken v Canadian National Railway, 2012 ONSC 6838. 
1042 LCO 2013, supra note 9 at 9. 
1043 Ibid. 
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Certification, too, has proven much more onerous than the Advisory Committee 
anticipated. Motions can easily take more than a year to bring,1044 and both sides file 
voluminous certification motion material, often going to the merits of the case. 
Certification hearings can last several days. The time and resources spent on the 
certification motion means that adverse costs awards against plaintiffs can be in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, especially if appeals are involved. Such awards can 
motivate plaintiffs to abandon any rights of appeal in exchange for a discount on costs, 
thereby compromising the rights of the class for reasons having nothing to do with the 
merits of the case.1045 
The Advisory Committee made it clear that its recommendations on certification 
were closely intertwined with its recommendations on the Fund, contingency fees and 
traditional costs rules. 1046  However, there is serious doubt as to whether those 
recommendations are functioning as intended.1047 Given that other provinces such as 
British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland have the “no-way” costs 
rule,1048 the Law Commission of Ontario has stated that, “[a] comparative analysis of the 
way in which adverse costs alter the landscape of class actions in Canada would assist to 
paint a clearer picture of its impact.”1049 Such a study has not been conducted to date,1050 
and would prove a fruitful avenue for future research. For now, however, it is clear that 
the costs provisions of the CPA are not functioning quite as the Advisory Committee 
intended, and may even be obstructing the goal of access to justice underlying the Act.1051 
 
G. Conclusion 
 
The Attorney General’s Advisory Committee succeeded where the OLRC had failed. The 
Committee’s success owed a great deal to the personality of Ian Scott, and the innovative 
consultation process that he set up with the help of Michael Cochrane. The collaborative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1044 This is despite the requirement of section 2(3) of the CPA that certification motions be brought within 
90 days of the date on which the last statement of defence, notice of intent to defend or notice of 
appearance is or should have been delivered. 
1045 LCO 2013, supra note 9 at 10. 
1046 AGAC Report, supra note 6 at 72; see also Cochrane May 28 1990, supra note 806 at 2. 
1047 LCO 2013, supra note 9 at 9. 
1048 Ibid. 
1049 Ibid at 10. 
1050 Correspondence from the Law Commission of Ontario, July 14, 2016. 
1051 LCO 2013, supra note 9 at 9. 
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nature of the AGAC Report and the political will with which it was carried forward into 
legislation explains its success. However, this success was not entirely democratic. The 
consensus of the Advisory Committee was admirable, but many groups remained shut out 
of this process, and the political “contract” that Ian Scott made with the Committee meant 
that the CPA was not subject to meaningful democratic oversight. In addition, the 
compromises that had to be made in order to reach unanimity were not without cost. 
Class actions came about in Ontario when they did because Ian Scott knew that 
consensus was the key, and that consensus involved negotiation and compromise. The 
compromises made for the sake of reform, however, are still being felt amongst class 
actions lawyers nearly a quarter of a century later. 
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